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Existing arguments and evidence suggests that the 
distribution of occurrence rates of software defects is 
lognormal and that the first occurrence times of defects 
follows the Laplace transform of the lognormal. We extend 
this research to hypothesize and confirm that the distribution 
of occurrence counts of software defects, including security 
related defects, follow the Discrete Lognormal. 
In this paper we summarize previous evidence for the 
lognormal, place the most recent evidence in context, and 
call attention to the unified quantified perspective the 
lognormal affords.  We outline additional applications of the 
lognormal to important problems of software engineering 
and suggest enabling research. 
 
Keywords: Discrete Lognormal, Lognormal, 
Poisson-Lognormal, Software Reliability, 
Software Maintenance. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides context for the slides we presented at 
WOSA, Chicago, 2005.  The slides present a summary of 
research demonstrating the natural and central role of the 
lognormal in software. 
Engineering disciplines are often based on deriving a 
variety of properties of constructed objects from a few 
underlying physical processes.  We suggest several 
observable properties of software systems are in fact related, 
being grounded in the conditional nature of software 
execution.  This leads to the emergence of a lognormal 
distribution of rates of events in software systems --- 
including failure rates of defects.  From the lognormal 
distribution of rates we can derive the distribution of first-
occurrence times and the distribution of occurrence counts of 
defects.  
The derivations and evidence are summarized in the 
slides and references.   In this paper we also propose 
opportunities for further research and wider application of 
the lognormal.  Some provide ways to increase confidence in 
applying the lognormal while others attempt to unlock the 
value of the insights by applying them to pressing software 
engineering problems.  
2. LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
RATES 
Whether one views software from the point of view of 
code execution, state-space, or an operational profile, the 
probability of any given event is determined by a 
multiplicative process.  It is proportional to the product of the 
conditioned probabilities of its preconditions.  [M98b] In 
typical systems there are sufficient factors (or preconditions) 
to bring the multiplicative form of the Central Limit 
Theorem into play. [AB69]  Thus a lognormal distribution of 
event rates emerges in a natural way from all three analytical 
perspectives. 
The proposed lognormal failure rate distribution was 
validated [M98b] by analyzing careful studies of failure rates 
of faults previously published by IBM [A84] and Boeing 
[NS82] [NSS84]. Bishop and Bloomfield [BB03] measured 
both the distribution of execution rates of code blocks and 
the distribution of failure rates of faults in the 10,000 line 
PREPRO application of the European Space Agency.  Both 
were well fit by the lognormal. 
We believe there are several directions in which further 
research may be fruitful.  It would be instructive to examine 
a large, detailed operational profile or a specific state-space 
for additional confirmation by direct rate measurement.   It 
would be especially valuable to understand how the 
parameters of the lognormal, especially sigma, are affected 
by the nature and size of the systems 
3. RELIABILITY GROWTH MODEL 
Many have recognized existing models as being either too 
optimistic or too pessimistic.  The dividing line is related, if 
not identical, to the division between finite and infinite 
failure models. The problem cannot be escaped by 
combining or weighting models to create super models or 
choosing which model to use on the fly.  The accuracy and 
tractability of each model are more apparent than actual, 
because the real uncertainties relating to predicting software 
failure rates have been moved out of the models and into the 
model selection process. 
1
Miller [M85] pointed out the mathematical 
transformation from a rate distribution to a first occurrence 
time (discovery time) distribution is equivalent to the 
Laplace Transform of the rate distribution.  If failure rates are 
lognormal then the distribution of first-failure-times is 
equivalent to the Laplace Transform of the lognormal. 
Mullen [M98a] derived the Lognormal Software 
Reliability Growth Model by approximating the Laplace 
Transform of the lognormal.  This model was validated using 
Stratus Computer data as well as data gathered by Musa.  
Increased testing should increase code coverage according to 
the same function. Gokhale and Mullen [GM04, GM05] 
showed the model fits four types of code coverage growth as 
the number of tests increase.  This was done by repetitive-run 
experiments which Miller proposed as the surest way to 
uncover the form of reliability growth. 
It would be useful to know the extent to which applying 
priors to the lognormal parameters improve prediction in 
real-life situations.   This may be very fruitful approach since 
according to [BB03] sigma seems to change slowly with size 
and complexity, and since there is extensive literature on 
estimating N (the number of defects.  A study of the 
accuracy of predictions, perhaps using prequential likelihood 
methods, would also be valuable. 
4. OCCURRENCE COUNT MODEL 
A second derivation is to compute the distribution of 
occurrence counts of defects.  If failure rates are lognormal 
then the distribution of occurrence counts of defects can be 
derived and shown to follow the Discrete Lognormal defined 
in [JKK93].   
There are several related questions needing further 
research.  Will the result still hold if fix-times are variable?  
What are the uncertainties in the measurements of the LN 
parameters?  How closely do the parameters of the 
lognormal agree when measured by direct rate, via the LTLN 
in SWRGM, or via the D-LN occurrence count data?  The 
sigma values, generally less than 2.0, seem low for the large 
size of these software products [MG05]; is this effect of 
heavy prior testing? Can knowledge of the form of the 
occurrence rate distribution and its parameters be used to 
quantitatively evaluate defect repair/ship strategies or even 
deduce optimal ones? 
5. OTHER OPPORTUNITIES 
The lognormal model has several advantages over earlier 
models.  Its genesis is apparent since the mathematical form 
of the model is directly traceable to the structure of the 
subject of the model. This mathematical link between 
software structures and the lognormal distribution is based 
on the central limit theorem, a profound result of probability 
theory.  The assumptions about software systems on which 
the model is founded are equivalent or similar to those 
successfully used within many sub-disciplines of software 
engineering. The lognormal distribution is one that has been 
applied in reliability modeling as well as a variety of other 
disciplines.  Most importantly, the lognormal is very well 
supported by previous studies of the failure rate distributions 
in both laboratory and commercial environments. 
There are many opportunities for future research.  Several 
were noted above, especially those which re-validate or 
apply either the rate distribution or one of the derived 
distributions.  In this section we take a broader unified view.  
If the lognormal appears to be nearly ubiquitous then the 
challenge is no longer to find it but rather to apply it. 
First, studies similar to those done with other models are 
needed.  These include studies of the ability of the model to 
predict future fault counts, the application of the model to 
determination of the optimal release time, optimum 
maintenance strategies, and the optimization of test 
strategies.   Robust solutions of each of these problems 
depend on knowing the form of the distribution of the failure 
rates of defects.   
Second, there is the opportunity to take advantage of the 
fact that the lognormal has its roots in the complexity of 
software states, program flows, and operational profiles, and 
to try to use such information to estimate the parameters in 
advance of execution.  It would be very useful to have 
methods for estimating the parameters, especially σ, given 
preliminary information about states, flows, or operational 
profiles.  Although the “true” operational profile is usually 
more complex than that of any analyst, the analyst’s 
operational profile may be used to set a lower bound on the 
variance of the log-rates of operations within the actual 
system.  Under what conditions is this bound tight or loose? 
Third, techniques can be exploited to make use of 
information from prior releases or similar products.  It is 
likely that similar systems will have similar parameters, 
allowing real use of prior information.  Additional theory and 
experiment is needed to develop reasonable quantitative 
guidelines and expectations 
The analytical properties of the lognormal and its related 
functions also need study.  What is the effect of prior testing 
or changes in the operational profile? How much data is 
needed in order to ensure predictions of a given level of 
accuracy?  Can the lognormal perspective illuminate the 
reasons certain reliability growth models work in some 
situations and not others?  We have seen the Discrete Pareto 
is close competitor to the Discrete Lognormal in our 
occurrence-count data; it would be useful to know the 
conditions under which that holds.  
What is especially promising is the potential to share 
information from structural knowledge (or size), operational 
profile, reliability growth, occurrence counts, and so on, 
when determining parameters, and then being able to apply 
those parameters with additional confidence 
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Outline
• Introduction and Origins
• Operational Profile, Program Flow, State Space
• Lognormal applications and evidence
• Rates, SRGM, Test Coverage, Occurrence Counts
• Occurrence Counts
• Discrete-LN, Data Collection, Security Defects
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Relationship to Other Disciplines,
Prediction, and Software Structures
Conventional 
reliability theory 
does not apply 
to software.
Dick Hamlet (1992)
Inference and prediction steps will be 
easier if the class of possible models can 
be restricted a priori, i.e. before testing 
or, ideally, before the program is written.
D. R. Miller (1985)
An underlying fault/failure model is central to a better 
understanding of reliability amplification,... the heart of 
the theoretical problem is finding a proper home for the 
failure rate, and we believe that it should be assigned to 
the program computation and its data-state values, 
instead of to points in its input domain.
Dick Hamlet and Jeff Voas (1993)
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Event Taxonomy
Most customer found defects are corner cases --- combinations of two or more 
events from  the rightmost columns. These may be <  .01%
Although they are less common or rare, they are essential to the product.  The 








RARE   <  1%LESS COMMON ~  9%COMMON  ~  90%
Crash/recoveryStart/shutdownNormal running
Process diedProcess slowProcess OK
Resource goneResource waitResource available
Queue overflowQueue longQueue modest
5
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Multiplicative origin of failure rates
• E.N. Adams: (in production code) "the 
typical design error requires very unusual 
circumstances to manifest itself, possibly in 
many cases the coincidence of very unusual 
circumstances."
• This suggests the failure rates of faults (both rare and common) are determined 
by a multiplicative process.
• The more factors needed to cause a failure and the more rare they are, the more 
rare the failure is. 
• As the number of factors increases the logarithm of the product approaches the 
Gaussian or Normal distribution.
• Iyer and Rossetti: "During periods of 
stress or uncommon workload 
patterns, rarely used code can be 
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Background of the lognormal 
• A random variable X is lognormally distributed if log (X) 
is normally distributed. 
• The lognormal is used in many other disciplines 
including hardware reliability engineering.
• Why hasn’t it been used for software before?
• T = 0 is a problem if used for failure times.
• Some attempted use for interfailure times.
• Here we use it for failure rates.
6
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Alternative Conditions for Central Limit 
Theorem
If i.i.d. and Xj has finite second moment.
– Lindeberg-Levy
If factors not identically distributed . . .
– Liapounoff, see also Petrov
If factors not independent . . .
– Loeve
If variable number of factors . . .
– Feller
8Mullen/Gokhale  WOSA 2005
Interpretation of  lognormal parameters
• N is the number of distinct events (code blocks, defects, etc). 
N can be affected by the software process and the size of the 
system.
• µ is the mean of the log-rates.
µ will increase if system speed increases.
• σ is the standard deviation of the log-rates. 
σ increases slowly with size. Proportional to square root of depth 
of conditionals or to square root of log2 number of blocks (for 
example).
7
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Statistical, but with an 
accelerated profile: run a 
much higher percentage of 
less common triggers to drive 
interactions.
Ten x the rare rates will find 
rare-rare interactions 100 
times as fast.
Equivalent to Heat/Power/ 
Temp “corner testing” of HW.
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Evidence for the lognormal
• LN Defect Rate Distribution
• 9 IBM products (Adams-1984)
• 12 Boeing experimental programs (Nagel-)
• European Space Agency PREPRO application (Bishop-2003)
• LN Block Execution Rate Distribution
• PREPRO (Bishop-2003)
• Laplace Transform-LN, Reliability Growth Model, Code Coverage
• 10 “Musa” data sets (Mullen-1998)
• 2   Stratus Releases (Mullen-1998)
• 4   Code Coverage Metrics SHARPE (Gokhale-2004, 2005)
• Discrete-LN,  Occurrence Count Distribution
• 12 Cisco subsets by year, product, severity, ODC  (ISSRE-2005)
• 3 Security related subsets (Mullen-2005, QOP)
8
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Range of sigma values
Quantitative change ⇒ qualitative change.
Variation of sigma changes behavior dramatically. 
 σ ~ 0     Identity of LNET with BET.
 σ ~ 1     Intermediate behavior by LNET. 
 σ ~ 2     Affinity of LNET with LPET in some cases.
 σ > 3     Novel and useful long tailed distribution,
 heavier than LPET for a long time.
12Mullen/Gokhale  WOSA 2005
Implications of sigma for 
lognormal functions
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Discrete LognormalLaplace Transform of Lognormal
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Musa, Juhlin: Operational Profile
• Compute probabilities by multiplication.
• Assumed probabilities approx. independent.










Call: internal,abbreviated ,answered,put on hold.
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From software structures to rates
Distribution of failure rates of faults
0
0.25
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.039 0.082 0.174 0.368






 We can color the 
nodes in the tree of 
an operational profile 
according to the log 
of their rates.  
 If we group them by 
the log of their rates 
we approach a 
normal distribution.
10
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Avritzer & Larson: Telecommunications
• Handles calls of 5  types, each with 
arrival and service times.
• State Vector: (n1,n2,n3,n4,n5)
• Kleinrock independence 
approximation of n(i)
• Probability of each state equals the 
product of probabilities of n(i) for 
each call.
• Tested most probable states for 
great gain in efficiency.
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Evidence for the Fault Rate Distribution
• Reality Check: Actual customer usage.
• Use Adams study of 9 IBM products
• indirect, commercial, large systems, many bugs. 
• Miller: “Best is repetitive-run experiments.”
• Use 12 experiments by Nagel et al. 
• direct, academic, small systems, few bugs.
11
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Adams’ Model of Software Defect Occurrences
• Each defect, in a given product,  has a characteristic rate R.
• Each occurrence of that defect is an event in a Poisson process, with rate R.
• Running time of the Poisson process is the cumulative time of all users.
• Software defects have different rates, some are more “virulent.
• The error rate of the product is the sum of the error rates of all defects.
• The rate of a given defect remains unchanged until it is removed.
Therefore the encountering of defects through time depends on :
• The number of defects in the product.
• The distribution of rates, R, of the defects, in the product
• The rate of use of the product, over time.
• The schedule of installing fixes for defects after they are discovered.
18Mullen/Gokhale  WOSA 2005
Adams: Example
Figure 1
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Adams’ data and some lognormal fits
• Adams started with occurrences, 
and used them to infer the rate-
distributions, shown in the bar 
charts, above
• Adams grouped the defects in 
buckets with geometrically 
decreasing rates. This is the same 
as grouping in buckets by log of 
rate.
• Relative number of defects is 
normalized to 100 by Adams. We 
extrapolate N to lower rates in the 
table.
• (The shape of the low-rate left-side 







































































































































































































Lognormals Fitted to Adams’
Products
Prod#     Sigma     Mu        N        R2
2.1      3.267     -6.220     309    .994
2.2      3.508     -6.752     355    .994
2.3      3.442     -6.488     319    .995
2.4      2.565     -4.642     191    .994
2.5      3.501     -6.859     369    .991
2.6      2.585     -4.443     185    .999
2.7      3.301     -6.272     313    .994
2.8      3.472     -6.185     297    .996
2.9      2.321     -3.883     157    .998
-----
ave   R2 = .995
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Repetitive Run Experiments
• 12 programs, several programmers and specs. 
• Total 97 faults, thousands of executions.
• The failure rate of each fault was determined by 
running input cases randomly based on an 
operational profile. 
• Defects were not fixed until the failure rate of each 
fault was determined. 
13

















Shapiro-Wilks Test for normality of small samples
good
poor
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Lognormal significantly better: 8 experiments
Gamma slightly better: 4 experiments
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Summary of Evidence on Rate Distribution
Adams Field Data
• Visually good fit.
• Very high values for correlation coefficient.
• Lognormal fits every case  better than power-law.
Repetitive Run Experiments
• Pooled data appears lognormal.
• Log-rates pass test for normality.
• The lognormal is astronomically more likely to generate 
the data than is the gamma.
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Revisit Earlier Statements
• Conventional reliability calculations and 
methods do work for software.
• Whether the home of the failure rate is in the 
input space, state space, or code paths, the 
mathematical form is, in the limit, the same.
• The lognormal distribution of failure rates of 
software faults can provide a solid basis for 
additional modeling.
15
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Fau lts  O bs .
10.35 11.84 9.09 9.79 9.69 9.24 10.72 9.47 12.65 10.01
10.07 4.65 4.78 4.52 4.59 4.58 4.53 4.68 4.56 4.85 4.61
8.53 4.48 4.61 4.35 4.42 4.41 4.37 4.51 4.39 4.68 4.45
8.96 4.53 4.66 4.40 4.47 4.46 4.42 4.56 4.44 4.73 4.50
9.47 4.59 4.72 4.46 4.53 4.52 4.47 4.62 4.50 4.79 4.55
8.51 4.48 4.61 4.35 4.42 4.41 4.36 4.51 4.39 4.68 4.44
9.12 4.55 4.68 4.42 4.49 4.48 4.43 4.58 4.46 4.75 4.51
9.34 4.57 4.71 4.44 4.52 4.51 4.46 4.61 4.48 4.77 4.54
8.67 4.50 4.63 4.37 4.44 4.43 4.38 4.53 4.41 4.70 4.46
10.22 4.66 4.80 4.53 4.61 4.60 4.55 4.70 4.57 4.86 4.63
9.90 4.63 4.76 4.50 4.57 4.56 4.52 4.66 4.54 4.83 4.60
9.43 4.58 4.72 4.45 4.53 4.52 4.47 4.62 4.49 4.78 4.55
6.68 4.24 4.37 4.11 4.18 4.17 4.12 4.27 4.15 4.44 4.20
9.68 4.61 4.74 4.48 4.55 4.54 4.49 4.64 4.52 4.81 4.57
9.15 4.55 4.68 4.42 4.49 4.48 4.44 4.59 4.46 4.75 4.52
7.85 4.40 4.53 4.27 4.34 4.33 4.28 4.43 4.31 4.60 4.36
9.66 4.60 4.74 4.48 4.55 4.54 4.49 4.64 4.52 4.81 4.57
10.01 4.64 4.77 4.51 4.58 4.57 4.53 4.68 4.55 4.84 4.61
8.03 4.42 4.55 4.29 4.36 4.35 4.31 4.46 4.33 4.62 4.39
9.21 4.56 4.69 4.43 4.50 4.49 4.44 4.59 4.47 4.76 4.52
7.56 4.36 4.49 4.23 4.30 4.29 4.25 4.40 4.27 4.56 4.33
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Software Reliability Growth Modeling
• Different models  --- even finite and infinite ---can appear arbitrarily 
similar over a finite interval.  
• In practice it can be impossible to decide between two models on
the basis of one unreplicated experience.
• "Inference and prediction steps will be easier if the class of 
possible models can be restricted a priori, i.e. before testing or, 
ideally, before the program is written."
– Miller, EOS Models of Software Reliability Growth 1985
Miller’s statements imply:  Use all available data and knowledge of 
software systems to determine the form of the model.   Use data 
from a specific debugging experience to determine the parameters of 
the model.
16
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Transformation from Rates to Times
• Defects with higher failure rates occur sooner, on average.
• X-axes are log-scaled.  Each rate-class is color coded.  
• Black and red are the highest rate,  yellow and brown are lowest.
• On the left, the Lognormal distribution of rates.
• On the right, the distribution of first failure times.
• It is not Lognormal, it is the Laplace transform of the Lognormal.
Distribution of failure rates of faults
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Mean rate at time t
The mathematical form of the mean function is formally 
equivalent to the Laplace Transform of the lognormal.
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From Rates to Cumulative Faults
• Rate-classes are color coded. X-axes are log-scaled
• On the left, the Lognormal distribution of rates.
• On the right, the cumulative distribution of first failure times, which 
equals the cumulative faults discovered.
• More rate-buckets creates a more exact approximation to the 
incremental and cumulative functions.
Distribution of failure rates of faults
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Reliability Growth: Stratus Data
• Manufacturer of Fault Tolerant Mini-computers.
• Used 24x7 in banks, brokerage, and telecom.
• Sites monitored by Remote Service Network.
• The execution time for each release is known.
• Releases presented were unchanged over life.
• For each week we know 
• system hours on the release
• number of defects reported for the first time against that 
release.
• Thus we can determine the first failure time of each 
fault, thereby the number of first-failures as a function 
of cumulative execution time.
18
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CODE COVERAGE GROWTH
Experimental Subject and Tools
• SHARPE Application was “System under Test”
• Developed at Duke, solves stochastic models
• Real program, 35,412 lines of C code in 29 program files
• Test Suite for SHARPE
• 735 test cases achieve 93.5% Block coverage  (275 tests suffice)
• Test Instrumentation Tools
• Telcordia SW Visualization and Analysis Tool Suite (TSVAT)
• Automatic Test Analyzer for C (ATAC) 
• Instruments code,  executes tests, and measures coverage
• Procedure
• Replicated test sequence (randomized) 10 times
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share.c cumulative decision coverage
(share.c is just one program in SHARPE)
• Linear chart shows problems with exponential and Log-Poisson.
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Entire SHARPE : (blocks) 
• Left: cumulative % coverage vs log test count.  The 10 replications and their 
average are also shown for each interval.  Much less noisy.
• Right: incremental % coverage vs log test count. The s.d. of the 10 runs are 
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• Shows percent 
incremental 
coverage per 






• For each metric 
the lognormal 
model comes 
closer to the 












































































Whole of SHARPE -- four coverage metrics  
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SHARPE SUMMARY
Note value of replicated test sequences
Overwhelming 
support for 
lognormal (vs exp or 
log-Poisson models)








Very noisy. Other 
models sometimes 
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Defect Occurrence Counts
• At Cisco, a Trouble-ticket is written when a defect occurs at a 
customer.  From them we can determine and fit the number of 
encounters or occurrences of each defect.
• We studied the distribution of Trouble-tickets among defects 
written within a given year.
• How many defects have one ticket? 
• How many have two, three … ?
• How many have none? (Can’t observe, but can estimate.)
• Assumption: over the interval studied, fixes are not put in 
service. 
22
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• Each defect has a rate λ generated from the lognormal distribution.
• Within a time interval, the number of occurrences of an unrepaired
defect having rate λ is distributed as a Poisson random variable with 
rate λ.  
• The number of defects with X occurrences is the sum (over all rates) of 
the probabilities of getting exactly X occurrences.
• The exact form of the occurence-count distribution is simply that of a 
mixed Poisson distribution in which the rate is distributed according to 
the lognormal.   
• This is the Discrete Lognormal or Poisson-Lognormal [Johnson, 1993].
• Related to the Lognormal Software Reliability Growth Model
• Differs from log-Poisson SW reliability growth model, which is not 
a distribution
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From software rates to number of occurences
Contributions of rate groups to occurrence-counts
Distribution of failure rates of faults
0
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 Assuming 50 time units. Note 
defects in bucket zero did not 
occur yet. The overall 
distribution is the sum of 
Poisson distributions of the 
various colors or rates
Distribution of occurence counts of faults
0
40











41Mullen/Gokhale  WOSA 2005
Example:  three years, large system
Note similar shapes. Tickets per defect 
declined from 2.3 to 2.0. Lognormal 
Sigma(spread) ranged from 1.92 to 
2.04.  To reveal other trends may 
require more careful analysis or 
narrower subsets of data.
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Example: by Product
• Data format: for product T, about 
9% of the bugs had 3 Tickets. 
About 1% had 9 Tickets.
• Three very different Products, 
each millions of LOC
• Product W is the oldest and in the 
most mature market.
• Charts show percentages in each 
count-bucket. Top is data, below 
is fitted P-LN.  Y-axis is log %.
• Below, we compute the rate per-







































































W fit T fit S fit
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Example: by Severity
• The more trouble tickets a defect 
generates, the more likely it is to 
be classified S1 (critical) or S2 
(severe).  Moderate defects (S3) 
tend to have 3 / 4 as many tickets.
• From the lognormal perspective, 
the spread in rates of S1 defects 
is also much larger, sigma = 3.5 
rather than 2.0 like S2 and S3. 
• The wider spread in S1 rates 
suggests high rate, as well as 
high impact, affect classification.
• Charts show percentages in each 
count-bucket. Top is data, below 
is fitted P-LN.  Y-axis is log-scale.



















































s Sev 1 fit
Sev 2 fit
Sev 3 fit
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• Top chart shows both data and fit 
for Defects with ODC Origin: BadFix.   
This has actual counts for selected 
product.  Fit and Data are better 
(higher counts) for New and Base 
code.
• On lower chart, note fitted curves 
are similar, consistent with Adams.
• Note defects with a higher number 
of incidents are less common 
among Base Code defects and more 
common among BadFix defects. 
BadFixes generate 50% more tickets 
per defect.
• Makes sense: the shorter the prior 
exposure of changed code, the more 
chance high-rate defects have 
survived.
Example:ODC Origin
























s Base Code fit
New Code fit
Bad Fix fit
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QOP (Quality of Protection)
Software Defects and Security Defects
• QoP will inevitably be affected by software defects.
• Strategy: attempt to apply ordinary software reliability 
engineering to security related defects as one step toward QoP.
• Reason & evidence imply software defect rates  are lognormal 
and discovery times follow Laplace transform of lognormal.
• Lognormal rates imply Discrete-LN occurrence counts.
• Hypothesis: security defect occurrence counts follow D-LN.
• Three classes of security defects are shown to follow D-LN, 
confirming both the strategy and the hypothesis.
26
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Problem and motivation
• Assessment of Quality of Protection (QoP) is predominantly 
qualitative. Unlike QOS or Reliability…
• Two-fold relationship between software defects and security:
– Defect may be exploited directly for a security breach.
– May manifest as a field failure, and repair of it may introduce 
another defect which may be exploited and cause QoP
degradation.
• Occurrence rates of software defects in general and security 
defects in particular will be an important component of QoP
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Problem and motivation (contd..)
• Occurrence rates of defects varies widely, from rarely to 
pervasive.
• Empirical observations and theoretical justification suggests 
that the:
– Distribution of defect occurrence rates is lognormal.
– Distribution of defect occurrence counts is Discrete-Lognormal. 
• Confirm the D-LN hypothesis by analyzing three sets of data.
• Link results from prior studies of software reliability growth, 
test coverage, defect failure rates and code execution rates to 
occurrence rates of security defects affecting QoP.  
27
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* Percentages of Defects with Specific Number of 
Tickets per Defect
• Three sets of data relating to 
security related defects.
• Shows percent of defects with 
a given number of tickets.
• Col 2: Defects with ODC 
Impact value of Security 
(within large system).
• Col 3: All defects within a 
security related product.
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• Alternative model: Pareto rates (for λ > k) 
• Model fitting 
• Model comparison
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Data and fitted discrete-lognormal
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Security• Lognormal is not 
rejected at .05 level 
by this data.
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• Pareto is also not 
rejected.
• Pareto chi-square are 
slightly larger (worse) 
than LN but there is no 
significant difference.
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* Comparison of defect subsets
• Visually the curves 
are similar.
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Advantages of Lognormal
• Fits data.
• Linked to structure of software and its usage.
• This may allow reasoning about how changes will affect the 
defect rates and therefore QoP.
• Cleaner separation of number of bugs, their rates, and the 
spread in their rates.
• Symmetry (on log scale) allows inferences about distribution 
of low-rate defects. 
• This is crucial because low rate defects can become high 
rate during an exploit.
• Though it can mimic part of a lognormal distribution the 
Pareto fails at low rates (see Perline, 2005)
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*Step 1: How to fit the Discrete-Lognormal
e.g. for mu = -1, sigma = 1, N=100
• Define wide range of rates R(i) 
geometrically spaced.  Factor of 
1:1,000,000   or more  overall.
• Use Excel lognormdist (sig, mu) 
function to determine percentage at 
each rate R(i).  Sum (weights) = 1
• Determine each rate’s contribution 
to each count-bucket according to 
Poisson distribution and weight..
• Sum contributions to each count-
bucket, multiplying by N, total 
number of defects, including ones 
that have not yet happened
• You will need rates that differ by a 

















210- 1- 2- 3Log Rate
7.392.721.00.368.135.05Rate
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Generate Fit Bugs col as Function of  
Sigma, Mu and N (as on prev slide) . 
An adjacent column has the Di, the 
number of bugs with i tickets. 
Set chisq(i) = (Di - Fi)^2 / Fi.
Sum  chisq(i) over all counts.
Allow Excel “solver” to minimize the 
SUM by varying the Sigma, Mu, and N 
used to generate the Fi column.
Note Tickets = Num * Bugs 
Preventing high-rate 15% of bugs 
prevents 57% of tickets in this case.
Above shows min-chi-square fit.  
Ultimately we used max-log-
likelihood for fitting.
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Opportunities  for Research
• Gather additional failure rate distribution data, test 
it for lognormal.
• To what extent are analyst’s operational profiles 
found to match the lognormal?
• What is effect of varying operational profile on  
shape of distribution, e.g. after test?
• Other  opportunities for application of lognormal 
insights to software.
• Use lognormal as prior in other applications.


















-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0
MonteCarlo
Normal
C u m u la tiv e  fa u lts  d is c o v e r e d




0 .4 1 .0 2 .7 7 .4 2 0 .1 5 4 .6 1 4 8 .4 4 0 3 .4 1 0 9 6 .6















SRGM = Coverage Growth   








Statistical, but with an 
accelerated profile: run a 
much higher percentage of 
less common triggers to drive 
interactions.
Ten x the rare rates will find 
rare-rare interactions 100 
times as fast.
Equivalent to Heat/Power/ 
Temp “corner testing” of HW.
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This model provides a framework for helping to understand and analyze the airport security 
problem. By modeling the security process, and identifying the weak points, we were able to 
make recommendations for possible Federal initiatives through legislative or management action 
to close the identified security loopholes. Passenger flow through the ticket counter, security 
station, and gate, which potentially includes terrorists, is modeled and quantified. A probability 
model estimates the probability of a terrorist escaping detection at the various stations. This 
probability is a function of the reliability of a proposed security database and the reliability of 
security equipment. The influence of these reliabilities on the probability of non detection is 
studied. In addition, a commonly overlooked security problem -- overloading security personnel 
with passenger traffic to the extent that they are distracted from thoroughly checking passengers -
- is modeled and analyzed. Model quantitative results are used to delineate the implications for 




 A model of airport security is proposed and executed. The model involves the flow of a 
group of passengers, who wish to board a given aircraft, to ticket counters, security stations, 
airline gates, and aircraft. By confining the security problem in this way, the very difficult 
problem of airport security analysis is simplified. Why do we develop such a model? An 
important reason is: “Airports and ticket counters have been attacked, and even airline offices 
have not been spared in terrorist attempts to intimidate governments and prevent the western 
public from flying. Terrorists simply cannot leave airports alone, nor does it make sense to do so, 
since they are the weak point in Western defenses” [JOH91]. And this was written before 9/11! 
By way of historical perspective, in 1973 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specified 
that the three critical security areas in airports are the ticket counter, boarding gate, and the 
aircraft [JOH91]. Curiously, the security station (i.e., luggage x-ray station) is omitted. 
 
According to [JOH91], technology has not kept pace with the threat: terrorists exploit 
existing technology, airports upgrade their technology, but terrorists outwit that technology, in a 
never-ending cycle. “we will always be in a position where deterrence presupposes a rational 
adversary” [JOH91]. 
 
This model contains new concepts as follows: improve the reliability of airport security 
equipment; implement a security database in airports that do not have this capability; improve the 
reliability of security databases in airports where they exist; and alleviate queuing problems at 
airline passenger stations and airport security facilities. If these measures are implemented by 
Congressional funding and enabling legislation, the threat of terrorist attacks should be reduced at 
the nation’s airports. 
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 The severity of the problem is dramatized by the following findings: 
 
Pre 9/11 Aviation Unpreparedness 
 
WASHINGTON - The Federal Aviation Administration received repeated warnings in the 
months prior to Sept. 11, 2001, about al-Qaeda and its desire to attack airlines, according to a 
previously undisclosed report by the commission that investigated the terror attacks [MSN05]. 
 
The report by the 9/11 commission that investigated the suicide airliner attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon detailed 52 such warnings given to FAA leaders from April to 
Sept. 10, 2001, about the radical Islamic terrorist group and its leader, Osama bin Laden. The 
commission report, written last August, said five security warnings mentioned al-Qaeda’s training 
for hijackings and two reports concerned suicide operations not connected to aviation. However, 
none of the warnings pinpointed what would happen on Sept. 11. FAA spokeswoman Laura 
Brown said the agency received intelligence from other agencies, which it passed on to airlines 
and airports. But, she said, “We had no specific information about means or methods that would 
have enabled us to tailor any countermeasures.” Brown also said the FAA was in the process of 
tightening security at the time of the attacks. “We were spending $100 million a year to deploy 
explosive detection equipment at the airports,” she said. The agency was also close to issuing a 
regulation that would have set higher standards for screeners and, for the first time, give it direct 
control over the screening work force. [911] However, there are few airports, today, that have 
explosive detection equipment installed. In addition, simulated tests have shown that it is possible 
to pass screener detection in major U.S. airports, while carrying concealed weapons. Thus, the 
need for a model that can pinpoint vulnerabilities in airport security. 
 
Findings from the 9/11 Commission: [911] 
 
• Aviation officials were “lulled into a false sense of security” and “intelligence that 
indicated a real and growing threat leading up to 9/11 did not stimulate significant 
increases in security procedures.” 
• Of the FAA’s 105 daily intelligence summaries between April 1, 2001, and Sept.10, 
2001, 52 mentioned Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or both, “mostly in regard to overseas 
threats.” 
• The FAA did not expand the use of in-flight air marshals or tighten airport screening for 
weapons. It said FAA officials were more concerned with reducing airline congestion, 
lessening delays and easing air carriers’ financial problems than thwarting a terrorist 
attack. 
• A proposed rule to improve passenger screening and other security measures ordered by 
Congress in 1996 had been held up by the Office of Management and Budget and was 
still not in effect when the attacks occurred, according to the FAA. 
 
Passenger and Baggage Screening 
 
 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) made overall aviation 
transportation security a direct federal responsibility for the first time [DHS05]. The 
Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) responsibilities include ensuring screening of 
passengers through a mix of federal and private screeners and technology. The screener 
workforce consists of 45,000 screeners located at 448 airports. The screeners are supported by 
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 technology, including x-ray machines, explosive trace detection machines, and explosive 
detection systems. U.S. air carriers transport 12.5 tons of cargo, 2.8 tons of which is secured on 
passenger planes. The remaining 9.7 million tons is shipped in cargo planes; air freight remains a 
serious threat to the nation. TSA is charged with closing this security vulnerability. While 
obviously important, air freight security is beyond the scope of this research.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Despite all of the above, according to [BEN05], “We are spending nearly $5 billion each year 
on passenger and baggage screening systems, yet lethal weapons still are getting past security and 
onto planes. While we have devoted enormous attention and resources to improving aviation 
security, it is still far too easy for a terrorist to get a weapon on a passenger plane. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), and the TSA have conducted tests on TSA screeners at the nation’s airports and 
found surprisingly high failure rates. An alarming number of prohibited items are still not being 
detected during checks of passengers, carry-on items, and checked baggage”. In addition, 
according to [CKE05], DHS has been slow to deploy equipment and technology that could aid 




“While airline passengers may be screened, cargo beneath their feet is not. The TSA has 
identified two critical risks to air cargo “(1) The hostile takeover of an all-cargo aircraft leading to 
its use as a weapon; and (2) the use of cargo to introduce an explosive device onboard a passenger 
aircraft in order to cause catastrophic damage. Terrorists have exploited the lack of cargo security 
on several occasions. For example, a device in a baggage container of Pan Am Flight 103 caused 
the flight to explode in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland.4. An explosion aboard a U.S. airliner in 
1979 was caused by a parcel linked to the “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski and shipped as air 
cargo. While Congress has mandated tripling air cargo screening, a large portion of commercial 
air cargo remain unscreened. TSA relies heavily on the “Known Shipper” program, under which 
only approved companies may ship cargo on passenger aircraft. A company can become a 
“Known Shipper” with practically no security checks” [BEN05]. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF MODELING AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
 
 Since modeling is the central tool used in this research, it is appropriate to outline the 
methodology and spirit of this quantitative approach to problem solving. In particular, we 
describe the operations research (OR) approach to model development [HIL01] and systems 
thinking as exemplified in the field of systems engineering [TUR93]. First, we outline the steps in 
an OR study, annotated with the relevance to the airport security model. 
1. Define the problem of interest and gather relevant data. 
The problem of interest is to improve the security of the nation’s airports. An 
important facet of problem definition is to identify the decision makers. For airport 
security, these are the managers in the FAA, TSA, and airport and airline executives.  
 
Unfortunately, with few exceptions, there is not much published data on airport 
security available. Our search of the Transportation Research Information Services 
and the Transportation Research Board. databases did not yield relevant data, such as 
airline terrorist threat incidents. Thus, we resort to the use of randomized 
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 hypothetical, but realistic data, and sensitivity analysis to compensate for the data 
void. We also subject the model to extreme value testing (e.g., using values of 
probability of terrorist non detection that seem unlikely, but, nevertheless, might 
occur in an airport security system), as a form of sensitivity analysis, to note the 
effect on the solution [HIL01]. 
2. Formulate a mathematical model to represent the problem. 
Since little is known with certainty about the details of the airport security problem, 
we use a probabilistic approach to estimating the quantities of interest, such as the 
probability of not detecting a terrorist by the time he reaches the gate, if he has not 
been detected prior to this point. No model can be a complete representation of the 
real system. If it were, it would be incomprehensible and mathematically intractable. 
Thus, we extract from the real world of airport security the key factors, such as the 
probability of non detection, as opposed to attempting to model every movement of a 
terrorist in an airport. Note that our focus is on non detection because we wish to 
emphasize the probability of a terrorist escaping apprehension. 
3. Develop a computer-based procedure for deriving solutions to the problem from the 
model. 
A spreadsheet approach is used because sensitivity analysis of the solutions can be 
performed conveniently and plots of the solutions can be obtained easily. 
      4.    Test the model and refine it as needed. 
Although we are unable to test the model in an airport at this time, we perform reality 
checks on the solutions. That is, we check the model assumptions, solutions, and 
sensitivity analyses to see whether they comport with reality (e.g., a solution of 
99.9% probability of terrorist detection would be considered unrealistically 
optimistic). If such a solution emerged, we would modify the model to produce a 
more realistic result. 
5. Prepare for the ongoing application of the model as prescribed by management. 
This step is beyond the scope of this research because, at this stage, the model is a 
proposal that may be considered for implementation by FAA, TSA, and airport, and 
airline managers. The details of implementation would be a decision taken by theses 
managers. 
6. Implement the model. 
Examples of implementation details are the following: training of airport personnel in 
the revised passenger security process, implementing the security database and 
terrorist detection procedures, and installing equipment to detect biological, 
chemical, and nuclear weapons. Biological agents and toxins are of particular 
concern [CSI04].  
A key piece of legislation pertaining to biological terror is the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that contains various provisions to promote 
and accelerate the use of biometric technology for secure identification. The law 
provides for the use of biometric technology in airport access control and law 
enforcement travel [USS05]. 
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 Systems Engineering Concepts 
 Now, we explore how systems engineering concepts can be applied to airport security. In 
this vein, an aspect of the origin of systems thinking was the realization that that particular 
objects are comprised of components and these components are interrelated and independent 
[TUR93]. The following Table 0 portrays the airport security example, showing current security 
holes that could be rectified by using a database ID check at the Security Station and Gate: 
 
Table 0. Airport Security Object 
Components Related By Security Control 
 Boarding Pass and 
ID 
Database Security Equipment 
Ticket Counter x x Does not apply 
Security Station x Security Hole x 
Gate x Security Hole Does not apply 
Passengers x   
Non 
Terrorists 
Terrorists x   
 
 One of the critical developments relative to the origins of systems thinking is that of 
cause and effect. When a particular component behaves in a certain way, a different component in 
the related object reacts in a predictable way. [TUR93] For example: 
 If a passenger (component P) fails a database ID check, then an agent (component A) 
reacts to detain component P.  
 Furthermore, the behavior of component P can only be understood by identifying and 
characterizing the impact of components on each other (e.g., component A checks the database) 




 According to [HIL01], the first order of business in an OR study is to define the 
objective. Accordingly, we state that our objective is to identify weak points (e.g., security station 
check) and links (e.g., passenger flow between security check station and gate) in the security 
process for the purpose of influencing government legislation and regulations to strengthen the 
process. We feel the subject of this research is extremely important because “America is not 
sufficiently prepared to fully respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil that involves 




 Consistent with the objective, we relate our experience at an airport that indicates the 
need for improvement in airport security. Instead of focusing on security measures, like a high 
reliability and comprehensive security database, which would significantly enhance security, the 
TSA, in some instances, spends considerable time on trivial matters. For example, we were 
recently passengers at the one of the nation’s airports. We were carrying a stapler in our briefcase. 
After the case went through the x-ray machine, and signaled an alert, the TSA agent asked to 
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 open the case. She saw that the “offending object” was the stapler. She then removed the stapler 
from the case, put it in a basket, and sent the case and basket through the x-ray machine again. It 
seemed obvious that the only object in the case -- the only metal object -- that could have signaled 
an alert was the stapler. Thus, the process should have stopped after the case was opened. Instead 
of paying TSA personnel to spend time on trivial searches, the TSA should invest in a security 
database and in improving the reliability of security station equipment. 
 
 In addition to seemly non productive security processes, as described above, certain 
proposed legislation, does not appear to be helpful. For example, a provision of immigration bill 
HR418, which passed the House of Representatives, would require: “that information on anyone 
convicted of using a false driver’s license to board an airplane be added to aviation security 
screening databases” [HOU05]. The trouble with this provision is that it “closes the barn door 
after the horse is out of the barn”. No terrorist is going to try to use the same identification again, 
if his identification had been discovered as false! It is important to note that there have been 
proposals for standardizing the driver’s license [WAR05], which could become, in effect, a 
national identification card. With such a card, it would be difficult to fake identification; thus, the 
probability of non detection would be decreased. This is an issue currently being debated by 
Congress. It is not clear that such legislation will be passed because of the opposition of privacy 
advocates. 
 
 Other examples of airport security problems that motivate our research are the following: 
Background on Airport Security Issues 
Selected Items from Terrorist Detection History 
 This section illustrates why airport security is a problem and why we are motivated to 
study the problem. A critical aspect of successful terrorist and weapons detection is the quality 
and appropriateness of the detection tests. The following reports from the media illustrate some of 
the problems in conducting successful tests:  
HOW NOT TO TEST AIRPORT SECURITY, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, DECEMBER 20, 
2004[BBC05] 
If this were fiction, no one would believe it. Four days after police at Charles de Gaulle 
Airport slipped some plastic explosives into a random passenger’s bag as part of an exercise for 
sniffer dogs, it is still missing -- and authorities are stumped and embarrassed. It is perfectly 
reasonable to plant an explosive-filled suitcase in an airport in order to test security. It is not okay 
to plant it in someone's bag without his knowledge and permission. (The explosive residue could 
remain on the suitcase long after the test, and might be picked up by one of those trace mass 
spectrometers that detects the chemical residue associated with bombs.) But if you are going to 
plant plastic explosives in the suitcase of some innocent passenger, shouldn't you at least write 
down which suitcase it was?  
US airport security loses 'bomb' [BBC05] 
Security screeners at a US airport lost track of a bag containing fake explosives and allowed to be 
loaded on a flight to Amsterdam. The "bomb" was planted in luggage for training exercise at 
Newark Liberty International Airport. A scanning machine raised the alarm, but the bag was not 
searched and airport staff lost track of it. "At no time did the bag pose a threat and at no time was 
anyone in danger," said a transport security spokeswoman.  
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 Airport Security Data 
 Since, with certain exceptions, airport security data is either classified or unavailable, we 
have had to resort, in this model, to use hypothetical but realistic data to illustrate the principles 
of the model. See the Appendix for the spreadsheet data and the results of example computations. 
In future research, we will attempt to collect data about security attacks from reports, web sites, 
and the Department of Homeland Security DHS).  
 
Information flow rates, queue characteristics, etc., which are used in the analytic model, are 
expected or mean values. If instantaneous values of these variables are desired, simulation must 
be used. The values of quantities used in the examples are for illustrative purposes. Sensitivity 
analysis is performed to protect against choosing certain values in the examples. As Cordesman 
points out, probabilities based on history may be worthless (e.g., pattern of past no indicator of 
9/11 attack). It is better to use “what if” analysis [COR, p. 25]. It is important to consider worst 
case scenarios [COR, p. 33]. Many of the model variables are randomized to provide further 
protection again bias. An example of “what if “analysis is covered in the What If section. 
Threats 
 Now, we consider the flow of passengers, wherein one or more could be terrorists, and a 
threat to innocent passengers, through the ticketing, security checking, and boarding process, as 




Refer to Figure 0 when reading the definitions: 
 
Facilities: ticket counter (A), security station (S), and gate (G). 
 
Pt is the probability that a passenger (on the aircraft) is a terrorist, mean ≈ .05 [CRS04], N is 
the estimated number of possible terrorists who are ticketed on Plane P (N is assumed to be in the 
range 1,,,10), and C is the capacity of P. A mean value for P would be appropriate to use, if C 
were a constant. However, just considering the Boeing Company alone, there are ten commercial 
models, with the capacity in number of passengers, shown in Table 1 [BOE05]. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to consider Pt as a variable, and to calculate it as Pt = N / C. 
 
Table 1. Boeing Company Commercial Aircraft Models 












 PA is the probability that the terrorist will be detected at the ticket counter by querying the 
security database. Specifically, this probability is a function of the accuracy and completeness of 
the security database and of the type of identification IA presented by the passenger at the ticket 
counter. Although the probabilities of detection at the ticket counter, security station, and gate 
differ in the real world, they are treated as equal in this model because 1) we have no evidence to 
the contrary and 2) the assumption of equality is mitigated by randomizing these quantities in the 
model. 
 
The probability that the terrorist will be detected at the ticket counter is of particular 
relevance in light of the El Al airlines practice of requiring complete identification of the 
passenger when purchasing a ticket to allow security officials to compile a reference file on the 
passenger [JOH91]. Although this is an excellent practice, it is not clear that it would be 
acceptable to American airline passengers.  
 
Rd is the reliability of the security database. Specifically, this is the probability of the 
database operating without failure during the security checks at the three stations. It is assumed 
that the reliabilities at the three facilities are equal, since this feature is new in airports, with little 
information available about operating characteristics. 
 
PS is the probability that the terrorist will be detected at the security station by querying the 
security database or by performing the luggage check. Specifically, this probability is a function 
of the accuracy and completeness of the security database and of the type of identification IS 
presented by the passenger at the security station and the accuracy of the luggage checking 
equipment. 
 
Rs is the reliability of the security checking equipment. Specifically, this is the probability of 
the security checking equipment at the three facilities operating without failure during the 
security checks. As in the case of Rd, it is assumed that the reliabilities at the three facilities are 
equal, because we have no information to the contrary. 
 
PG is the probability that the terrorist will be detected at the gate by querying the security 
database. Specifically, this probability is a function of the accuracy and completeness of the 
security database and of the type of identification IG presented by the passenger at the gate. 
 
 In later sections, we use the following additional definitions: 
 
PAf, probability of non detection at the ticket counter. 
 
PSf, probability of non detection at the security station. 
 
PGf, probability of non detection at the gate.   
 
PGs, probability of detection at the gate. 
 
Rdo, overall reliability that is decomposed into the reliabilities of the primary and secondary 




 Rso overall reliability that is decomposed into the reliabilities of the primary and secondary 
security equipment, Rs1 and Rs2, respectively. 
 
Assumption: The events and variables in the analysis are assumed to be independent. Thus, 
their probabilities can be multiplied. This assumption seems reasonable because there is no 




Before we begin the scenario, let us consider the fact that multiple checks against a database 
are needed, even if this seems counter intuitive, for the following reason: 
 
Assume that X is not a Muslim, but is part of a terrorist plot. X has a ticket under a false 
name – the name of Y and a false photo ID with the name of Y. X passes the check at the airline 
check in counter. Next, X gives his ticket to Y, a Muslim, who has a photo ID. Y goes to the 
security station and presents “his ticket” and photo ID. Although Y’s name on his ticket and ID 
match, a search of the database shows that the ticketed person, X, is not a Muslim, and Y is 
detained for further investigation. Of course, if the database contains Y’s photo, X would have 
been stopped at the ticket counter, but the reviewer did not make this point. 
 
Picture the scenario shown in Figure 0, where a passenger, who may have biological, 
chemical, or nuclear weapons in his luggage, stops first at the ticket counter (A) to check in. In 
this model, airline and security personnel access a security database that contains information 
about people who are considered possible security threats; their identification is designated by T. 





























Pt: probability that passenger is a terrorist
PA: probability of detecting terrorist at Ticket Counter
PS: probability of detecting terrorist at Security Station
PG: probability of detecting terrorist at Gate
RS: reliability of Security Station equipment
Rd: reliability of security database
T: terrorist identification in the database
I: passenger identification
C: plane capacity






 The reason for the three identifications is that a passenger could use a different identification at 
each facility. If a database check results in T = IA, or T = IS, or T = IG, the passenger is detained 
for interrogation. At the start of the interrogation, the passenger is assumed to not be a terrorist; 
however, subsequent questioning may suggest otherwise. If the passenger passes the ticket 
counter check, he proceeds to the security station (S), which is staffed by TSA and airport 
personnel. The same database check process takes place again. Why? The reason is that no 
database and computer system is 100% reliable. It is possible that the passenger is a terrorist and 
the ticket counter check failed to reveal this fact. Of course, the converse is possible. This is why 
there should be presumed innocence at the start of the interrogation. Unfortunately, currently, the 
drivers license is the main means of passenger identification, and it is not standardized among the 
states. As Richard Clark points out, airline agents make no attempt to validate passenger 
identification [CLA05]. Perhaps, a national identification card is needed, but this might be 
considered a violation of civil liberties. 
 
 This process is repeated at the gate (G). If a terrorist manages to pass all three checks, he 
is allowed on board the aircraft. Of course, we want this event to have a very low probability. 




 The events pertinent to the process of terrorist detection are listed below. 
 
1. Terrorist detected at ticket counter (A) 
2. Terrorist not detected at ticket counter (A) 
3. Terrorist detected at security station (S) 
4. Terrorist not detected at security station (S) 
5. Terrorist detected at gate (G) 




The nomenclature of stations and their associated events are defined below. 
 
A, S, and G are called stations 
 
Events 1, 3, and 5 are independent (i.e., detection at a given station does not depend on detection 
at other stations). 
 
Events 2, 4, and 6 are independent (i.e., non detection at a given station does not depend on non 




 The sequence of events that transpire in the attempt to detect a terrorist is captures in the 
event transitions that follow. 
 
A. Start → Event 1 → Terrorist stopped for interrogation at A 
B. Start → Event 2 → Event 3 → Terrorist stopped for interrogation at S 
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 C. Start → Event 2 → Event 4 → Event 5 → Terrorist stopped for interrogation at G 
D. Start → Event 2 → Event 4 → Event 6 → Terrorist not detected at A, S, and G 
 
Event Sequences A, B, C, and D are independent (i.e., the fact that a terrorist is stopped at a given 
station does not depend on being stopped at other stations) 
 
The event sequences A, B, C, and D and events 1, …, 6 in the passenger flow process are 




p: probability of terrorist not being detected on any given attempt at passing a single security 
check, independent of his location in the airport at any given time. This is a function of the 
accuracy and comprehensiveness of the security database and of the accuracy of security 
equipment (e.g., luggage x-ray equipment). Thus, p becomes the key probability in the model 
because we are modeling the process of the terrorist attempting to go undetected at the ticket 
counter, security station, and gate.  
 
1 – p: probability of terrorist being detected on a given attempt at passing a single security check. 
This probability is also a function of the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the security database 










Figure ASG. Airport Passenger Flow Diagram
Event 1 Event 2
Event 4
Event 3














1   Terrorist  detected at ticket counter (A)
2   Terrorist not detected at ticket counter (A)
3   Terrorist  detected at security station (S)
4   Terrorist not detected at security station (S)
5   Terrorist  detected at ticket gate (G)





The binomial distribution describes the possible number of times n that a particular event 
(e.g., terrorist non detection) will occur in a sequence of observations (e.g., at the ticket counter, 
security station, and gate). The binomial distribution is used when a researcher is interested in the 
probability of an event occurring. The binomial distribution is specified by the number of 
observations, x (e.g., number of times a passenger is subjected to a security check), and the 




n trails: number of possible attempts by terrorist to avoid detection 
 
n = 3 (A, S, G) 
 
x: given number of attempts by terrorist to avoid detection 
 
Apply Binomial Distribution 
 
Our objective is to estimate the probability of non detection at A, S, and G, as a function of p, 
for the purpose of determining the threat posed by a terrorist at each of these stations. 
Therefore, we have, according to the binomial distribution,  
 
P = 
n! x n-xp (1-p)
x!(n-x)!
         
      (1) 
 
Why is it necessary to use the probability P when p has already been defined? The reason is 
that p does not take into account the number of times x that the terrorist attempts detection out 
of n = 3 possible attempts. The probability p only pertains to the event of non detection, 
independent of the number of attempts. 
 
The following Table Event summarizes the application of the binomial distribution as it is 
applied to the quantities n, x, P, and p and the events 2, 4, 6, and 5, showing that the 
P∑ exhausts the probability space. 
45
  
Table Event. n = 3 
event  x P = 
2 Not detected 
at A 
1 3! 1 2p (1-p)
1!2!
 
    3 p – 6 p2 + 3 p3 
4 Not detected 
at S 
2 3! 2p (1-p)
2!1!
 
 3 p2 – 3 p3 
6 Not detected 
at G 




5 detected at G 0 3! 0 3p (1-p)
0!3!
      2 31-3p+3p -p
   Total 1 
 
Probabilities of Events 
 
In the sections that follow, we describe the airport security events, model the related 
probabilities of events, determine key points and values on the probability functions, and 
determine local minima and maxima of the functions by using the calculus. The key points 
and values, and the local minima and maxima, characterize the probability of non detection 
(our airport security metric), and identify the optimal non detection probabilities at the ticket 
counter, security station, and gate that imply policy decisions for government, airport, and 
airline managers. In developing an optimal solution, we strive for optimality across all 
entities and personnel within the scope of this research -- airlines; airport security personnel, 
security database, and equipment; FAA; and TSA – rather than a single entity [HIL01]. This 
is achieved by modeling the ticket counter, security station, and gate as a single integrated 
security system.  
 
It is important to note that an “optimal solution” provided by a model may not br optimal 
in the eyes of the decision makers responsible for airport security. They are the final arbiters of 
what constitutes a good security policy {HIL01]. 
 
Event 2: Terrorist not detected at ticket counter (A) 
 
x = 1 attempt at non detection at A; n =3 possible attempts 
 
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 2 = PAf: 
 
PAf = 
3! 1 2 2p (1-p) =3p(1-p)
1!2!
        
      (2) 
 
PAf = 3 p – 6 p2 + 3 p3         
      (3) 
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 For PAf = 1, 3 p – 6 p2 + 3 p3 =1, 3 p – 6 p2 + 3 p3 -1 = 0     
  (4) 
 
Solving for the roots of (4), p = 1.475; this value is obviously infeasible 
 
For PAf = 0, p = 0, p = 1; only p = 0 is a realistic solution (i.e., PAf should = 0 when p = 0; it 
should not equal 0 when p = 1). The rate of change of PAf with p is given by equation (5): 
 
dP 2Af =3-12p+9p =0
dp
, 3p2 - 4p + 1 = 0       
    (5) 
 
p = 
4 16 4(3)(1) 4 2 2 1
6 6 3 3
+ − − ±
= = ±        
    (6) 
 
p1 = 1, p2 = 1 / 3 
 
2d PAf =-12+18p2d p
          
       (7) 
For p1 = 1, 
2d PAf
2d p
 = -12 + 18 = 6 ⇒ PAf minimum 
For p2 = .3333, 
2d PAf
2d p
 = - 12 + (18) (.3333) = - 6.0 ⇒ PAf maximum 
For p1 = 1, PAf = (3) (1) – (6) (1) + (3) (11) = 0 
 
For p2 = .35, PAf = (3) (.3333) - (6) (.3333)2 + (3) (.3333)3 = .4444 
 
As shown in Figure 1, where PAf is plotted against p, the maximum value of PAf = .4444 
occurs at p = .3333. After that, PAf decreases with p, becoming 0 at p =1. The reason for the 
decrease is that the binomial representation of equation (2) is not only a function of probability of 
non detection p but also a function of the probability of detection (1-p) at the ticket counter. At p 
= .3333, p1 begins to exceed (1-p)2 in equation (2). Thus the optimal p represents the resolution of 
these counteracting factors. The policy implication suggested by this result is that the FAA, 
airport managers, and airline managers would attempt to improve security at ticket counters (e.g., 









Event 4: Terrorist not detected at security station (S) 
 
x = 2 attempts at non detection at S; n =3 possible attempts 
 
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 4 = PSf: 
 
PSf = 
3! 2 2p (1-p)=3p (1-p)
2!1!
        
       (8) 
 
PSf = 3 p2 – 3 p3          
        (9) 
 
For PSf =1, 3 p2 – 3 p3 = 1, 3 p2 – 3 p3 – 1 =0 
 
Solving for the roots of (8), p = 1.264; this value is obviously infeasible 
 
For PSf = 0, p = 0, p = 1; only p = 1 is realistic solution (i.e., PSf should = 0 when p = 0; it 
should not equal 0 when p = 1). The rate of change of PSf with p is given by equation (10): 
 






















dP 2 2Sf =6p-9p =0,2p-3p =0
dp
        
      (10) 
 
 p = 
2 4 4( 30(0) 2 2 1 1.4192
6 6 3 6





 p1 = .65, p2 ≈ 0 
 
 
2d PSf =6-18p2d p
         
        (11) 
 For p1 = .65, 
2d PSf
2d p
 = 6 – (18) (.65) = - 5.7 ⇒ PSf maximum 
 For p1 = 0, 
2d PSf
2d p
= 6 – (18) (0) = 6 ⇒ PSf minimum 
 
 For p1 = .65, PSf = (3) (.65)2 – 3 (.65)3 = .4436 
 
 For p1 = 0, PSf = 0 
 
 As shown in Figure 2, where PSf is plotted against p, the maximum value of PSf = .4436 
occurs at p = .65. After that, PSf decreases with p, becoming 0 at p =1. The reason for the decrease 
is that, while the binomial representation of equation (2) increases with p, (1-p) -- the probability 
of terrorist being detected -- decreases with p. Thus the optimal p represents the resolution of 
these counteracting factors. The policy implication suggested by this result is that the FAA, 
airport managers, and TSA managers would attempt to improve security at security stations (e.g., 
use of computerized luggage checking system) so that p would be reduced to a value much lower 
than .65.  
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Event 6: Terrorist not Detected at gate (G) 
 
 x = 3 attempts at non detection out of n = 3 total attempts 
 
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 6 = PGf: 
 
PGf = 
3! 3 0 3p (1-p) =p
3!0!
         
      (12) 
 
As shown in Figure 3, where PGf is plotted against p, the maximum value of PGf = 1.0 occurs 
at p = 1.0. In this case, PGf increases monotonically. The reason for this is that there is only a p 
non detection term in equation (12); no 1-p detection term. The policy implication suggested by 
this result is that the FAA, airport managers, airline managers, and TSA managers would attempt 
to improve security at the ticket counters and at security stations to the extent that terrorists would 
be detected before they reach the gate, because after they reach the gate, there is little opportunity 
for detection, as shown in Figure 3. 





















Since the gate is the last place to stop the terrorist  within the scope of the model -- PGf is our 
metric of the quality of the security system -- the lower the better – consistent with cost, 
personnel and technology constraints. Decision makers could gauge the performance of their 
security system against this metric [HIL01]. 
 
 
Event 5: Terrorist Detected at gate (G): 
 
x = 0 attempts at non detection out of n = 3 total attempts is equivalent to a successful 
detection. 
 
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 5 (successful detection at G) =  
PGs = 
3! 0 3 2 3p (1-p) =1-3p+3p -p
0!3!
       
    (13) 
This is also equal to: 
 
PGs = 1 – PAf – PSf –PGf = 1 – (3 p -6 p2 +3 p3) – (3 p2 -3 p3) – p3 = 1 – 3 p + 3 p2 – p3 
 
For PGs =1, 1 – 3 p + 3 p2 – p3 = 1, - 3 p + 3 p2 – p3 = 0 
 
Solving for the roots of (13), no feasible roots were found 
For PGs =0, p = 0 
dP 2 2 2Gs =-3+6P-3p =0,3p -6p+3=0,p -2p+1=0
dp
      
   (14)  
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p
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 2± 4-(4)(1)(1) 2p= = =1
2 2
 
2 2d P d PGs Gs=6-6p,forp =1, =012 2d p d p
       
     (15) 
3d PGs =-63d p
0≠ , for p1 = 1, PGs is neither a minimum nor maximum   (16) 
For p1 =1, PGs = 1 – 3 + 3 -1 = 0 
 
For p2 =0, PGs = 1 – 0 + 0 – 0 = 1 
 
As shown in Figure 4, where PGs is plotted against p, the maximum value of PGs = 1.0 occurs 
at p = 0. In this case, PGs decreases monotonically. The reason for this is that there is only a 1 - p 
detection term in equation (13); no p non detection term. The policy implication suggested by this 
result is that the FAA, airport managers, and airline managers would attempt to improve security 
at the gate so that p is not significantly greater than 0, because PGs decreases rapidly thereafter, as 
shown in Figure 4.  
Effectiveness of Detection at Gate 
 
 Now, we combine probability of non detection PGs with the reliability of the security 
database Rd and the reliability of the security equipment Rs to produce the effectiveness at the 
gate. Before we present this effectiveness equation, we elaborate on the characteristics of Rd and 
Rs, and show how redundancy increases reliability and, therefore, effectiveness. 
 
















Definitions that characterize the redundant security database and security equipment, and 
their reliabilities are presented below. 
 
 d1: primary security database 
 d2: secondary security database  
 s1: primary security equipment 
 s2: secondary security equipment 
 
 Rdo: overall reliability of security database 
 Rd1: reliability of primary security database   
 Rd2: reliability of secondary security database   
 
 Rso: overall reliability of security equipment  
 Rs1: reliability of primary security equipment (.96, 1.00, with a mean = .98 [CRS04]  




The assumptions upon which the computations of reliability rest are as follows: 
 
d1 and d2 are independent (i.e., failure of d2 does not affect reliability of d1) 
 
 s1 and s2 are independent (i.e., failure of s1 does not affect reliability of s2) 
 
Reliability Equations 
The reliability of parallel components is computed below. 
Rdo = Rd1 + Rd2 - Rd1 Rd2: reliability of two components in parallel (i.e., redundancy) (16) 
Rso = Rs1 + Rs2 – Rs1 Rs2: reliability of two components in parallel (i.e., redundancy) (17) 
The redundancy characteristics are re-elaborated in Figures 5 and 6.  
 
Data Values 
Mean values of security database and security equipment reliabilities were obtained from 
Congressional Research Service reports as follows: 
Rd1, Rd2, Rs1, Rs2: specified between 0 and 1, and randomized, with a mean ≅ .96 [CRS04] 
Probability that the passenger is a terrorist = Pt: specified between 0 and 1, and randomized, 
with a mean ≅ .05 [CRS04] 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Randomization of Rd1, Rd2, Rs1, Rs2, and Pt, within the specified constraints, provides a degree 




 The effectiveness of terrorist detection at the gate is obtained by melding PGs with the 
reliabilities obtained by redundant component analysis, as shown in equation (18).  
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 Effectiveness is a better metric of ability to detect terrorists than PGs alone, because, whereas 
PGs is a function of the accuracy and speed of the database and equipment, it does not include 
reliability. If accuracy and speed are high, but reliability is low, overall effectiveness of detection 
will be low.   
  
 
Effectiveness of security measures at the gate = EG: 
 
EG = PGs Rdo RSo = (1 – p)3 (Rd1 + Rd2 - Rd1 Rd2) (Rs1 + Rs2 – Rs1 Rs2)   (18) 
 
Also, using equations (16) and (17), EG = (1- p)3  Rdo RSo      
 (19) 
dE 2 2 2G =-3(1-p) R R =0,(1-p) =0,1-2p+p =0,p =1,p =1do so 1 2dp
    
 (21) 
2dEG =6(1-p)R Rdo so2dp
         
      (22) 
For p1 = p2 = 1, 
2dEG
2dp
 = 0,  ⇒  neither minimum or maximum 
For p1 =1, EGs = 0 
For p2 = 0, EG = Rdo RSo 
The policy implication of Figure 7, where  EG is plotted against p is to make Rd1, Rd2, Rs1, 
Rs2 as high as possible, because from equations (16) and (17), this will maximize Rdo and Rso, 
respectively.  Of course, this plan must be consistent with cost and technical considerations 
(i.e., state of the practice with respect to achieving reliability). Doing this will maximize EG at 
probability of non detection = p = 0, as can be seen in Figure 7. 
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 Figure 5. Redundancy in Security Database System 
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 Evaluation of Relative Terrorist Threats at the Ticket Counter, Security Station, and 
Gate 
 
 Figure 8 quantifies what seems intuitive about a terrorist escaping detection at the ticket 
counter, security station, and gate. That, is the more stations that fail to detect the terrorist, the 
easier it is for him to go undetected at succeeding stations. In Figure 8, this is portrayed by 
the optimal probability of non detection p increasing from ticket counter to security station, 
and, finally, the probability of non detection increasing monotonically with p, at the gate. The 
policy implication is clear: stop the terrorist as soon as possible, preferably at the ticket 
counter. This objective is crucial when we consider that the terrorist’s chances of achieving at 
least partial success (i.e., high probability of non detection) exceeds 75 per cent, according to 
[JOH91]. According to the model, as Figure 8 shows, this level of success would not be 
achieved at the ticket counter or security station but could be accomplished at the gate.  
 
Unfortunately, the ticket counters are under the control of the airlines and are the entity 
least subject to control by the government. A compromise solution might be to emphasize 
detection at the security station because it is under the control of the TSA and airport 
management and has the advantage of containing luggage checking equipment and, in the 
future may be equipped with a security database, as an additional check on passengers. 















 Actors and Facilities 
 
 As shown in Figure 0, the security process actors are airline ticket agents, security station 
personnel (TSA and airport luggage screeners), and airline personnel at the gate; not shown is the 
flight crew. The security measures exercised by the crew are beyond the scope of this research. 
For the security system to work, there must be communication and coordination among these 
actors. The 9/11 report states that better coordination between the FAA and the airlines is needed 
[911, p. 10]. In addition, as stated in [JOH91]: “Good airport security involves outthinking the 
terrorist. It also involves cooperation among all agencies that can, together, block security 
loopholes that begins with ticket purchase and ends when the plane takes off”. In response, TSA 
is developing a computer network to tie together administrative, passenger screening, and 
baggage screening areas [DHS05].  
 
The TSA has obvious influence over airport and airline security personnel. In the model, this 
is accomplished, in part, by the security database. This capability seems to be lacking in airports 
at present. In addition to the database, an important contributor to terrorist detection is the number 
and quality of airport screeners. With respect to the former, TSA reports that the number of 
screeners has dropped from 60,000 to 45,000 due to insufficient funding [CSI04]. An additional 
concern is that the DHS Inspector General issued a report in September 2004 stating that Federal 
screening improvements were needed in training, equipment, and technology, policy and 
procedures, and management and supervision [SEC05]. Improvements in equipment and 



















f Probability of Non Detection at Ticket Counter
Probability of Non Detection at Security Station





 technology could be achieved by using highly reliable and effective security database and 
security equipment for checking carry on luggage, checked luggage, and cargo.  
 
In the model, the flight crew does not have access to the database because airline personnel at 
the gate would provide a security check prior to passenger boarding. The gate represents a further 
opportunity for passenger security database checking, before the passenger boards [JOH91]. 




Information flow, as opposed to physical flow, which is shown in Figure 0, is shown in 
Figure 9. This figure shows the important quantities associated with queuing at the various 
security checking facilities. An objective of this section is to expose security vulnerabilities that 




Refer to Figure 9 when reading the definitions: 
 
λA: mean rate at which passengers approach the ticket counter in passengers per minute 
 
λ : passenger input rate at Security StationS : mean rate at which passengers approach the 
security station in passengers per minute  
 
λ : passenger input rate at GateG : mean rate at which passengers approach the gate in 
passengers per minute 
 
µ :passenger service rate at Ticket CounterA : mean rate passengers can be served at the 
ticket counter in passengers per minute 
 
µ  :passenger service rate at Security StationS : mean rate passengers can go through the 
security check at the security station in passengers per minute 
 
µ :passenger service rate at GateG : mean rate passengers can be boarded at the gate in 
passengers per minute 
 
ρ :utilization at Ticket CounterA : mean fraction of time that ticket counter is busy serving 
passengers 
 
ρ :utilization at Security StationS : mean fraction of time security station is busing doing 
security checks on passengers 
58
  
ρ :utilization at the GateG : mean fraction of time that the agents at the gate are busy serving 
passengers 
 
Passenger Security Processing Scenario 
 
 Passengers approach the ticket counter with a mean input rate of λA passengers per 
minute. The queue characteristics at the ticket counter are the number of agent stations (i.e., 
servers) MA, queue utilization ρA, and queue service rate µA in passengers per minute. In addition, 
the terrorist could be carrying on luggage Co, checking luggage Ch, or requesting that luggage be 
delivered to the cargo bay of the plane Ca. The concern about cargo has received increase 
emphasis of late because TSA is not only responsible for passenger security but cargo security as 
well [CSI04]. 
 
 It is interesting to note the practice of El Al Airlines that first x-rays baggage destined for the 
cargo hold and then subjects it to depressurization to simulate flight conditions [JOH91]. The 
concept is that either the x-rays will expose weapons or depressurization will cause premature 
detonation. In addition, it has been recommended that vapor sniffing machines be added to the x-
ray capability [JOH91]. 
 
Furthermore, “the success of TSA in fulfilling its aviation security mission depends heavily 
on the quality of its staff and the capability and reliability of the equipment (i.e., overall reliability 
Rs) to screen passengers and cargo in order to identify terrorists and terrorists’ weapons, while 
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Figure 9. Security Checking Information Flow
λ : passenger input rate at TicketCounterA
λ : passenger input rate at Security StationS
λ : passenger input rate at GateG
µ :passenger service rate at Ticket CounterA
µ  :passenger service rate at Security StationS
µ :passenger service rate at GateG
MA: number of servers at Ticket Counter
MS: number of servers at Security Station
MG: number of servers at Gate
ρ :utilization at Ticket CounterA
ρ :utilization at Security StationS
ρ :utilization at the GateG
Co: carry on luggage
Ch: checked luggage
λ :passenger input rate at PlaneP





 Integrating Probability of Non Detection with Queue Characteristics 
 
Now, we integrate the probability of non detection with the queue characteristics of the 
stations, such as the station service rate. Why would there be this relationship? The answer is that 
as the personnel at the stations are pressured to process passengers at increasing rates, their ability 
to detect terrorists decreases as they are distracted by the growing passenger flow rate. Therefore, 
we expect the probability of non detection to increase with increasing service rate (i.e., increasing 
number of passengers serviced per unit time).  
  
 To determine the mean input rate at the ticket counter λA, compute equation (23): 
 
λA = C / t            
         (23) 
 
where C = plane mean capacity = 400 passengers (assumed) and t is the time required to process 
passengers at the three facilities = 100 minutes (assumed). Therefore, λA = 4 passengers per 
minute (mean). 
 
A security vulnerability could be created by the agents becoming overloaded by the size of 
the queue with the result that security checking becomes inadequate. Indeed, this very factor was 
discovered in the airports of Europe where passengers going through the screening process 
produced the assembly line effect, causing security personnel to become much less vigilant 
[JOH91]. This vulnerability is represented by the queue utilization ρA, as given by equation (24), 
taking into account the overall reliability of the security checking equipment Rso. Recall from 
Figure 0, that we are concerned with the reliability Rso of the ticket counter, security station, and 
gate. Thus, Rso appears in the queuing equations below. 
 





           
        (24)    
            
     
Solving for µA yields equation (25): 
 
λ RA soµ =A ρ MA A
           
        (25) 
 
Since the service rate at the ticket counter µA = the input rate at the security station λS, (see 
Figure 9), we can develop equation (26) for the service rate µS at the security station: 
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 µ RA soµ =S ρ MS S
          
        (26) 
 
Since the service rate at the security station µS = the input rate at the gate λG, (see Figure 9), 
we can develop equation (27) for the service rate µG at the gate: 
 
µ RS soµ =G ρ MG G
          
        (27) 
 
Equations (25, 26, and 27) indicate that the vulnerability could be mitigated by reducing Rso 
or increasing the number of servers. Interestingly, reducing Rso, while helping to close this 
vulnerability, would decrease the Effectiveness of Detection at the gate! (see equation 18). Thus, 
there is a tradeoff between  Rso and the number of servers, as they affect the Effectiveness of 
Detection and service rate, respectively. 
 
 At this point, we provide an example, to illustrate the analysis of the results of the 
example calculations of the relationships between service rate and number of servers, between 
probability of non detection and service rate, and between probability that the passenger is a 
terrorist and the estimated number of terrorists: 
 
The data used in this example are the following: 
 
Rso = Rs1 + Rs2 – Rs1 Rs2: reliability of two components in parallel   
 (28) 
 
Rs1, Rs2, Rs1, Rs2: mean ≈ .98 
 
ρA = .8 (assumed from observation of ticket counter operations) 
 
ρS = .9 (assumed from observation of security station operations: higher service rate 
requirement that ticket counter) 
 
MA = 1, …, 20 
 
MS = 1, …, 20 
 
Pt = probability that passenger is a terrorist = N / C (on  plane)    
 (29) 
 
N= 0,…,10 terrorists on plane 
 
C: Capacity of plane = number of passengers. See Table 1 
 
Sample size = 10 or 20 depending on variable 
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Example Calculations 
 
 Ticket Counter 
 
 In Figure 10, we see that the service rate at the ticket counter µA decreases rapidly with 
the number of servers MA, at first, but then decreases less rapidly later, reaching  an optimal value 
at µA = .62 passengers per minute; this occurs at  MA = 8 servers. The optimal µA is obtained from 
Figure 11, where the probability of non detection at ticket counter PAf is maximum at µA = .62. A 
possible explanation for this relationship in Figure 11 is that initially the ticket agents are unable 
to cope with the passenger input rate λA, thus allowing an increase in the probability of non 
detection PAf. Eventually, at service rate µA = .62, the agents adjust, get the security process under 
control, and PAf decreases. The policy implication for airline managers is that providing more 
than eight agents, (see Figure 10), from a security standpoint, would be a waste of money and 
personnel. Of course, this may not be the correct policy from the standpoint of customer 
satisfaction. 
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 Figure 11. Probability of Non Detection at Ticket Counter, PAf, vs. 
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 Figure 12, illustrates dramatically the danger in letting a terrorist past the ticket counter: 
In Figure 11, we saw that after the service rate at the ticket counter reached .62 passengers per 
minute, the probability of non detection steadily decreases. No such benign condition exists at the 
security station, where the probability of non detection increase monotonically with service rate. 
Therefore, the policy implication for airline and airport managers is to stop the terrorist at the 
ticket counter!  
 
 Analysis of Terrorist Factors 
 
  Figure 13 shows the relationship between the probability that a passenger is a terrorist Pt 
and the estimated number of passengers who are terrorists. We see that the Pt ranges between 
.001 and .039, for N ranging between 0 and 9, respectively; these are significant probabilities in 
light of the damage that terrorists did on 9/11, where a priori the probability of such a successful 
attack was considered insignificant. Therefore, since the number of terrorists, and their 
probabilities of occurrence, are areas not under the control of airport management, the policy 
implication is that they must be prepared to handle a number of incidents of high severity in the 
foreseeable future, and it behooves them to greatly improve the reliability and accuracy of 
detection hardware and software. 
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 Countermeasures to the threats, consistent with the previous section, involve the 
following: 
 
Ticket Counter and Gate 
 
 Reduce the service rate of airline personnel at the ticket counter (µA) and gate (µG) by 
increasing the number of agents MA, MG, respectively. The first countermeasure may not be 
attractive to the airlines because of the personnel cost involved and limited space for additional 
personnel. The second countermeasure may be even less attractive because the number of gates is 
governed by airport design. More space could be considered when airports are redesigned or 




 Reduce the service rate of the security station (µS) by increasing the number of stations 
MS. This option is attractive because the TSA controls TSA personnel and equipment and airport 
screeners. Thus, Congressional funding might be considered for more security personnel and 
equipment, airport space permitting.  
 
 Increase the reliability of the security station equipment Rs. This quantity influences 




 As we have seen, the quality of the security database can have a pervasive effect on the 
ability to detect terrorists. Since the security database is accessed by all facilities, its reliability 
could be considered a high priority for Congressional funding.   
  
What If Analysis 
 
Terrorist with False Identification  
 
One of the critical situations that would mitigate against terrorist detection: what if the 
terrorist carries a false identification? This means that the security database checks at the ticket 
counter, security station, and gate could fail. Then, the only facility to catch the terrorist is the x-
ray equipment at the security station for checking luggage. The implication of this is that the 
terrorist could only be stopped at the security station. With only the luggage check to stop a 
terrorist, we now need a probability of non detection PSf < .65, as shown in Figure 8, for the 
security station, as opposed to a probability of non detection PAf < .35, for the ticket counter, also 
shown in Figure 8. At the security station,  PSf does not decline until .65, as opposed to  PAf 
declining at .35, in the case of the ticket counter. If the database check were working at the ticket 
counter, it would be easier to catch the terrorist there, as shown in Figure 8. However, what if the 
ticket counter security check is not working! What is the policy implication of this scenario? It 
means that the TSA and airport and airline managers need to operate as though the security 
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 database will fail at all stations (even with redundant equipment), and the only line of defense is 
luggage x-ray equipment. Each manager must assess the security threat in a worst case scenario 
and guarantee that an adequate level of security is maintained. 
 
Database and Equipment Failures 
 
 Another “what if” situation, with less adverse consequences than the above, is when the 
primary security database equipment d1 fails or the primary security equipment s1 fails. This 
adversity is covered by the redundant back up equipment d2 and s2, respectively. The implication 
for management in this case is to have a switchover and repair policy that can bring all units back 
on line as soon as feasible. 
 
Security Station Performance 
 
 “What if” the queue characteristics that were evaluated in the “Integrating Probability of 
Non Detection with Queue Characteristics” section, do not hold. For example, what if we use the 
Department of Transportation goal that passenger wait time for security processing not exceed 10 
minutes [CRS04] (e.g., at the security station): tsw ≤ 10 minutes. 
Actually, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics found, in 2003 [CRS04], that tsw = 18 minutes 
(mean). We will evaluate and compare the goal with the real world experience to note the effect 
of passenger wait time on the probability of non detection at the security station. Continuing the 
analysis, and noting that the reciprocal of the service time is equal to the service rate (i.e., µs = 1 / 
tss), we have the following equations: 
 
tst = total time in security station system (wait time = tsw + service time = tss)   (30) 
 
Case 1: tsw ≤ 10 minutes per passenger: 
tst ≤ (10 + tss)          
        (31) 
tss ≥ (tst -10 )          
        (32) 
tst ≤ (1 / µS) + 10 minutes per passenger       
    (33) 
 
Case 2: tsw = 18 minutes per passenger (mean): 
 tst = 18 + tss          
        (34) 
 tss = tst – 18          
        (35) 
 tst = (1 / µS) + 18 minutes per passenger (mean)      
   (36) 
 
Now from equation (26), we have: 
 




 Combining (26) with (33), we obtain equations (37) for Case 1: 
 
ρ MS St +10st µ RA so
≤           
       (37)  
 
Combining (26) with (36), we obtain equations (38) for Case 2: 
 
ρ MS St +18st µ RA so
=           
       (38) 
 
The  results of this analysis are shown in Figure 14 for Case 1 (equation 37) and Case 2 
(equation 38). The two curves are separated by a time of 8 minutes, as the two equations indicate. 
By providing upper bound and mean values, a band of total time of processing passengers tst is 
provided that airport managers can use for estimating tst for a given value of probability of non 
detection PSf at the security station. In addition, we note that if the managers lose control of 
passenger processing time, and it exceeds the allowable band, PSf will increase. 
Figure 14. Total Time of Security Check at Security Station,tst, vs. Probability of Non 
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 Based on the foregoing analysis that showed a preference for security improvements that 




 Increase the accuracy and reliability of security checking equipment 
 





Implement, if the system does not exist, a high accuracy and reliable security database at the 
nation’s airports 
 
 For existing databases, increase their accuracy and reliability 
 
Maintain a centralized database of all passenger flight activity and perform security checks at 
all security points, using this database. 
 
Include the use of fingerprints or photographs in the database of passengers as one way of 
positively identifying each passenger on each flight. However, this kind of surveillance 
would likely face serious legal and privacy challenges [BBC05]. 
. 
Future Research Directions 
 
The focus of future research will be to visit several major airports and hold discussions with 
airport managers for the purpose of collecting detailed security data and to obtain their opinions 
about the validity of the model. In addition, we will attempt to validate the model, based on the 
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 Appendix: Spreadsheet Data and Computations 
 
p PAf PSf PGf PGs Rd1 Rd2 Rs1 Rs2 EG
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9942 0.9897 0.9822 0.9991 0.9999
0.05 0.1354 0.0071 0.0001 0.8574 0.9840 0.9776 0.9757 0.9608 0.8563
0.1 0.2430 0.0270 0.0010 0.7290 0.9708 0.9817 0.9892 0.9764 0.7284
0.15 0.3251 0.0574 0.0034 0.6141 0.9906 0.9910 0.9861 0.9983 0.6141
0.2 0.3840 0.0960 0.0080 0.5120 0.9901 0.9990 0.9819 0.9612 0.5116
0.25 0.4219 0.1406 0.0156 0.4219 0.9606 0.9757 0.9755 0.9937 0.4214
0.3 0.4410 0.1890 0.0270 0.3430 0.9858 0.9848 0.9617 0.9771 0.3426
0.35 0.4436 0.2389 0.0429 0.2746 0.9777 0.9940 0.9914 0.9950 0.2746
0.4 0.4320 0.2880 0.0640 0.2160 0.9655 0.9924 0.9704 0.9708 0.2158
0.45 0.4084 0.3341 0.0911 0.1664 0.9882 0.9756 0.9829 0.9705 0.1662
0.5 0.3750 0.3750 0.1250 0.1250 0.9660 0.9807 0.9826 0.9610 0.1248
0.55 0.3341 0.4084 0.1664 0.0911 0.9654 0.9994 0.9623 0.9831 0.0911
0.6 0.2880 0.4320 0.2160 0.0640 0.9805 0.9803 0.9832 0.9989 0.0640
0.65 0.2389 0.4436 0.2746 0.0429 0.9807 0.9844 0.9706 0.9987 0.0429
0.7 0.1890 0.4410 0.3430 0.0270 0.9683 0.9992 0.9750 0.9916 0.0270
0.75 0.1406 0.4219 0.4219 0.0156 0.9655 0.9673 0.9889 0.9875 0.0156
0.8 0.0960 0.3840 0.5120 0.0080 0.9882 0.9965 0.9905 0.9608 0.0080
0.85 0.0574 0.3251 0.6141 0.0034 0.9652 0.9669 0.9605 0.9652 0.0034
0.9 0.0270 0.2430 0.7290 0.0010 0.9974 0.9852 0.9940 0.9851 0.0010
1 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.9645 0.9697 0.9734 0.9752 0.0000
mean 0.9774 0.9846 0.9789 0.9805  
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 Rdo Rso MA µΑ MS µS MG µG Pt N C
0.9999 1.0000 1 5.00 1 5.555 1 7.936 0.051 5 106
0.9996 0.9990 2 2.50 2 1.386 2 0.989 0.035 7 189
0.9995 0.9997 3 1.67 3 0.617 3 0.294 0.001 0 524
0.9999 1.0000 4 1.25 4 0.347 4 0.124 0.016 4 280
1.0000 0.9993 5 1.00 5 0.222 5 0.063 0.017 4 228
0.9990 0.9998 6 0.83 6 0.154 6 0.037 0.023 9 375
0.9998 0.9991 7 0.71 7 0.113 7 0.023 0.011 6 550
0.9999 1.0000 8 0.62 8 0.087 8 0.015 0.005 2 296
0.9997 0.9991 9 0.56 9 0.068 9 0.011 0.039 9 223
0.9997 0.9995 10 0.50 10 0.055 10 0.008 0.019 5 259
0.9993 0.9993 11 0.45 11 0.046 11 0.006
1.0000 0.9994 12 0.42 12 0.039 12 0.005
0.9996 1.0000 13 0.38 13 0.033 13 0.004
0.9997 1.0000 14 0.36 14 0.028 14 0.003
1.0000 0.9998 15 0.33 15 0.025 15 0.002
0.9989 0.9999 16 0.31 16 0.022 16 0.002
1.0000 0.9996 17 0.29 17 0.019 17 0.002
0.9988 0.9986 18 0.28 18 0.017 18 0.001
1.0000 0.9999 19 0.26 19 0.015 19 0.001
0.9989 0.9993 20 0.25 20 0.014 20 0.001
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Abstract 
Satisfying customers is an essential element in software development because it 
enables service providers to benchmark their performance and to identify areas that 
require improvement (Das et al., 1999). However, one of the key challenges in the 
software quality research is to quantify the quality of various non-functional attributes. 
The goal of this study is to quantify quality of non-functional quality attributes using a 
customer survey approach. In order to quantify quality from the customer’s perspective 
the following steps were followed a) Identified quality characteristics, b) developed 
questionnaire and a tool to conduct a quality requirement collection, c) quantified the 
Quality Expectation Score (QES) from expectation survey, d) conducted satisfaction 
survey after product delivery and quantified the Quality Satisfaction Score (QSS), and e) 
finally compared QES with QSS to judge how well the customer’s expectations were 
met. The methodology was designed and tested with a product as a case study1. The 
survey raw data were converted into information that can be used by managers in 
understanding customer’s expectation and satisfaction. The result of the expectation 
survey showed the importance of different attributes and customer’s expectation. The 
satisfaction survey results explained where improvements were needed. Final comparison 
between satisfaction and expectation survey showed how the quality satisfaction score 
                                                 
1 The case study was not conducted in John Deere. 
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 can help software engineers and other technical staff to identify opportunities for ongoing 
process improvements and to monitor the impact of those improvements.             
1. Introduction 
Software plays an important role both in our personal and work lives. As the software 
take control of so many aspects of our life, the failure of software results in immense 
losses. For example, software bugs are costing the U.S. economy an estimated $59.5 
billion each year, in which more than half of the cost is borne by end users and the 
remainder by the developers and vendors (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [NIST]), 2002). In another study by Boston Globe (2000) reported that the 
cost of failed projects for the U.S. IT industry in the year 2000 was estimated at $84 
billion. Thus, delivering “quality product” or “quality services” is important concern in 
software development field. 
 To understand and measure quality, researchers have often built models of how 
quality characteristics relate to one another. Best known quality models are ISO 9126, 
McCall’s model, Boehm’s model and Dromey’s model using functional and non-
functional attributes. Although many researchers mentioned the importance of non-
functional attributes, non-functional issues have received little attention compared to 
functional issues in the software quality measurements. “Non-functional requirements are 
explicit statements of some aspect of the design, development or performance in the very 
broadest sense of an application” (Acquisition Management System, 2005). During the 
software development process non-functional requirements are not very often taken into 
account (Rosa et al., 2001)  Franch (1997) precisely summarizes why non-functionality is 
so important. He says “the lack of non-functional issues in software components has 
some negative effects on many software development tasks that include specification, 
implementation, maintenance and reusability”.  In every definition of quality the 
satisfaction of user’s expectations is emphasized (Stavrinoudis et al., 2005).  
 In addition, satisfying customers is also an essential element in software 
development because it enables service providers to benchmark their performance and to 
identify areas that require improvement. However, one of the key challenges in software 
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 quality research is to quantify the quality of various non-functional requirement attributes 
from the customer perspective. By getting the user’s perception of software quality, we 
can proceed towards corrective actions and define market strategies. (Stavrinoudis et al., 
2005).  As Svahnberg, et al. (2005) points out that quality can not be added to the systems 
as an afterthought, it has to be built into the system right from the beginning.  In order to 
add quality from the beginning, it is important to know what the customer’s expectations 
regarding quality. Most of the researchers have focused on how to conduct customer 
satisfaction surveys efficiently and how customer’s opinion changes progressively as they 
use the software. 
The goal of this study is to quantify quality of non-functional quality attributes using 
customer survey approach. This was achieved through surveying the customers before the 
product development to get their non-functional quality expectation level and after the 
product development to get their quality satisfaction level.  
2. Methodology 
In order to quantify quality from the customer’s view the following nine steps 
were followed (Figure 1). This study was designed and tested with a small company 
where the end product requirement was developed. The end product’s main 
functionalities are data entry, data manipulation and visualization.  First step was to 
identify the important non-functional attributes to end product.  Several Meetings were 
organized with customers resulting in identifying the five most important non-functional   
attributes Reliability, Maintainability, Security, Performance and Usability. For this study 
the customers answered two surveys, first survey was to help identify their quality 
expectations for these five non-functional attributes and second survey was to measure 
their satisfaction level. The first survey was taken in the analysis phase and the second 




Figure 1. Overall methodology used in this study  
 
The second step involved the development of questionnaire. After successfully 
identifying the quality characteristics, a questionnaire was developed. The questions were 
created focusing on what would be important to day to day users, IT managers and the 
business owners within the company.  The questionnaire was given at the end of the 
functional requirement collection but before customers signing off the functional 
requirement document. Similarly, for each non-functional quality attributes (Reliability 
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 (RE), Maintainability (MA), Security (SE), Performance (PE) and Usability (US)) five 
questions that were well related to the product were developed. Customers were asked to 
a give numerical score (NS) of 1 to 5, 1 being unimportant and 5 being very important. A 
numerical score was calculated using an average of all the five questions. Then the 
customers were also asked to weigh (W) the characteristics to get the relative importance.  
W of all the characteristics is equal to 1. Importance of weighting factor in survey was 
discussed by several authors (Voas, 2003). To make this weighing process easier, 
customers were asked how much they would be willing to spend for each characteristic if 
they were given 100% budget. Finally the quality expectation score was calculated using 
the following formula. 
                                                                                      5 
Quality Expectation Score (QESj) for one customer = ∑ NESi * Wi  
                                                                                                                                i=1 
Where NESi = mean of all the 5 expectation questions for a quality characteristic 
n = number of customers surveyed 
 
The overall Quality Expectation Score was calculated using total Quality Expectation 
Score(QES) upon total number (n). 
 
Overall Quality Expectation Score (QES) = QESj / n 
 
After creating relevant questions, the customers were educated to understand the 
terminology used to explain the characteristic of the quality. We gave a presentation 
covering the meaning of Reliability, Maintainability, Security, Performance and Usability 
and the goal of this experiment. 
In third step, a survey tool was developed because it was easy for the customers to 
answer the questions, save the survey results directly into the database and for the data 
manipulation. In order to achieve this goal, the user interface for the end product was 
developed in Java and on the backend SQL server was used as the RDBMS The 
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 customer’s expectation responses were colleted and stored in the database. After 
collecting the quality expectations from the customers, the data was analyzed and 
interpreted.  
After the product was delivered to the customer, the survey tool was used again 
for the satisfaction survey. The feedback was received through another survey called 
“satisfaction survey”.  The expectation survey was used to understand the customers’ 
need before the product developed, whereas the satisfaction survey was conducted to 
study how the customer was satisfied with the end product.  Once the product was 
delivered and the users started using the product, the same questionnaire was given again 
to understand the customer satisfaction with few changes. The changes include instead of 
asking the expectation score, the users were asked to rate the questions based on how 
satisfied they are with the product and they were not asked to weigh the characteristics. 
Customers were again asked to give numerical score of 1 to 5, 1 being unsatisfied and 5 
being satisfied. Customers used the same tool with some word changes for the second 
survey. Finally, quality satisfaction score was stored in the database and later analyzed. 
Similar to expectation, a Quality satisfaction score was developed with the following 
formula.        
                                                                                       5  
Quality Satisfaction Score (QSSj) for one customer = ∑ NSSi * Wi  
                                                                                                                                i=1 
Overall Quality Satisfaction Score (QSS) = QSSj / n 
NSS – Numerical score from satisfaction survey 
W – weigh from original survey  
n – Number of customers surveyed 






 3. Results and Discussion 
We have used four ways to view the customer survey results for both expectation 
and satisfaction. The first approach examines the distribution of the detailed response 
data for each key quality requirement. The second method compares the quality 
expectation between attributes. The third view shows the order of relative importance of 
the attributes from the weighing method and final method summarizes the overall 
quantification score of the quality.  
 
3.1. Quality Expectation Survey Results 
3.1.1 Distribution of Each Key Quality Requirement 
To produce this report, the survey responses to all five questions related to those 
quality characteristic were averaged for expectation level and for importance. For each 
requirement, the value was plotted as bar graph. The expectation number is shown on the 
X axis, and Y-axis shows the expectation questions. In addition, Standard Deviation 
(STDEV) is also calculated to see how many customers are close to the mean value. In 
other words, STDEV helps to understand if customers are agreeing with each other. The 
STDEV is the short line on the X axis along with the expectation number. This view 
allows managers and technical staff to quickly identify expectation requirements from the 
customers. Table 1 shows customer expectation survey questions for each quality 
attribute. In this paper we only give a detailed description of one quality characteristics – 
reliability. 
  












RE1. Implementation of the required functionalities without crashes or service 
interruptions 
RE2. Implementation of the required functionalities without any errors or problems 
RE3. Ability to recover from crash in timely manner 
RE4. Ability to recover from crash without loosing data 
RE5. Being able to do a task without doing workaround 
Maintainability 
MA1: Ability to add functionalities to the software in future. 
MA2: Ability to correct the errors reported by the users in timely manner 
MA3. Availability of software 24/7 
MA4. Availability of technical support in case of difficulty 
MA5. Software is not affected by multiple users 
Security 
SE1. Editing department specific information should be restricted to certain users. 
SE2. Deleting department specific information should be restricted to certain users. 
SE3. Importing data from other sources should be restricted to certain users. 
SE4. Importance of restricting users to view certain sections (example: Admin 
section) 
SE5. Importance of restricting users to adding new user should be restricted to 
certain users. 
Performance 
PE1. There should not be any performance delays with multiple users. 
PE2. Updates must show immediately. 
PE3. All new records must show up immediately. 
PE4. Software should have same performance while running on different platform.  
PE5. Application should start-up immediately. 
Usability 
US1. Importance of having screens similar to the application currently in use. 
US2. In case of error the displayed message should be easily understandable. 
US3. Comprehensive help message. 
US4. Software should display status messages in case of operational delays. 
US5. Software should be easily learnable for novice users. 
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Reliablity Expectation Average RE_EX_STDV
 
  Figure 2. Reliability (RE) expectation (EX) summary (RE_EX_STDV = Reliability 
Expectation Standard Deviation). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates an example for reliability expectation report that summarizes the 
survey results and indicates the current customer expectation level with each of the 
reliability quality attribute requirements. From this figure it is clear that the overall 
expectation for reliability shows the value above 4 that indicates the customer 
expectations for all the five questions are very important. It is also clear for IT managers 
and developers from figure 2 that customer was very keen on crash free product and more 
emphasis should be given for these attributes. Summary report also reveals that the 
“implementation of the required functionalities without crashes or service interruptions” 
is much more important to the customer than other reliability requirements. It is evident 
from the standard deviation that everyone agrees. It is also interesting to note that the 






 3.1.2 Comparison between Five Expectation Quality Attributes 
 Figure 3 shows the customer’s expectation for all the quality attributes. This was 
calculated by averaging all the responses of the user surveyed. It is clear from the chart is 
that customer’s overall expectation was very high with all scores above 3.5. Within these 
five attributes, reliability and performance have the highest value and it shows that 
customer wants very reliable software. Security is the least important attribute. The order 
of importance was Reliability > Maintainability > Performance > Usability > Security. 
                    
            Figure 3. Comparison between expectation quality attributes. 
 
3.1.3 Weighting between the Quality Attributes 
Users were asked to weigh the attributes to show which quality attribute is 
important to this particular product. In this Figure 4 it is clear that users rated usability 
and reliability were the most important quality attributes for this product. Security and 
performance were given relatively low importance. The order of relative importance was 
Usability>Reliability > Maintenance> Performance > Security.   
 






Expectation Quality Attributes Comparison 
Average
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Figure 4. Relative importance of the five expectation quality attributes. 
 
3.1.4 Quantifying the Overall Quality Expectation Score (QES) 
The main goal of this research is to quantify the quality and provide a single score 
which will provide not only the developers but also all the stakeholders to understand the 
overall customer’s expectation and satisfaction. The overall Quality Expectation score 
(QES) was calculated using the formula given below. 
QES = (MESRE * WRE) + (MESMA* WMA) + (MESSE * WSE) + (MESPE * WPE) + 
(MESUS*WUS) 
 
Where: MES: Mean expectation survey for each quality attribute and W: Weighing given 
by the customer for that characteristic. 
 In this case study, overall QES was 4.34. This shows that the quality expectations 
were very high for the customer. There are nine customers surveyed in this example. We 
are aware that this number is not statistically significant, but these 9 people are 100% 
customers involved with this software.  
From the quality expectation survey it was easy to understand what the customers are 
really looking for with respect to quality. During the functional requirement collection 
users were stating that security was very important, but the survey actually showed that 
Percentage Weight
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 users were really looking for reliable and usable software. This expectation survey also 
gave us an opportunity to discuss other problems related to quality and helped to improve 
customer relationship. It gave the opportunity for the customers to convey what they 
really wanted instead of a round table meeting, where their thoughts can be influenced by 
others. This process made users understand that a software product has its own 
characteristics.  It is also interesting to note that IT administrator’s expectation is very 
different from end users expectation (Figure 5). 









                 Figure 5.  Quality expectations between IT admin and end users 
3.2. Quality Satisfaction Survey 
 After the quality requirements were collected, the product was developed, 
tested and delivered to the customers. Customers were using the product for 
approximately three months, and then the satisfaction survey was conducted. Figure 7 
shows the summary of Quality Satisfaction Survey results for all five attributes. The 
expected results are also shown in Figure 6. In the satisfaction survey same questions 
were asked but users were asked to rate the questions based on how satisfied they were 
with the product.    
 Even though we analyzed all five attributes key quality requirements in the 
project, in this example, we are demonstrating only the reliability satisfaction. The 
comparison graph clearly depicts that overall none of the reliability qualities are met the 
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 customer’s expectations (Figure 6). The graph shows that the satisfaction level for 
attribute reliability is more than 2.5 when comparing with expectation level; it is obvious 
that the product’s reliability needs some improvement, especially for Reliability question 
1 which has very low satisfaction level 2.78. The result shows that product is not as stable 
as the users wanted. These scores give the technical staff and mangers to quickly view the 
product status. As we look closely, Reliability question 1, Reliability question 2 and 
Reliability question 5 i.e. crash, error handling and workarounds are required more 
















Reliability Sat isfact ion
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Figure 6.  Quality Satisfaction Score summary for all five attributes. 
EX stands for Expectation, SA – Stands for Satisfaction. 
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 3.2.2 Overall Comparison between Expectation and Satisfaction survey 
The Figure 7 below shows customer expectation and the satisfaction results. This graph helps to see 
where improvement is needed. It is clear from the graph that customer’s satisfaction scores were lower than 
their expectation scores. Out of these five attributes, the customer had higher satisfaction for usability and 
maintainability attributes. The least satisfaction was noted for security attribute. Even though the customer 
reliability expectations were high, the product did not achieve the higher customer satisfaction. These score 
shows the developers can do work more on reliability related issue.  









Figure 7. Comparison between expectation and satisfaction survey scores 
 
3.2.3 Quantifying the Overall Quality Satisfaction Score (QSS) 
Quality satisfaction for a customer is calculated in this tool, the same weight is used from the expectation 
survey.  
Quality satisfaction score (QSS) for a customer  
QSS = (NSRE * WRE) + (NSMA* WMA) + (NSSE * WSE) + (NSPE * WPE) + (NSUS*WUS) 
Where NSx = mean of all the 5 satisfaction questions for a quality characteristic for x, and x is one of the 5 
quality characteristics. 
Overall satisfaction score is = 3.19 
The overall satisfaction score of 3.19 shows clearly that product needs improvement.  
Gap 
86
 Expectation score is 4.34 and the satisfaction is 3.19. We have met 73.5% of customer’s expectation. This helps 
to understand how we much our customers are satisfied with our product.  
3.3. Limitations of this Study 
It is important to critically evaluate the study. Some of the limitations of this study include survey 
audience and sample size, questionnaire development, importance of weighting,  
The first problem was related to survey audience particularly to figure out whom to survey and sample 
size. We discussed about whether the survey is to be given to all the stakeholders or only to the end users. As 
literature clearly says that correctly determining the target population is critical and if you do not survey the 
right kinds of people, you will not successfully meet the product goals. In this study we have collected the 
functional and quality requirements from the business owners, IT administrators and the end users.  The 
challenge in this approach was the level of technical knowledge from this varied group. In the beginning of the 
process, end users did not understand the technical details and how it impacts the product. We have successfully 
educated the end users and then the survey was done.  The next issue was about how many people you need to 
survey. Statisticians know that a small, representative sample will reflect the group from which it is drawn. The 
larger the sample, the more precisely it reflects the target group. However, the rate of improvement in the 
precision decreases as your sample size increases. As mentioned before, in this research we had only 9 
customers using the product with varied background. This may not be statistically significant. However, our 
goal was to validate our methodology. Future study will explore the sample size and its impact on customer 
survey. 
The second problem was creating the questionnaire. We have chosen five important questions for each 
quality attribute. We believe if more questions were asked subjects would not think carefully about each 
questions. Before the survey was given to the customers we piloted the questions with one end user to make 
sure the questions were understandable. We have created the questions related to the product, and the questions 
can be modified to fit another product.     
The third problem was related to explaining the weighting to the users, we asked them to divide the 
budget of 100% among the characteristics, and this way they understood how to weigh the characteristics. The 
weighing helped to get the relative importance of the attributes (Voas, 2003) to end product. From the 
expectation survey results, it seemed that Reliability was an important attribute for this product, but the 
weighting show that users really valued Usability.  
We also debated sending out the paper survey or to asking them to take a survey using a tool. Tool has 
minimized our data entry work and it has been reused to give the satisfaction survey.  
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 4. Conclusion and Future Direction 
Understanding what the customer wants and expects is very important to any type of business.  This 
study developed a methodology to quantify the quality of non-functional quality attributes using customer 
survey approach. The survey raw data were converted into information that can be used by managers in 
understanding customer’s expectation and satisfaction. Of the non-functional quality characteristics, Reliability, 
Maintainability, Security, Performance and Usability were identified as important attributes. The result of the 
expectation survey showed the importance of different attributes and customer’s expectation. Within these five 
attributes, reliability and performance have the highest value and it shows that customer wants very reliable 
software. The order of importance was Reliability > Maintainability > Performance > Usability > Security.  The 
detailed reliability expectation score showed an overall expectation score of above 4. Customers were very keen 
on a crash free product. On the other hand, security was the least important attributes in customer expectation. 
From the customer survey, the average security expectation score was only 3.6  . The second approach was to 
identify the relative importance between the quality attributes using weighting method. It also showed that 
usability and reliability are the most important quality attributes for this product. The order of relative 
importance was Usability > Reliability > Maintainability > Performance > Security.  The final method 
produced the overall quality expectation score that provided a single score which helps the developer to 
understand the overall customer’s expectation.  The overall quality expectation score was 4.34 which indicate 
the quality expectations were very high for the customer. These three quantification methods help the 
developers and managers to understand the overall customer expectations of the product. Expectation survey 
result has allowed developers to set a goal related to non-functional quality. While testing the product special 
attention was given towards non-functional quality expectations. 
 Comparison between satisfaction and expectation survey showed how quality satisfaction score can 
help software engineers and other technical staff to identify opportunities for ongoing process improvements 
and to monitor the impact of those improvements.  Overall for all the five attributes, the customers’ satisfaction 
scores were lower than their expectation scores. Out of these five attributes, the customer had higher satisfaction 
for usability and maintainability attributes. The least satisfaction was noted for security attribute The 3.19 
satisfaction score and 4.34 expectation score shows that product can be improved. 
 The method used in this study to quantify the quality through customer survey provides a tool for the 
developers and managers to track the product development and successful process. However, the present study 
has certain limitations including the survey audience background and sample size. The future direction of the 
research will explore how customers with different background (for example IT admin versus end users) impact 
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 the result?   The second limitation is related to the sample size used in this study. The future study will also 
concentrate on the development of online or web-based customer survey and also study the optimum number of 
questions to be asked to the customer when conduction survey. Further more, future direction will answer the 
question such as “after the delivery should we conduct surveys in fixed time intervals?” and “Will it help show 
how customer’s satisfaction levels are improving?” 
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How to effectively and efficiently test and assess 
available Web services with similar functionalities 
published by different service providers remains a 
challenge. In this paper, we present a boundary value-




According to the Stencil Group, one leading industry 
analyst firm, Web services are defined as “loosely 
coupled, reusable software components that semantically 
encapsulate discrete functionality and are and 
programmatically accessible over standard Internet 
protocols.” [1] This paradigm of Web services has been 
changing the face of Internet from a repository of data into 
a repository of services in several significant ways [2]. 
First, the model of Web services facilitates Business-to-
Business (B2B) e-Commerce within and across 
organizational boundaries, by means of business 
organizations enabling universal Internet access to their 
software services through standard programmatic 
interfaces [3]. Second, the Web services technology 
enables cross-language and cross-platform interoperability 
for distributed computing and resource sharing, Third, the 
paradigm of Web services enables rapid development of 
new business software by integrating published Web 
services as components. In short, the paradigm of Web 
services is widely considered to be the strategic model for 
the next generation of Internet computing [4, 5]. 
The backbone of the Web services paradigm comprises 
of three fundamental techniques: (1) communication 
protocols, (2) service descriptions, and (3) service 
registration and discovery [6, 7]. Each category has its 
own ad hoc standard: the Simple Object Access Protocol 
(SOAP) [8] acts as a lightweight protocol for exchanging 
structured and typed information between Web services; 
the Web Service Description Language (WSDL) is an 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML)-based description 
language that is used to describe the programmatic 
interfaces of Web services [9]; and the Universal 
Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) standard 
[10] provides a mechanism to publish, register, and locate 
Web services. 
This SOAP+WSDL+UDDI foundation ensures 
publication, discovery, and transportation of a specific 
Web service. However, as more and more Web services 
are published onto the Internet on a daily basis, it is 
apparently that a service requester may need to make a 
decision facing a large set of available Web services with 
similar functionalities. How to effectively and efficiently 
test, assess, and select a Web service that match most 
predefined requirements becomes critical [2]. Moreover, a 
Web service may utilize other third-party Web services as 
components, which fact further worsens the problem. 
Typically, a service requester uses quantitative or 
qualitative Quality of Service (QoS) to assess and 
distinguish a Web service. The QoS of a Web service is 
normally measured against a set of persistent software 
attributes, or so-called “ilities,” such as reliability, 
scalability, efficiency, security, reusability, adaptability, 
interoperability, maintainability, availability, portability, 
etc [11]. If a Web service scores high in the evaluation of 
these attributes (here we omit the exception that some 
attributes naturally conflict with each other, such as the 
fault tolerance and testability,) it is considered as of high 
quality [2]. 
Last fifty years of software development history has 
witnessed the establishment of a research branch software 
testing, which contains a wealth of theories, technologies, 
methodologies, and tools in order to guide the verification 
process of a software product against each of the above 
attributes [12]. However, Web services possess unique 
features; thus, their testing and assessments require further 
investigation. The model of Web services implies that 
Web service components can be dynamically searched, 
located, and invoked at run time [13-16]. This distinctive 
feature of dynamic discovery and invocation requires 
highly efficient testing and assessment of Web services 
components. 
In this paper, we aim to explore effective and efficient 
techniques of automatic Web services test case generation 
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for reliability verification of Web services-oriented 
systems. By “Web services-oriented system”, we mean a 
software system that consists of components that will be 
fulfilled by Web services. It can be a standalone Web 
service or a system composed of multiple Web services 
components. Here we adopt the standard definition of 
software reliability: Musa defined software reliability as 
the probability of failure-free operation of a computer 
program for a specified time in a specified environment 
[17]. Our essential idea is to automatically elicit test cases 
from WSDL documents. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. We will first introduce our boundary 
value-based automatic test case generation approach. 
Then we will discuss our preliminary experiments. Finally 
we will draw conclusions and discuss future work. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we discuss related work. In Section 3, we 
discuss our boundary values-based Web services 
reliability testing approach. In Section 4, we discuss in 
detail how to generate test cases. In Section 5, we present 
our preliminary experiments. In Section 6, we make 
conclusions and discuss future work. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Casati et al. suggested that Web service providers 
define service quality metrics, which contain non-
functional parameters specifying the cost, duration, and 
other characteristics of a service, to help service 
requestors make decisions over multiple candidates [18]. 
However, their work remains as a high-level abstraction 
without technical discussions such as how to construct 
service quality metrics. 
Simulation has been utilized to validate and monitor 
Web services composition. Narayanan and Mcllraith 
translate DAML-S service descriptions of composite 
services into a Petri nets formalism in order to provide 
decision procedures for Web services simulation, 
verification, and composition [19]. Cardoso and Sheth use 
simulation to validate Web services composition based 
upon a mathematical Quality of Service (QoS) model that 
emphasizes on timeliness, cost of service, and reliability 
[20, 21]. Miller and colleagues focused on utilizing 
simulation analysis to monitor Web process composition 
[22]. Lerner uses parameterized state machine to verify 
process models [23]. Contrast with their work, our 
research focuses on efficiently generate test cases to 
assess Web services and concentrate on reliability 
attribute. 
Researchers argued that the selection of component 
services should be performed during the execution of a 
composite service, instead of at design time [13-15]. Zeng 
et al. proposed a global planning selection approach that 
not only takes into account multiple criteria (e.g., price, 
duration, reliability), but also global constraints and 
preferences set by service requestors (e.g., budget 
constraints) [14]. Menascé argued that a Web service 
should be characterized by its functionality, QoS 
attributes, and cost [13]. He proposed that the total 
execution time and cost of the whole composite Web 
service be calculated for the selection of each individual 
service component. However, there still lacks a 
comprehensive QoS model of Web services. Contrast with 
their work, our research intends to investigate how to 
assess reliability of Web services. 
Zhang et al. [24] explored how to measure reliability of 
Web services using the techniques of mobile agents. 
Menascé stated that QoS measures should be evaluated 
from different perspectives: from service providers’ 
perspective and from service requestors’ perspective [25]. 
Menascé presented a way to calculate response time for 
composite Web services on the perspective of service 
requestors [25, 26]. Compared with those work, this 
research explores how to generate test cases for Web 
services reliability assessment. 
Offutt and Xu propose to adopt data perturbation 
technique to generate test cases of testing message 
communications between pairs of Web services. Data 
perturbation includes two approaches: data value 
perturbation modifies values according to the data types 
specified by Web services; and interaction perturbation 
tests on RPC communication and data communication 
[27]. Their goal is to use mutation analysis to find faults 
from Web services. In contrast with their approach, this 
research aims to help service requestors automatically 
create test cases to select Web services found from public 
registry. From a service requestor’s perspective, a Web 
service is a complete black box with its published WSDL 
definitions. Therefore, the basis of our test cases 
generation is the found WSDL definition files of the Web 
services. In addition, their research uses machine-related 
boundary values as data perturbation strategy (e.g., largest 
number for a double data type). Our research proposes 
much finer-grain strategy to find boundary values based 
upon constraining facets and XML schema-referenced 
data type standards. 
 
3. Boundary values-based Web services 
testing 
 
Our research applies boundary values and faulty data 
to test Web services candidates. Our major strategy is to 
generate test cases to eliminate Web service candidates. 
The core challenge is: how to create appropriate test cases 
to efficiently test a Web service candidate. Since it is 
obviously impractical to test every piece of datum in the 
possible input space outlined by the operational profiles, 
the question can be broken down into the following two 
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questions: (1) How to decide possible test case space? and 
(2) How many test cases are sufficient and necessary to 
obtain the full state of a remote Web service? 
In order to answer these two questions, let us re-
examine the goal of the test cases that we are interested. 
As we discussed earlier, the test cases intend to carry back 
the full states of a remote Web service. The full states of 
the Web service are based upon the entire input space, 
which ought to involve the input data that are able to test 
both the functional and non-functional attributes of the 
Web service. The test data related to the functional 
attributes intend to test whether the Web service fulfill the 
functional requirements from the operational profile; and 
the ones related to non-functional attributes intend to test 
the ilities of the Web service, which in the context of the 
specific scenario in our paper imply the reliability of the 
Web service, and more specifically its interoperability. 
Our proposed solution is to utilize boundary values 
together with faulty data perturbed from boundary values 
to quickly verify the reliability of a Web service 
candidate. Each test case will test a Web service upon a 
function call which signature contains several parameters. 
Each parameter requires a specific data type with implicit 
boundary constraints. Our approach focuses on finding out 
the boundary values for each input parameter’s data type. 
Let us take a simple example: suppose that a Web service 
exposes a WSDL interface that includes a string-type 
parameter defined as follows: 
 
 <part name="loginId" type="xs:string"/> 
 
For this parameter, we can test on boundary values 
such as: null, “” (empty string), short string (i.e., one 
character long), very long string (e.g., 200 characters 
long), string containing “new line” character, non-string 
value (i.e., integer 3), etc. 
For every WSDL interface exposed by a Web service, 
we will list boundary values for each input parameter. 
Then we will assemble all boundary values for each input 
parameter to obtain a list of test cases. For example, 
suppose a Web service interface contains three input 
parameters, each one being a string type without further 
constraints. As shown above, each parameter can have 
five boundary values. Assembling them together, we will 
get a list of fifteen different test cases for the functional 
call. 
In short, our strategy of generating test cases to test the 
correctness of a Web service is to find boundary values 
for each parameter. These boundary values are definitely 
within the input domain. In order to test the fault tolerance 
of a Web service, we perturb the boundary values to 
generate faulty data as test cases. Injecting faulty data to 
verify fault tolerance is not new. Traditional software 
testing establishes the fault injection technique [28, 29]. 
However, applying the traditional fault injection technique 
to the domain of Web services testing remains 
challenging. In more detail, we adopted the basic concept 
of the fault injection but we need to solve corresponding 
technical issues. 
Here we will first briefly review the concept of fault 
injection and then discuss the technical challenges we are 
facing in the domain of Web services. Derived from the 
technique used in traditional industry for a long time (e.g., 
automobile manufacture), fault injection is a set of 
techniques that provide worst-case predictions for how 
badly a system will behave in the future [28, 29]. More 
specifically, the Interface Propagation Analysis (IPA) 
technique proposed by Voas and colleagues is an 
advanced fault injection technique to test upon black-box 
like software systems [30]. We believe that IPA is a right 
candidate concept to test the reliability of Web services 
due to the following reason: similar to normally called 
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, users of 
Web services have no access to their internal source code. 
Users can only access Web services via Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) [31] request messages, and get 
results from Web services via SOAP response messages. 
Therefore, Web services exhibit as black-box systems 
from users’ perspectives. 
The IPA technique suggests to inject corrupted data to 
the input of a black-box system [28], and monitors the 
output of the system to obtain knowledge of its fault 
tolerance, as shown in Figure 1(a). IPA can help us test 
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in a software system with respect to two levels: (1) the 
Web service in isolation, and (2) the Web service as a 
component interoperating with other parts of a system. As 
shown in Figure 1(b), the second level can be considered 
along with two scenarios: (2.1) when the Web service 
component returns corrupted information or no 
information at all, and (2.2) when the Web service fails to 
interoperate with other components of the system. In 
short, IPA can be applied to test the degree of how a 
system can tolerate a Web service as a component; or in 
other words, IPA can help test the interoperability of a 
Web service in a system. 
However, although the basic concept of IPA seems 
appropriate to be applied to test both the fault tolerance 
and interoperability of Web services, how to apply the 
IPA technique in the domain of Web services remains a 
challenge. The core challenge of the IPA technique is how 
to create corrupted data for a testing component. Voas and 
colleagues proposed to perturb the input domain to find 
corrupted data [28]. In traditional component-based 
testing, a testing component is already deployed in its 
execution environment; thus, it is feasible to conduct 
arbitrary amount of testing over the testing component. 
When we deal with Web services, on the other hand, we 
are facing remote Web components so that network traffic 
needs to be considered imperatively, let alone the fact that 
some Web services might have access charges associated. 
Furthermore, unlike traditional software components, 
Web services found from public registries oftentimes 
reveal limited information except the access prototypes 
defined in WSDL. Therefore, our strategy of designing 
faulty data to test the fault tolerance of a Web service 
focuses on perturbing the boundary values for each input 
parameter’s data type. Let us take a simple example: 
suppose that a Web service login function requires a 
string-type input parameter with a length limitation of 6 to 
16 characters. 6 and 16 character-long strings are both 
boundary values for the input parameter. Perturbing these 
two boundary values, we can obtain 5 and 17 character-
long strings, which can be used as faulty data to test the 
fault tolerance of the Web service. 
The generated faulty test cases can also be used to test 
the interoperability of a Web service, as shown in Figure 
1(b). As we discussed earlier, we shall actually test the 
interoperability of its substitute - X3’ - of the remote Web 
service. Faulty data should be injected into the X3’, and 
then we will monitor the output of X3’ and the output of 
its successor X4, and so on, as shown in Figure 1(b). 
Notice that the output of X3’ will be the input of X4. Since 
X3’ is a substitute, in order to enable the testing, X3’ 
should already hold the corresponding output values that 
the remote Web service will produce from the expected 
faulty data. In other words, in order to facilitate the local 
interoperability testing, the corresponding mobile agent 
should not only carry the test data from the normal input 
domain specified by the WSDL interface of the Web 
service, but also the faulty input data to acquire a 
comprehensive state of the remote Web service. 
In summary, the faulty data should be divided into two 
sets with different purposes: (1) to test the Web service in 
isolation, as shown in Figure 1(a); and (2) to test the Web 
service as a component in the system environment, as 
shown in Figure 1(b). In order to test the vulnerability of a 
Web service in isolation, we will perturb each boundary 
values to generate faulty test cases, and monitor and 
analyze the post-condition of the Web service to decide 
whether the output events from the Web service is 
undesirable. It should be noted that certain amount of 
testing should be performed to achieve particular level of 
assurance. On the other hand, in order to test the 
interoperability of a Web service in its final operating 
environment, specific operation scenarios and profiles 
need to be considered, in addition to our proposed 
boundary value perturbing approach. Exploring 
generating test cases based upon operation profiles is an 
area of future research. 
 
4. The design of test cases 
 
To be specific, a test case of a Web service is a set of 
mappings between input variables and their values. Each 
test case can be used to generate a SOAP input message to 
test a corresponding Web service. 
 
4.1 The design of test cases for correctness of 
individual Web services 
 
As we discussed in the previous section, we will test 
the correctness of a Web service by applying test cases 
with boundary values elicited from the Web services 
interfaces written in WSDL. Here we will first briefly 
introduce the related WSDL specification on Web 
services interface definition; then we will discuss in detail 
how we extract test cases (including both testing data and 
faulty data) from WSDL definition. 
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WSDL is “an XML format for describing network 
services as a set of endpoints operating on messages 
containing either document-oriented or procedure-
oriented information” [32]. As shown in Figure 2, using 
the WSDL, a Web service is defined as a set of ports, each 
publishing a collection of port types that bind to network 
addresses using common binding mechanism. Every port 
type is a published operation that is accessible through 
messages. Messages are in turn categorized into input 
messages containing incoming data arguments and output 
messages containing results. Each message consists of 
data elements; and every data element must belong to a 
data type, either a XML Schema Definition (XSD) simple 
type or a XSD complex type2. In summary, in order to 
design test cases for a Web service, our basis is its WSDL 
operations, input messages, and output messages. For 
simplicity, we do not consider to design test cases on the 
binding of the Web service. 
Our basic strategy is to design test cases based upon 
boundary values of each formal argument of the published 
WSDL definition of the Web service. It should be noted 
that one major motivation is to enable automatic test case 
generation. Therefore, our challenge here turns into how 
to find efficient boundary values for each formal 
argument. Since each input parameter must be a XML-
allowed data type, it can be either XML built-in types or 
user-defined compound types, as shown in Figure 3. Let 
us discuss XML built-in type first. 
 
4.2 Boundary values for XML built-in primitive 
type 
 
As shown in Figure 3, XML built-in types include 
                                                 
2
 Here we omit the fact that WSDL allows other data type system in 
addition to XSD, since XSD is its canonical type system. 
built-in simple types and built-in complex types. The 
former can be in turn divided into built-in primitive types 
and built-in derived types. A built-in complex type is 
defined in terms of built-in primitive types and built-in 
derived types by unioning their value spaces and lexical 
spaces. Built-in derived types actually depend on built-in 
simple types [33]. In other words, built-in primitive types 
are base types, and other types can be derived in terms of 
primitive types. Thus, we only need to investigate how to 
extract boundary values for built-in primitive types. 
As shown in Table I, W3C Specification of the XML 
Schema language defines nineteen built-in primitive types: 
string, decimal, boolean, duration, dataTime, time, date, 
gYearMonth, gYear, gMonthDay, gDay, gMonth, 
base64Binary, hexBinary, float, double, anyURI, QName, 
and NOTATION [34] [33]. For each primitive type, W3C 
XML specification defines a set of constraining facets. 
Each constraining facet restricts an aspect of the value 
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Figure 3. XML schema data types 
XML type 
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maximum value, etc). Taking string as an example, it has 
six constraining facets: length, minLength, maxLength, 
pattern, enumeration, and whiteSpace. 
As summarized in Table I, there are altogether twelve 
kinds of constraining facets: (1) length: the number of 
units of length based upon data types, (2) minLength: the 
minimum number of units of length, (3) maxLength: the 
maximum number of units of length, (4) pattern: regular 
expression that restricts the lexical spaces to literals, (5) 
enumeration: a set of values, (6) whiteSpace: space, tab, 
line feed, and carriage return, (7) maxInclusive: inclusive 
upper bound, (8) minInclusive: inclusive lower bound, (9) 
maxExclusive: exclusive upper bound, (10) minExclusive: 
exclusive lower bound, (11) totalDigits: maximum 
number of digits, and (12) fractionDigits: maximum 
number of digits in the fractional part. Detailed 
information about each constraining facets can be found in 
W3C XML Schema [33]. 
We believe that these constraining facets can be used 
as guidelines to identify boundary values. For example, 
consider a WSDL input argument that is an XML data 
type string with constraining facet of length: <length value 
= ‘8’>. We can identify a boundary value of a string with 
the length of 8-character long. For each input parameter, 
we will then search for its constraining facets. These 
constraining facets will be part of the corresponding XML 
schema definition, which can be either included in the 
corresponding WSDL definitions, or referenced by 
separate XSD files. The keywords for the twelve 
constraining facets will be utilized to search for the 
corresponding specifications. Using the example above, 
the keyword “length” can be used to search in the 
corresponding XSD specifications for the constraining 
facet length and its specified value 8. 
The twelve constraining facets can be divided into five 
categories based upon how they can be used to identify 
boundary value-based test cases. (1) Four constraining 
facets explicitly specify the boundary values to test: 
maxInclusive, minInclusive, maxExclusive, and 
minExclusive. (2) One constraining facet explicitly 
defines the set of values to test: enumeration. (3) Five 
constraining facets define the length of a test case: length, 
minLength, maxLength, totalDigits, and fractionDigits. 
(4) WhiteSpace facet guides to generate test cases on 
spaces. (5) Pattern facet guides to generate test cases 
based upon regular expressions specified. The first, 
second, and fourth categories explicitly define the 
boundary values that can be used. The third category 
specifies the length of test cases. The fifth category 
specifies the rules to validate test cases, which deserve 
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further separate investigation and will not be discussed in 
this paper. 
Therefore, for each input parameter defined in a 
WSDL document, we will obtain a set of possible 
constraining facets from Table I based upon the XML data 
type of the parameter. The keywords of this set of possible 
constraining facets will be used to search from the 
corresponding schema definitions for defined boundary 
values or rules. Note that the constraining facets 
summarized in Table I are possible facets for each data 
type. If for a defined input parameter, there is no value 
defined for a possible constraining facet, an implicit 
constraint value should be used based upon the 
corresponding IEEE standards [33]. For example, 
consider an input parameter with type float, if there is no 
value defined for a possible constraining facet, say 
maxInclusive, an implicit value is actually defined. XML 
schema adopts for the type float the IEEE single-precision 
32-bit floating point type. Thus the basic value space of a 
float consists of the values m × 2^e, where m is an integer 
whose absolute value is less than 2^24, and e is an integer 
between -149 and 104. Therefore, an implicit 
maxInclusive for a type float is 2^24 x 2^104 – 1 = 2^128 
– 1. Similar rules should be applied to other numeric 
XML data types, such as double. Similarly, ISO standards 
of Gregorian time values should be applied to time-related 
data types: duration, dateTime, time, date, gYearMonth, 
gYear, gMonthDay, gDay, and gMonth. 
For each XML primitive type, we believe that its 
comprehensive boundary values can be extracted from 
three dimensions: (1) XML constraining facets, (2) 
operational profiles, and (3) semantic meanings. XML 
constraining facets provide generic guidelines for us to 
find boundary values; and the operational profiles of a 
Web service will help us find more efficient boundary 
values. For example, let us consider a login id field with 
type string. From the XML constraining facets of string, 
we know that we need to test on the length of the string. A 
specific operational profile can help us decide to test 
whether the string can accept more than 16 characters. In 
addition, operational profiles can help decide the 
boundary values for patterns testing, as defined by the 
corresponding XML constraining facets. Taking the login 
id field as an example again, the operational profiles may 
help to generate boundary values to test the string such as: 
whether the field accepts a string containing only digits, 
whether the field is case sensitive, whether the first 
character can be a digit, etc. 
Finally, the semantic meanings of an argument can 
further facilitate boundary values elicitation. Taking an 
input field of credit card expiration year as an example, it 
is intuitive for us to test the following cases: whether the 
input year is a future year or a past year, whether the year 
is way too far in the future, whether the combination of 
the year and the month represents a date in the future, 
whether the month is between 1 to 12, etc. 
Although operational profiles and semantic meanings 
can facilitate more accurate and comprehensive boundary 
value elicitation, they mainly require manual involvement. 
On the other hand, constraining facets-based boundary 
value elicitation can mainly be performed through 
automatic process, following the methods we discussed in 
this section. Regarding to Web services testing, automatic 
test case generation is critical due to the unique time and 
dynamic feature requirements. In this research, we focus 
on test case generation based upon constraining facets-
based approach. Automating test case generation based 
upon operational profiles and semantic meanings will be a 
future research topic. 
 
4.3 Boundary values for XML compound type 
 
As shown in Figure 3, based upon the nineteen built-in 
primitive types, XML schema defines twenty-five built-in 
derived data types, such as normalizedString, token, 
language, etc [33]. In addition, complex data types can be 
composed of primitive types and derived types. 
Furthermore, users can define their own data types. In 
general, each user-derived data type must be defined in 
terms of another data type in one of three ways [33]: 1) by 
assigning constraining facets that restrict the value space 
of the user-derived data type to a subset of that of its base 
type; 2) by creating a list of data types whose value space 
consists of finite-length sequences of values of its item 
types; or 3) by creating a union data type whose value 
space consists of the union of the value space of its 
member types. In other words, for each compound data 
type, it is associated with a hierarchical tree of how it is 
composed of simpler data types. Each leaf element of the 
tree is an XSD built-in primitive data type. Therefore, for 
a compound data type, we can navigate through its 
hierarchy tree and design test cases based upon each leaf 
element that is a XSD built-in primitive data type. 
Figure 4 shows a simplified XSD compound data type 
AddressBook. The address book for a person contains 
three elements: his/her id as a double type, name as a 
string type, and addresses as a list of address information. 
Each address is composed of five elements: an address 
type as a double type, an address line as a string type, a 
city as a string type, a state as a string type, and a zip code 
as a string type. Therefore, there are seven leaf elements 
in this AddressBook data type: id, name, addrType, 
addrLine, city, state, and zipCode. Each element belongs 
to a XSD built-in primitive data type, either double or 
string. Then for each element, we can apply our method of 
designing boundary values for XSD built-in primitive data 
types, as we discussed in the previous section. Since we 
prefer to locate errors if there is any, each test case only 
focuses on testing one boundary value of one leaf element, 
without combining several boundary values of multiple 
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elements. In other words, we have purposely limited the 
boundary values to single parameter to avoid the 
explosion that occurs in the number of combinatorial edge 
values that could be set at each SOAP input message. 
Accumulating all of these test cases together, we will 
obtain a set of test cases targeting at testing the overall 
AddressBook data type. 
 
4.4 The design of test cases for fault tolerance of 
individual Web services 
 
In this section we will discuss how to perturb boundary 
values to validate fault tolerance of an individual Web 
service. Our approach is again based upon XML schema 
constraining facets. In the last section we discussed how 
to extract boundary values from the WSDL definition of a 
Web service to efficiently test its correctness. These 
elicited boundary values can be perturbed to generate 
faulty data. Since our boundary values are generated from 
constraining facets, it is straightforward to generate faulty 
data in terms of constraining facets also. Table II 
summaries our methods of creating faulty data based on 
each constraining facet. 
For length, since it defines the exact length of the 
characters/digits to be used in an argument, two test cases 
will be generated, one with (length+1) and one with 
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Figure 4. A simple example of XSD complex data type AddressBook 
Table II. Perturbation strategy to generate faulty data 
 





enumeration Values outside of the set 
whiteSpace Null/tabs/space/multiple spaces 
maxInclusive +1 
maxExclusive The value 
minExclusive -1 






(length-1). For minLength, since it defines the minimum 
length of the digits to be used in an argument, one test 
case will be generated with smaller length of (minLength-
1). For maxLength, since it defines the maximum length of 
the characters/digits to be used in an argument, one test 
case will be generated with larger length of 
(maxLength+1). For enumeration, since it defines 
explicitly the set of values to be used, we can generate one 
or more test cases with values out of the set defined. For 
whiteSpace, we can generate test cases with value null, 
one or multiple white spaces, or tabs. For maxInclusive, 
since it defines the largest value that can be used, one test 
case can be generated with the value of (maxInclusive+1). 
For maxExclusive, since it defines the largest value that 
can not be used, one test case can be generated with the 
value of (maxInclusive). For minExclusive, since it 
defines the smallest value that can not be used, one test 
case can be generated with the value of (minExclusive). 
For minExclusive, since it defines the smallest value that 
can be used, one test case can be generated with the value 
of (minInclusive-1). The approach to perturb regular 
expression patterns will not be discussed in this paper. 
Table II summarizes our perturbation algorithm over 
each constraining facet. Recall that using the algorithm 
discussed in the previous section, a suite of test cases with 
boundary values will be generated. For each such test 
case, we will iterate through each input argument, find out 
from which constraining facet it is generated from, and 
perturb the data using the algorithm defined in Table II. 
Each perturbation will create a new test case. A suite of 
test cases will then be generated by combining all such 
test cases. 
It should be noted that the test cases with faulty data 
generated from our strategy obviously do not cover all 
faulty data domain. It is by no means our objective to test 
a Web service with any possible faulty data though. Our 
goal is to find efficient faulty data to eliminate a Web 
service candidate. Our strategy covers faulty data 
violating constraining facets that definitely should be 
tested. In addition, as shown in Table II, our approach of 
generating faulty test cases can be easily automated, which 
meets the requirements of Web services testing. Faulty 
data can be further elicited from operational profiles and 





The third set of experiments performed intended to test 
the effectiveness and efficiency of our boundary value-
based test cases and faulty test case generation algorithm. 
In Y1 and Y2, we embedded various types of errors, (1) 
computational faults, such as changing the algorithm to 
translate retrieved double-type grade value into character-
type grade value, (2) input SOAP processing faults, such 
as errors of parsing incoming SOAP messages, (3) output 
SOAP processing faults, such as errors of generating 
SOAP response messages, (4) data exception handling 
faults, such as improper handling over boundary values, 
(5) incorrect method calls, such as calling wrong methods, 
(6) database access errors, such as incorrect SQL calls to 
relational database underneath, and (7) other errors, such 
as random errors. In order to facilitate the experiments, we 
carefully implant code to throw meaningful exceptions if 
an error is found. Table III summarized the number of 
errors seeded. The total number of seeded errors is 18. 
We performed three categories of test case generation: 
(1) manually and randomly pick up test cases from the 
input space, (2) manually go through possible test case 
from input data space, and (3) automatically generate test 
cases using our boundary value-based approach. The 
results are shown in Figure 5. 
We found that random test case selection is the least 
robust algorithm to find errors. As the number of test 
cases increased, the second exhaustive approach can find 
more and more errors. Meanwhile, it should be noted that 
both the first and the second algorithms have to go 
through manual process of test case generation. As shown 
in Figure 5, we found that our boundary value-based test 
case generation approach is efficient to find most errors. It 
found 16 out of 18 seeded errors (88.89%). If the number 
of test cases increased by randomly picking up more test 
cases in addition to automatically generated test cases, no 
more errors were found. 
Table III. Distribution of errors seeded into the services 
 
Error type Number of errors 
Computational faults 3 
Input SOAP processing faults 2 
Output SOAP processing faults 2 
Data exception handling faults 3 
Incorrect method calls 3 
Database access errors 3 




We also found that our algorithm is good at finding 
errors such as SOAP processing faults, data exception 
handling errors, as well as incorrect method calls. One 
database access error and one computational error were 
not found from our algorithm. If the database retrieval of a 
grade is incorrect, then the error of translating the grade in 
double to string was not found. In other words, it is 
difficult to test those errors depending on database 
retrieval. 
In order to further test the efficiency of three 
algorithms, we chose to set up the reliability decision 
threshold to zero, which means that all test cases will be 
conducted. The testing results are similar to that was 
described above. 
In summary, our preliminary experiments show that 
our test case generation algorithm is efficient. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we propose a boundary value-based 
approach to automatically generate test cases for Web 
services reliability assessment. Based upon their limited 
exposed interfaces, our approach is appropriate to test the 
reliability of Web services candidates. By constructing 
test data including normal data and corrupted data, our 
approach is capable of certifying whether the tested Web 
service thoroughly fulfill the functional requirements as 
desired. By perturbing the test data to imitate unusual 
events, our approach is capable of testing whether the 
hosts of Web services act maliciously or errantly at 
invocation times. 
Our future work will include: (1) constructing code 
generation tools for test case generation, (2) exploring 
comprehensive selection criteria to ensure reliability of 
Web services, and (3) conducting more case studies. 
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In this paper we discuss some of the challenges and 
approaches for providing safety assurance for modern 
weapon systems via software-based safety kernels.  We 
argue that software-centric approaches for designing and 
verifying safety kernels are flawed.  We claim that the design 
and verification of safety kernels for complex event-driven 
real-time systems is a matter of physics and dynamical 
system analysis of system design.  We describe an approach 
for rapidly prototyping safety kernels (and plants and 
controllers) using an agent-based safety-kernel architecture.  
The approach utilizes multiagent modeling and hybrid 
automata. 
 
Keywords: System safety, safety kernel, software, hybrid 
automata, verification 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A safety kernel is a component specifically designed to 
reduce the probability of occurrence of mishaps by 
performing one or more of the following types of fail-safe 
functions in a system:  detecting, tolerating, and isolating 
faults.  The design of a safety kernel should be based on the 
following information obtained from hazard analyses of the 
target system:  
• Hazard causal factors, along with frequency and 
severity of hazards and mishaps 
• Complexity of the system protected by the safety 
kernel 
• Number of safety-related functions in the system 
Based on the foregoing information, decisions need to be 
made about the following: 
• How much control is to be exercised by the safety 
kernel over safety-related functions? 
                                                 
* The views and conclusions contained in this 
presentation are those of the author and should not be 
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or 
endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. 
Government. 
• What type of safety-kernels architecture should be 
employed? 
• Which parts of the safety-kernel functions should 
be allocated to software, hardware, and humans? 
The safety kernel needs both sufficient control and 
functionality to return the system that has entered an unsafe 
state to a safe (or less risky) state. 
So why in the past did so few safety-critical systems have 
safety kernels?  Many factors played a role in stymieing the 
introduction of safety kernels into safety-critical systems.  
For example, consider design experience.  There was no 
concept of a safety kernel in the analog version of legacy 
systems that have since been reengineered to incorporate 
digital technology.  Another factor is engineering judgment.  
Up until recently there was little experience upon which to 
judge the prudence of using safety kernels rather than the 
tried-and-true safety-engineering techniques—the use of a 
safety kernel was viewed as posing an untenable level of risk 
not only by the developer and operator of a system, but also 
by safety certification and accreditation boards. 
2. SAFETY KERNELS FOR WEAPON 
SYSTEMS 
The first weapon within the U.S. Navy’s arsenal to use a 
safety kernel was the fire-by-wire Rolling Airframe Missile 
(RAM) Guided Missile Weapon System (GMWS).  RAM is 
quick-reaction, fire-and-forget missile designed to destroy 
anti-ship missiles. 
The GMWS is an example of a complex event-driven 
real-time system.  The system performs real-time processing 
of sensor data in order to detect, track, and target threat 
objects.  GMWS and the RAM itself are both safety-critical 
because they control the release of energy—energy that can 
cause death or injury to humans, property damage, or 
damage to the environment.  For example, both inadvertent 
launches and premature detonation of a RAM in close 
proximity of the mother ship are hazards which need to be 
controlled. 
Let’s take a look at the Launcher Control/No-Point No-
Fire (LC/NPNF) subsystem of the GMWS.  The LC/NPNF 
system monitors the potential movement of the missile 
launcher into a NPNF zone.  The launcher is mounted to the 
deck of a ship.  The NPNF zone consists of the deck, the 
ships superstructure (e.g., bridge, antennas), and other areas 
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 on deck such as where sailors may be located.  A safety 
incident occurs if the launcher points in a NPNF zone.  If the 
launcher points or fires in a NPNF zone and fires, a mishap is 
almost certain to occur.  
Prior to RAM GMWS, the LC/NPNF subsystem was 
controlled via electromechanical mechanisms, including 
metal cams, switches, and roller contacts.  However, the U.S. 
Navy found that its reliance on electromechanical means for 
enforcing NPNF safety policy was not a cost-effective 
approach if modifications were made to a ship’s 
superstructure or the weapon needed to be installed on 
another class of ship (e.g., cruiser, frigate).  In other words, 
any changes to the superstructure or movement of the 
weapons system to either a different mounting position or 
another platform would require the reengineering of the 
electromechanical system.  This was one of the reasons the 
U.S. Navy assumed the risk of introducing the use of 
software-controlled dynamic NPNF zones. 
The software-controlled NPNF function of the LC/NPNF 
subsystem is an example of a safety kernel.  The NPNF 
safety kernel detects the potential movement of the launcher 
into a NPNF zone.  If the NPNF safety kernel determines 
that the Launch Control System (LCS) will move the 
weapon into the NPNF zone, the kernel takes control of the 
LCS and executes an orderly shutdown of the GMWS.  
However, the NPNF processor does not provide the fidelity 
or control necessary to train or elevate the launcher to 
prosecute an engagement.  The NPNF processor performs 
the following two tasks:  (i) stops the launcher movement 
and (ii) interrupts concurrently the Launcher Control 
Processor and the firing circuit to the missile (in order to 
preclude arming and firing of the RAM). 
The use of a software-controlled NPNF safety kernel for 
the LC/NPNF subsystem is a double-edged sword:  it 
increased the complexity of the system (i.e., in terms of state-
space) and approximately doubled the size of control 
software of the GMWS, but on the other hand it reduced 
both the overall level of risk of putting the system into 
operation and the need to make costly changes to the GMWS 
hardware or the ship’s superstructure. 
3. EXAMPLES OF SAFETY-KERNEL 
ARCHITECTURES 
At one end of the spectrum of safety-kernel architectures 
is the watchdog safety kernel.  This kernel has limited 
functionality:  its primary function is to detect failures and 
either reset the processor or throw an exception to terminate 
a process. 
At the other end of the spectrum are dual and multiple 
redundant architectures, which may consist of homogeneous 
or heterogeneous safety kernels.  Dual redundant safety 
kernel architectures only provide for fault detection.  In 
contrast, multiple redundant safety kernel architectures 
provide for fault detection, fault tolerance, and fault isolation. 
Examples of safety kernel architectures that lie within the 
middle of the spectrum are safety executives and monitor-
actuator patterns.  The former initiates fail-safe processing:  
monitors the state of a system and ensures that the software 
cannot enter a potentially unsafe state, in addition to 
coordinating recovery from faults.  The latter returns a 
system to a known less-risky state and resumes processing 
via monitoring the actuation functions of another process and 
the state of the actuators.  The RAM GMWS LC/NPNF is an 
example of the application of the monitor-actuator pattern. 
4. NEED FOR A NEW APPROACHES TO 
PROVIDING SAFETY ASSURANCE 
Safety design requirements are typically easier to 
implement in the weapons system or weapons-related system 
than in an external system.  The way in which safety design 
requirements are implemented in U.S. Navy weapons 
systems is relatively homogeneous:  known safety attributes 
and characteristics of these systems are already relatively 
well known to the system safety programs. 
So why consider the use of safety kernels?  Assessing the 
level of control to be exercised over the weapons or 
weapons-related system becomes increasing challenging as 
the level of system integration and complexity increases.  
Such assessments are especially problematic to perform for 
system-of-systems.  A system-of-systems is an amalgamation 
of legacy systems and developing systems that provide an 
enhanced capability greater than that of any of the individual 
systems within the system-of-systems.  Systems-of-systems 
are a great departure from standalone systems.  There is 
uncertainty and risk associated with assumptions and 
unknowns regarding the interfaces between the component 
systems.  There is also uncertainty and risk associated with 
system interoperability issues. 
Let’s take a look at a real-world system-of-systems—the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).  Like the RAM 
GMWS, the battle manager element of the BMDS is a real-
time, event-driven complex system.  However, it is also 
asynchronous and distributed.  The battle manager must 
interface to a large number of heterogeneous legacy, organic, 
and even foreign systems, some of which may not have 
undergone sufficient safety assessment.  In addition, the 
configuration of the system needs to adapt via plug-and-play 
components to changes in the environment; that is, the 
system needs to be readily reconfigurable during operation.  
Thus, traditional approaches for providing safety assurance 
of BMDS will not be cost effective and do not lend 
themselves well to verification. 
5. WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD? 
System safety relies on predictability.  There is a need to 
know what the system must guard against (i.e., hazards).  
How does one handle unanticipated hazards?  Adaptive 
systems can have lots of configurations; it is hard to 
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 characterize these configurations because each instance of a 
component has a different view of the system. 
Moreover, the set of things in the environment is neither 
closed nor stable.  However, it might be possible to create a 
sufficiently large closed world so that one can deal with all 
of the system hazards.  Even so, there will still be a challenge 
to validate an upper bound on the probability of a system 
failure leading to a given hazard. 
The lack of predictability is at odds with the view of a 
system for which safety, reliability, and other forms of 
dependability engineering (i.e., dependability encompasses 
all of the “ilities”) typically rely. 
One of the promising new approaches to providing safety 
assurance for weapon systems is to think in terms of 
dependability disciplines. 
5.1 CHALLENGES 
In order to explore a dependability-disciplines view of 
providing safety assurance for weapon systems, one must 
treat a system or system-of-systems in terms of integration 
properties in at least two respects:  (i) to identify the 
emergent requirements of the weapon system from the 
collaborations (i.e., determine value-added, rather than what 
must not happen) and (ii) to certify that the legacy, organic, 
and foreign systems meet constraints of the well-defined 
“plug-in slots” (i.e., system interfaces) of the plug-and-play 
reconfigurable system. 
We can construct a wish list for weapon systems, to 
include, for example, the following desires: 
• Coordinated battle management at system-of-
systems level vice system level 
• Predictable behavior of system-of-systems 
• Integrated systems vice interconnected systems, 
bringing together legacy systems, new system 
developments, and nondevelopmental (e.g., 
commercial- and government-off-the-shelf) items 
• Minimal effort for modifications to system-of-
systems 
• System architectures that outlive their components 
5.2 ACHIEVING DEPENDABILITY2 
We advocate a departure from business as usual in the 
engineering of weapon systems, especially those that a part 
of systems-of-systems, by requiring the following: 
                                                 
2 The concept of a Spartan safety kernels and 
Draconian design of safety-critical systems emerged during 
discussions between Valdis Berzins and Bret Michael.  Bret 
Michael presented these concepts in the context of missile 
defense at the Defence and Aerospace Research Partnership 
in High Integrity Real Time Systems (DARP HIRTS) 
Workshop, Manchester, England, on May 5, 2004. 
• Spartan and Draconian designs of the system 
• Distinguishing up front which system requirements 
are stable from those that are expected to change 
• Institutionalizing the invariant part of the principles 
of operation of the system  
• Taking a positive approach to handling emergent 
properties of systems, thinking in terms of 
integration 
• Defining emergent requirements and ensure 
realization 
A Spartan safety kernel provides for liveness properties 
with service guarantees.  The Spartan safety kernel only 
provides services needed to achieve critical requirements in a 
timely manner. 
A Draconian global structure provides for safety with 
non-interference guarantees.  The structure affords for the 
visible dependencies to be much less than potential 
dependencies, with fault containment at boundaries and no 
invisible interactions. 
The safety executive resides within the Spartan safety 
kernel.  The safety executive monitors in a cyclic fashion the 
high-level functionality (i.e., execution of high-level 
processes) of the system or system-of-systems to ensure that 
the processes follow the desired sequence of execution.  For 
example, in the case of ballistic missile defense, the safety 
executive of the safety kernel associated with one of the 
replicated battle managers would monitor whether the battle 
manager’s processes for prosecuting a missile engagement 
execute in the required manner. 
5.3 BATTLE MANAGER DEVELOPMENT 
In addition to the Spartan safety kernel, we foresee the 
need for the weapon system to also have one or more battle 
management kernels—kernels that contain only the basic 
functions of battle management.  Derived from the kill chain, 
these basic battle-management functions will manage the use 
of the system’s computing resources to ensure that all time-
critical, battle-management events are processed as 
efficiently as possible.  All other weapon-system 
functionality is to be placed in components that interface 
with the battle management kernel via the aforementioned 
well-defined plug-in slots.  The Spartan safety kernels 
monitor the behavior of the battle management kernels, 
taking action as needed to enforce safety policy, while the 
battle management kernels are responsible for monitoring the 
behavior of the weapon system or system-of-systems of 
weapons, taking action as needed to enforce the rules of 
engagement and other policy and doctrine related to 
prosecuting an engagement. 
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 6. DESIGN AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY 
KERNELS 
Existing software-centric approaches for designing and 
verifying safety kernels are flawed:  these approaches rely on 
models of faults which occur at discrete times and can be 
identified.  This has little to do with systems that are 
governed by a continuous sequence of messages which alter 
the controlled behavior of devices (e.g., networks of 
weapons and sensors).  In essence, today’s popular 
approaches are based on verifying that a pure software 
system obeys its software specification and does not send out 
ineligible signals. 
What is needed is a verification approach that provides 
the dependability engineer with the ability to determine what 
sequences of control actions would cause a catastrophe.  No 
one control action in the sequence has any meaning, but the 
whole sequence may send the system spiraling out of control 
(i.e., positive feedback, not control). 
However, we do not believe that the design and 
verification of safety kernels is software problem.  We claim 
that the design of safety kernels for complex event-driven 
real-time systems is a matter of physics and dynamical 
system analysis of system design. 
For verification purposes, one needs to provide simulation 
or mathematical evidence for complex systems that the real 
systems of physical devices are similar enough to their finite 
automaton approximations so that the finite automata 
controls would control the system in the real world. 
Hybrid automata are needed for prototyping and verifying 
safety kernels.  The automata can be used to represent 
complex real-time systems as distributed systems of 
interacting physical (e.g., sensors and launch systems) and 
rule-based (e.g., decision makers and threat evaluators) 
agents.  Physical devices are modeled as Buchi finite state 
automata on infinite strings; Buchi finite state automata 
differ from finite automata in that they operate on infinite 
words and have a different acceptance condition.  Agent 
networks of Buchi automata constitute a special case of 
Rabin automata (have strong-fairness acceptance) which is 
computationally feasible and represent many significant 
aspects of multiagent systems. 
Doctrine, policy (including safety policy) and 
organizational structures are treated as rule-based constraints 
on system behavior. 
Every agent is modeled as Datalog program, which can 
then be used to run simulations with the aim of determining 
the effects of inserting, modifying, or deleting physical and 
rule-based agents.  This approach provides a means for rapid 
prototyping of safety kernels (and plants and controllers) 
using an agent-based safety-kernel architecture. 
We believe that Datalog is a good choice of modeling 
languages because it is expressive enough to represent the 
agents, but yet compiles decently to real-time deterministic 
Buchi automata. 
The next step we intend to take is to develop a 
professional-grade simulation test bed, with the aim of 
providing a means for verifying the design of safety kernels 
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The independent verification and validation (IV&V) process provides assessment to the project as 
to whether the developer’s artifacts have met a pre-determined “readiness” level. In practice, 
this is quantified using engineering judgment. We describe the application of Bayesian Belief 
networks (BBN) to analyze the readiness of software requirements specifications during software 
requirements review (SRR) milestone. The method proposed in this paper brings an additional 
level of rigor to IV&V analysis and the input provided to developers. Starting with a dataflow 
model of the IV&V process, we construct a BBN semi-automatically. Then, we provide a 
quantitative interpretation of the readiness level of software requirements in terms of artifact 
properties. The results of IV&V analysis are used as evidence in the BBN to obtain a posterior 
distribution of readiness. We illustrate our approach by applying it to two example systems. 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
Independent verification and validation (IV&V) of software adds value to software projects 
by identifying potential defects in the software product and by uncovering shortcomings which 
may exist in the software development process [1].  It is typically performed in parallel with 
software development, and scheduled readiness review milestones are used to communicate 
IV&V task results to the developers.  One of the main tasks in the IV&V process is building a 
case that (1) an artifact has met some pre-determined level of acceptability; i.e. analyzing the 
readiness of the artifact, and (2) the subsequent phase of the development process can proceed.  
The IV&V analysis level, determined from a criticality analysis and risk assessment process 
usually dictates the effort invested and the type of activities performed [2] e.g. a comprehensive 
analysis would require using formal techniques in addition to a broader set of analysis techniques, 
whereas the so-called lightweight formal methods can be applied at less critical levels to maintain 
rigor.  It is especially valuable to evaluate requirements readiness, since requirements errors are 
most often responsible for software failures and they are the most expensive to correct when not 
discovered early in the development lifecycle [3].  One of the main benefits of using formal 
techniques is that it provides a clearer and more confident assessment of the readiness level.  
However, in practice, formal techniques are mainly applied to critical elements while the rest of 
the analysis is comparatively less rigorous.  Consequently, the readiness evaluation of an artifact 
is fuzzy and it may be quantified using engineering judgment.  
We use Bayesian networks (BBN) to assess the readiness level of software artifacts, 
specifically requirements specifications by combining evidence from diverse sources.  The 
overall approach is to first build an annotated process model which describes the IV&V process 
being used, the entities involved in the process and their respective properties. Thereafter we 
build the BBN structure semi-automatically from the process model to encode the case for 
readiness i.e. the rationale with which the analyst can argue whether an artifact is ready at the 
desired level (Sections 2 and 3). The BBN numerical specification is generated from elicitation, 
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empirical data and from metrics applied to the artifacts. We characterize readiness in terms of the 
generic properties desired from requirements specifications and describe how to quantify it as a 
conditional probability distribution (Section 4).  To illustrate our methodology, we apply it to 
software requirements specifications for two real example systems (1) a fault protection system of 
the Cassini deep space probe, and (2) the non-volatile memory management module for a real-
time space system (Section 5).  
 
2. Modeling the IV&V process  
The overall IV&V process is usually specified as a set of work instructions.  These resemble 
guidelines which provide a high-level overview and a flow of the activities that the IV&V team 
must perform for a given analysis level.  The rigor with which these activities are implemented, 
affects the quality, and in turn, the artifact readiness level.  Thus an IV&V team which applies 
formal techniques to analyze an artifact is less likely to miss potential problems compared to a 
team which either does not apply or is unfamiliar with formal analysis.  Consequently, their 
respective assessments of the readiness level will differ.  Our rationale is that modeling the IV&V 
process to capture such diverse factors as skill/expertise of the IV&V team or compliance with 
process specifications will provide insight into the artifact readiness level and the reasoning used 
to arrive at the assessment. To model the IV&V process, we use model the dataflow within a 
process, where a process or process activity has input entities, is enacted by agents and produces 









































































Figure 1. IV&V requirements analysis process model 
 
Figure 1 shows a simplification of the IV&V process activities and input and output entities 
at the requirements development phase; some of the properties of interest are also shown.  This 
model itself is a refinement of a higher level process which includes activities such as the 
identification of relevant inputs, and criticality based prioritization of artifacts for review. 
The box labeled “Software requirements analysis” shows some of the activities prescribed in 
the IV&V literature [2] for requirements analysis.  The model captures the notion that software 
requirements analysis takes as input not only the prioritized software requirements, but also 
system software documentation, system requirements, and relevant IV&V documentation.  
Additionally, the model also captures the idea that the team which enacts the process may use 
tools or approaches tailored for a particular domain.  The suitability of these agents influences the 
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quality of the analysis to some degree since these agents are used to execute the process.   We can 
further decompose the sub-activities shown, to include activity specific tasks: for example, in 
analyzing whether a requirement described using scenarios is internally complete, some of the 
tasks would include checking that (for a required functionality):  all scenarios and their relevant 
pre- and post-conditions have been defined, the conditions for any temporal transitions within the 
scenarios have been defined, all relevant actors have been identified and that the scenarios 
identified can be stepped through to completion.  Again, such tasks may be performed using 
formal methods if the requirements are critical or using relatively less rigorous techniques 
otherwise.  
For our purpose of building a BBN, this relatively informal process model suffices.  
Furthermore, it is simple and high-level enough to build so that the IV&V team can quickly and 
easily build a model of their process. This model was informally validated by an IV&V analyst 
who had implemented these processes from an original set of work instructions. Once the process 
models are built, we semi-automatically build a BBN from the process models. 
 
3. Constructing the BBN model  
3.1 Bayesian networks 
A BBN is a concise representation of a joint probability distribution on a set of statistical 
variables, encoded as an acyclic graph of nodes and directed edges [4].  The nodes model random 
variables which can be discrete or continuous.  Edges model the probabilistic relations between 
the nodes.  Each node has an associated conditional probability distribution p(A|π(A)) which 
characterizes the relationship of the node with its immediate parents π(A).   
The joint probability distribution for a node is computed by marginalization, whereas the 
conditional posterior distribution for the nodes given evidence, i.e. observations about the state of 
a node, is computed using Bayes’ rule. The qualitative part of a BBN is encoded in the structure 
of the digraph, while the conditional probability distributions for the nodes encode the 
quantitative portion.  One of the strengths of a BBN is that both subjective judgment and 
empirical data can be used as input.  Furthermore, as evidence becomes available, we can update 
the model and refine its assessments.  The fundamental tasks of mathematical modeling using a 
BBN are: (1) identifying a belief structure that best describes the phenomenon being modeled, 
and (2) specifying the conditional probability distributions on the nodes. 
The BBN structure is built semi-automatically from the process model [5]. Briefly, this 
method constructs nodes for each of the entities in the process model and for their properties. It 
appropriately directs arcs between the nodes, such that the observable variable is a leaf node, i.e. 
from entities to their properties. It also directs arcs from the nodes for the input, and the process 
entities, to the nodes for the output entities.  Since entities relevant to a process activity can exist 
across levels of abstraction, the algorithm generates subnets which repeat at these different 
abstraction levels.  Although such subnets can be pruned algorithmically, checking whether it 
produces the correct belief structure is important, i.e. we want to inspect whether the model 
makes practical sense.  Currently, we prune the model manually as this gives us the opportunity 
to modify the structure of the BBN to account for dependencies between nodes that may not have 
been explicitly captured or may not be representable in the process model.  Thus, the procedure 
mainly builds a generic structure of dependencies; the BBN used for analysis may be modified by 
appropriately re-directing transitions or by including or eliminating nodes.   
An additional change to the network structure is binary factorization [6], which splits nodes 
with three or more input arcs and creates logical intermediate nodes that preserve the numerical 
specification of the original network. Essentially, this operation simplifies both computation and 
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specification of conditional node probability tables. The latter is beneficial since the tables 
increase exponentially in size with the number of parents and their respective states. 
 
3.2 BBN model for IV&V of SRS 
 
A partial BBN obtained by for the IV&V is shown in figure 2, labeled as the subnet software 
requirements analysis.  Subnet 1 models the influence of process activities on Readiness.  In this 
paper, we refine the completeness analysis activity of the IV&V software requirements analysis 
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Similar subnets are generated for the remaining activities in the IV&V requirements analysis 
process. Shaded nodes represent nodes replicated across levels of abstraction as a result of 
algorithmic construction.  We prune the BBN by simply eliminating subnet 1a, since the 
influences modeled by this subnet has already been captured.  The resulting two BBN can be 
pruned further by re-directing arcs between the appropriate nodes.  Alternatively, we can simply 
use the data obtained from the lower level BBN as evidence for the higher level BBN.  The node 
labeled “SW requirements with IVV recommendations” has arcs to its properties, of which two 
have been shown in the figure i.e. Completeness and Correctness.  Together, these nodes 
compose the subnet Readiness, and the probability distribution on the root node in this subnet i.e., 
SW requirements with IVV recommendations represents the evaluation of readiness at the 
software requirements review milestone.   
 
3.3 Numerical specification 
 
Specifying root and intermediate node probabilities in the BBN encodes its quantitative 
portion. These model the nature and the weight of the probabilistic relations between related 
nodes. The relation between nodes need not be only probabilistic. However a deterministic 
relationship can be easily transformed into the appropriate probabilistic function. For root nodes 
(nodes without parents), we specify a (prior) probability distribution which reflects either the 
IV&V team’s initial belief or the available data. Typically, prior distributions are specified such 
that all available data are considered. In the absence of relevant data, an alternative to a subjective 
prior is a non-informative prior [7].  
We model each node as random variable (say X) whose states are mapped to an ordinal scale. 
i.e. X: {Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very High}. These states can be further mapped to either 
a monotonically increasing, continuous numeric scale or a discrete numeric scale with integer 
values. The probability distribution across its states can be specified from (1) historical data or (2) 
a prior belief (such as a uniform distribution). Given data, i.e. observations (θ) on the set of child 
nodes (Θ), Bayes’ rule is used to compute the posterior distribution (p[X| Θ = θ]). For 
intermediate or child nodes (nodes with parents), we specify a continuous conditional probability 
density function (pdf); then, the corresponding discrete distribution is easy to build. For our 
analyses, we use a simple procedure developed by Neil et al. [6] to construct the conditional pdf 
as a tail-truncated normal distribution tN(µ, σ). This is a normal distribution truncated at both 
tails and normalized such that the resulting distribution is proper (integrates to 1).  
 
4. Readiness of an artifact 
As mentioned earlier, IV&V analysts are typically required to assess the ‘readiness’ or 
‘maturity’ of an artifact at a milestone in the process.  Admittedly, readiness is an imprecise and 
fuzzy term; this value is, in practice, largely quantified by using engineering judgment.  Provided 
it meets some pre-determined value, development is allowed to proceed to the subsequent 
development phase.  Readiness assessment is essentially an inference task, i.e. the IV&V team 
constructs a case for readiness based on the results of their analyses.  The IV&V process model 
and the resulting BBN formalize the procedures and the evidence used to construct this case.  
To mathematically characterize readiness, we model the readiness of an artifact as a discrete 
random variable M, qualified on a five point ordinal scale, i.e. M: {very low, low, medium, high, 
very high}. Properties desired from an artifact are modeled as a vector of random variables X, 
each of which can assume some state x, also on the same five point scale. Readiness is then, some 




p[(M ≥ m)|(X = {x})]          
 (1) 
 
Given some initial prior distribution on M, results of IV&V analysis provides evidence to X 
and equation (1) is the posterior distribution of (M|X) computed using Bayes’ rule. The result is 
the probability that the readiness level is some value m. In figure 2, this is modeled as the subnet 
readiness, where the root node SW requirements with IVV recommendations represents 
requirements readiness as function of the desired properties of requirements. Thus, we can 
interpret readiness (1) with respect to individual properties or (2) as a function of all the 
properties. The former allows us to make statements of the form “The requirements are ready at a 
level M with respect to property X1, but not with respect to property X2”. 
 
5. Application to example systems 
5.1 Non-volatile memory load component example 
 
For this system, IV&V analysis was performed mainly for the requirements analysis stage 
and is scenario and inspection based. Since the example provided here is mainly to illustrate our 
approach, we describe analysis of one of the criteria, i.e. completeness, which composes overall 
component readiness. The requirements for the non-volatile memory load component were 
expressed as use-cases and were supplemented with natural language descriptions. In addition to 
use cases, design stage models for the component were also available in terms unified modeling 
language (UML) constructs i.e. class diagrams, statechart diagrams, component diagrams, etc. 
Figure 3 shows the use case diagram of the module and figure 4 shows the natural language 
specifications corresponding to the module from the requirements specifications document.  
 

























 The EX-3-MODULE-1 FSW, in Initialize Mode and Ground Load 
State, shall load data from the ground into non-volatile memory 
upon receiving non-volatile memory load command packets.   
A1. The EX-3-MODULE-1 FSW, upon receipt of an off-SBC 
non-volatile write request, shall append Reed-Solomon parity 
symbols and write the requested data into the specified non-
volatile memory  
A2. The EX-3-MODULE-1 FSW shall load the data given at the 
address specified into non-volatile memory upon receipt of a non-
volatile memory load command. 
 
A2.1. The EX-3-MODULE-1 FSW shall reject the non-
volatile memory load command and report the rejection to 




Figure 4. Natural language specifications for non-volatile memory load operations 
 
5.2 Example analysis 
 
The IV&V analysis procedure was essentially to build a structured use-case description from 
the natural language specifications, with minimum changes to the text of the natural language, so 
as to try and preserve the original intent of the specifications. We believe that organizing the 
natural language into a structured description permits us to identify methodically, missing 
conditions, scenarios and statements with ambiguity. Of course, we may also convert such a 
structured description into formal statements and apply formal analysis to reason about the 
desired properties of the requirements specifications. Table 1 provides metrics which were 
computed once the structured use-cases were constructed. Other techniques such as use-case 




Table 1. Metrics computed on use-case specification 
 







Missing actors Amissing 0 
 ATOTAL = A + Amissing 1 
Normal scenarios NS 1 
Missing normal scenarios NSmissing 1 
 NSTOTAL= NS + NSmissing 2 
Exceptional scenarios ES 1 
Missing exceptional scenarios ESmissing 1 
 ESTOTAL = ES + ESmissing 2 
Operations  2 
Missing operations  ≥ 2 
 OpTOTAL = Op + Opmissing ≥ 4 
Invariant conditions I 0 
Missing invariant conditions Imissing 2 
 ITOTAL= I + Imissing 2 
Pre-conditions PreC 5 
Missing pre-conditions PreCmissing 15 
 PreCTOTAL = PreC + PreCmissing 20 
Post-conditions PostC 3 
Missing post-conditions PostCmissing ≥ 2 
 PostCTOTAL = PostC + PostCmissing ≥ 5 
 




Scale:  (0.0 – 0.2: Very low), (0.2 – 0.4: Low), (0.4 – 0.6: Medium), (0.6 – 0.8: High), (0.8 – 1.0: 
Very high) 
 
Given the metrics computed on the use-case specifications and the BBN constructed from the 
IV&V process model, we may use the BBN which models the activities that evaluate 
completeness of use-cases.  Figure 5 and Table 2 show the BBN model and the evidences 
provided to the BBN, respectively. Essentially, we compute the evidence from the metrics; the 
nodes in the BBN are assigned an initial prior distribution, assuming that child nodes are 
normally distributed as functions of the weighted average of parent nodes. Additionally, a 
variance factor expresses our degree of belief in the priors [6]. 
 
Node Node State  
Exceptional Scenarios 0.4 – 0.5 
Normal Scenarios 0.4 – 0.5  
Actors 0.9 – 1.0 
Operations 0.4 – 0.5  
Post conditions 0.4 – 0.5  
Pre-conditions 0.2 – 0.3 













Given our assumptions of the priors and the evidence obtained from the IV&V analysis, the 
BBN computes the level of completeness for these specifications as approximately Medium, with 
~37% probability. Since the specifications and the design approach uses a model based 
development approach, we provide an initial assumption of High quality for the tools and 
approaches used during the requirements phase.  
Figure 6 shows the BBN model for readiness computed given completeness at level Medium. 
Essentially, we use the BBN of figure 5, to provide evidence into the BBN at the higher level of 
abstraction. Given completeness alone and that other nodes are in an unknown state, Readiness of 
the non-volatile memory load module requirements is between Medium and High.  
To illustrate how the BBN can be used to evaluate readiness given all other properties, we 
make certain assumptions for the other nodes in this BBN. These assumptions are stated in table 
3. For example, we assume that the system requirements have a high quality; the consistency of 
the requirements is medium, whereas the properties of correctness and clarity are in state high. 
We observe that given these assumptions, the BBN computes the readiness of the requirements to 
lie at a High level, with approx. 75% probability (Figure 7).   
 
Table 3: Evidence provided for Readiness analysis 
 
Scale:  (0.0 – 0.2: Very low), (0.2 – 0.4: Low), (0.4 – 0.6: Medium), (0.6 – 0.8: High), (0.8 – 1.0: 
Very high) 
 
Node Prior Node State (Evidence) 
System Requirements N(0.5,0.1) 0.7 – 0.8 (High) 
IV&V Documentation N(0.4,0.1) 0.5 – 0.6 (Medium) 
IV&V Team N(0.5,0.1) 0.7 – 0.8 (High) 
Tools/Approaches N(0.5,0.1) 0.7 – 0.8 (High) 
Prioritized SW Requirements N(0.5,0.1) No evidence 
Consistence  0.5 – 0.6 (Medium) 
Complexity1  0.7 – 0.8 (Low)  
Correct  0.7 – 0.8 (High) 
Complete  0.4 – 0.6 (Medium) 
Clarity  0.7 – 0.8 (High) 
 
                                                 
1 Complexity is measured on the same scale but has an inverse relationship with readiness. Hence higher 





Figure 7. Example analysis of readiness given completeness and other properties 
 
5.3 Fault protection system example 
 
In this section, we apply our methodology to evaluate readiness for a fault protection system 
of the Cassini deep space probe. For this system, lightweight formal methods had been applied by 
Easterbrook et al. [8] at the requirements specification stage, resulting in a finding of 37 issues. 
To summarize these, there were 11 undocumented assumptions, of which some were significant, 
10 cases of inadequate requirements, 9 inconsistency problems, 6 cases of ambiguous 
terminology and 1 logical error. From the details their IV&V process, we provide prior 
distributions for the BBN nodes (table 4).  
 
Table 4. Prior distributions for BBN 
 
Node Prior Node State 
System Requirements N(0.6,0.2) Medium 
IV&V Documentation N(0.75,0.1) High 
IV&V Team N(0.75,0.1) High 
Tools/Approaches N(0.75,0.1) High 
Prioritized SW Req N(0.5,0.1) Medium 
 
Our rationale for using these priors is as follows: the IV&V documentation, and the tools 
used were qualified as having the state High since the application of formal methods provides a 
stronger assurance of detecting potential errors. The state of the node IV&V Team was qualified 
as High since the team performing the analysis had expertise in performing both formal analysis 
as well as IV&V. The prioritized software requirements and system requirements were qualified 
as having the state Medium as we believe that the developers of the requirements have several 
years of domain experience in building space probes. Therefore the requirements would be 






Figure 8. Readiness: fault protection example 
 
Since more information about the particular IV&V process used for this system was 
unavailable, we directly provide evidence to the BBN shown in figure 8. The result of IV&V 
analysis is interpreted as pessimistic evidence and this evidence is used to assess the readiness of 
the fault protection system requirements. In this figure, most of the mass of the distribution of M 
is defined over the interval [0.3-0.5) with more than 50% of the mass in the interval [0.3-0.4) ↔ 
{Low}. The variance of the distribution is also small indicating a greater degree of credibility. 
We feel that this assessment of the readiness level and the decision to revise the requirements (i.e. 
not proceed to the development phase) is consistent with the results of IV&V analysis in 
reference [8]. 
 
6. Related work 
Neil et al. have conducted research on building object-oriented BBN from process models 
[9]. Their work models the underlying process of inference and represents the BBN at a higher 
level of abstraction. Our work differs primarily in modeling an enacted process and building the 
BBN from the parameters of the input entities, and the process itself. To the best of our 
knowledge, readiness assessment in a systematic and quantitative fashion in the context of IV&V 
has not been performed before. Bayesian networks have been used in analyzing software quality 
[10]; however, quality has been assessed in terms of defect content of artifacts. In our work, BBN 
are applied to the IV&V process to estimate readiness in terms of artifact properties. The notion 
of modeling processes is not new [11], however process models have been mainly used to specify 
and simulate processes.  
Our notation is currently simple enough to model dataflow in a process and is sufficient for 
building a BBN. It is straightforward to extend and formalize the model or map it to existing 
process modeling formalisms so as to get the benefits of traditional process models. Additionally, 
we use the process model to analyze how properties of the process and its inputs influence the 




7. Summary and conclusions  
The BBN model constructed from the IV&V process model captures the diverse factors that 
affect the readiness of an artifact. The assessment of readiness is performed by obtaining 
evidence from IV&V analysis and using this data in the BBN model. In the light of evidence, the 
assessment of readiness is updated indicating the likelihood that it is in some particular state.  
The BBN also models the intuitive notion that an informal process is less likely to detect 
errors or issues in an artifact as compared with a process that employs formal methods. This is 
evident from the variance parameter for the readiness distributions, shown in figures 7 and 8. The 
latter has a lower variance indicating that we are more confident in this assessment of readiness 
(as we should be, given that formal methods were used). Thus, the BBN allows using data from 
both formal and informal IV&V processes in analyzing readiness. In practice, since both of these 
are employed in the IV&V of a complete system, the BBN provides an elegant framework to 
aggregate arguments from both sources. Additionally, parameters which influence the IV&V 
process, and in turn the assessment of readiness of the artifact, (such as IV&V documentation, 
appropriateness of the tools or methods used, expertise of the analysts) are also modeled. We can 
measure properties of interest in the artifact and use these easily within the BBN formalism.  
The BBN numerical specification requires an identification of prior probability distributions 
(both conditional and unconditional). These are specified either by elicitation from expert opinion 
or from empirical/ historical data. We assess readiness using the results of IV&V analysis as 
evidence in the BBN. Evidence can be supplied in the form of metrics applicable to artifacts, 
problems found from formal or informal analysis, etc. The BBN is capable of modeling the 
intuitive notion that an informal process is less likely to detect errors or issues in an artifact as 
compared with a process that employs formal methods. We validate the IV&V process model and 
in-turn the BBN model via consultation with IV&V practitioner(s).  
The BBN encodes a comprehensive argument for artifact readiness level, quantifies this 
level, and indicates potential problem areas to the development team/ customer. Thus, the BBN 
structure is a mechanism to formalize (1) the IV&V process and (2) the underlying reasoning 
used to assess readiness. Thus, this approach provides a mathematical basis for the so-called 
“go/no-go” decision. The BBN is versatile enough to model both probabilistic and deterministic 
relations. Consequently, it has greater expressive power compared to a functional form or a 
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Abstract 
This  study examines the code quality for four widely used versions of the UNIX operating system (OS) used by 
industry, government and educational institutions. All four of these operating systems are written primarily in the C 
programming language and run on a variety of different hardware platforms. One system is a commercial derivative 
of System V Release 4 UNIX. Cooperating closely with this particular vendor [Vendor A] we tracked the release 
cycle for this commercial operating system’s kernel from the time the product was first distributed widely to 
industry through its current release. We examined and analyzed over 6.7 million lines of kernel code during the 
history of all major releases of this operating system. The vendor closely cooperated with us, providing defect 
reports on the product that allowed us to better understand the product and to correlate the design and 
implementation with the known defects at the functional level. In addition, we obtained a competitor’s kernel source 
[Vendor B] and compared these two vendor kernel source codes1 to open source OS kernel code to gain some insight 
into how code quality manifests itself in open source kernels versus commercial source kernels. Linux and FreeBSD 
were used as examples of open source kernels for this comparison. One result from our work that generalized across 
operating systems (except Linux) was a common trend in high risk networking code.  Another result that surprised 
us was that the riskiest functions crossed the boundaries of the various subsystems analyzed.  In terms of comparison 
between systems, Linux numbers are dramatically more positive in comparison to the other three OSs. 
INDEX TERMS: Software Metrics, Software Quality, Operating Systems.
                                                                 
1 The names of the vendor products are not identified due to the terms of our research with the respective vendors. 
1.0 Goals and General Approach 
The goal of this research is to objectively measure 
operating system kernel code quality. In this work we 
analyzed the two commercial versions of UNIX and two 
open source kernels.  We seek to assess the quality of 
these systems by observing the evolution of the releases 
of the kernels using objective methodologies. The quality 
of the final product, in this case the operating system 
kernel code, will reflect the level of quality of the 
processes that were used in its construction.   
The approach we used examines the source code through 
the prism of some key static metrics that for procedurally 
intensive kernel code can serve as a powerful predictor of 
risk, maintenance and development effort, error 
proneness, excessive program size, and code optimization 
levels. For example, this type of source code analysis can 
detect the potential likelihood or the risk that errors could 
be latent, the degree of difficulty for maintenance, and/or 
the degree to which the code is cyclomatically complex.  
We use well recognized static software source code 
metrics (ANSI/IEEE standard and derived) for comparing 
and profiling the four operating systems[1]. These metrics 
expose the syntactic associations and relationships in the 
code and the degree to which the code possesses 
predictive risk from a software engineering perspective. 
Finally, for one of the commercial operating system 
releases [Vendor A], we have been able to validate the 
results of the predicted risk analysis with field faults.  
Specifically, the results associate the predicted at-risk 
code with serious defects that occurred at customer sites 
due to the code.   
Our analysis breaks new ground because, to our 
knowledge, correlation of field faults with static metric 
predictors has not been validated at such a large scale as 
in a commercial operating system nor has a direct detailed 
quantitative comparison been made between commercial 
and open source kernels. The analysis also allows us to 
distinguish between the higher quality code and the lower 
quality code; this can be of great value in operating 
system improvement. In addition, the analysis reveals the 
quality of the associated software engineering practices 
and discipline used in the software construction process in 
terms of open source and closed source methods. 
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 2.0 Metrics Approach 
The use of software metrics has been deemed a major 
factor in the transformation of software development from 
an art to an engineering discipline. Despite this, static 
source and instrumented source code analysis has not 
been widely adopted by software developers and 
engineers, nor fully appreciated for its discovery 
properties and predictive profiling abilities.  Predictive 
profiling assists in identifying errors early during the 
development cycle.  Unfortunately, the detection of errors 
late in the development lifecycle process is expensive to 
correct.  Late detection also leads to code that is poorly 
supported and difficult to maintain[2]. 
Software metrics measure specific attributes of a software 
product, including the software development process, in a 
very precise way.  The metrics approach allows us to: 
· Distinguish the higher quality code versus lower 
quality code in each release of the kernel  
· Determine subsystems in the kernel that are of higher 
quality versus lower quality and to observe 
subsystem quality as it evolves over time (trending) 
· Determine the quality of code removed from the 
kernel between releases, to assess quality of code 
added to the kernel in a new release and to assess the 
change in quality between releases based on the code 
added or deleted 
· Correlate the results of the predicted "risk" analysis 
to actual bugs associated with the same code and 
therefore to validate the predictive profiling ability of 
the metrics used in this study 
· Obtain important information concerning the 
associated software engineering practices used to 
construct the software itself 
 
In the next section we review the metrics that we use in 
this study.  Because many will already be familiar with 
these metrics, readers with software engineering 
background may choose to skip this Section 2.2. 
2.1 Software Science Metrics Background 
In the early 1970s, Maurice Halstead of Purdue 
University observed that all computer software programs 
were made up of operators and operands or the key tokens 
in the code[3]. Halstead defined the four parameters upon 
which the rest of his theoretical framework was built: the 
number of unique operators, the number of unique 
operands, the total number of operators and the total 
number of operands.2 Halstead was able to derive a large 
number of relationships from the four basic parameters 
from which the core and extended ANSI/IEEE Software 
Science metrics have been built.  
                                                                 
2 Declarations and specification statements were not part of this count as 
Halstead considered the functional execution code as more important. 
Halstead theorized that a well-written program with n1 
unique operators and n2 unique operands should have a 
length of approximately: 
N^ = [n1 x log2(n1)] + [n2 x log2(n2)] 
From these observations Halstead defined the Purity Ratio 
as the ratio of N^ to the actual length N (i.e., N^/N). A 
Purity Ratio of 1 suggests few impurities exist. It also 
indicates predictively the degree to which more code or 
less code was used to implement the function being 
analyized. More code (P/R < 1) is predictively less well 
optimized, while less code (P/R ratio > 1) is predictively 
better well optimized. 
Another interesting code-level syntactic relationship that 
Halstead developed is called Volume or V. If a program 
has n unique operators and operands or n1 + n2, then it 
would take log2(n) ‘‘bits’’ to uniquely represent each. If 
there are N total usages of those operators and operands, 
then the number of ‘‘bits’’ to represent the program is 
defined as V = N x log2n. Halstead suggested that Volume 
was a reasonable measure of program size. 
Correspondingly, potential volume is a metric for 
denoting the corresponding parameters in an algorithm's 
shortest possible form.  
A derivative of the Volume metric calculates predicted 
errors. People tend to make mistakes, on the average, 
every E0 mental comparisons. Therefore, the number of 
errors (B^), that would be expected in a program would 
be calculated as B^ = [N x log2(n)] / E0.  Thus, the 
number of errors predicted by B^ is simply an estimate of 
how many errors existed in the code upon completion of 
the coding phase. This metric is normally converted to 
predicted errors per thousands of lines of source code 
(KSLOC). 
Another measure suggested by Halstead is the abstraction 
level of a program called L. This metric provides  the 
relationship between Program Volume and Potential 
Volume. Only the most clear algorithm can have a level of 
unity. Halstead also proposed an “L^” metric that could 
be calculated from the basic token parameters. In fact, 
because L^ can be derived from a simple analysis of the 
source program without having to know much about the 
design or application, it is usually used in most studies in 
place of L. More specifically L^ is used when the value of 
Potential Volume  is not known. 
Another related metric is called Effort, or E. Effort is 
based somewhat on Volume, but is ‘‘adjusted’’ to account 
for the level of abstraction at which the program is 
written. Effort is simply E = V / L^. Halstead suggested 
that the Effort measure reflected the “difficulty” of 
converting the specifications for the code or its 
abstraction, into the actual symbolic representation of the 
code for a particular programming language. 
A different approach for assessing program complexity is 
to consider the program’s control flow. A program’s 
control flow is based on the number and arrangement of 
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 decision statements within the code and one of the most 
popular measures in this regard is widely known as the 
McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity[4]. Cyclomatic 
complexity and its associated complexity measures 
measure the structural complexity of a program. 
The cyclomatic number is calculated as follows: V(g) = E 
- N + 2 where N is the number of nodes in the graph, and 
E is the number of edges or lines connecting each node. 
The nodes represent computational statements or 
expressions, and the edges represent transfer of control 
between nodes. 
Additional metrics including executable code counts with 
average per function, line of code counts with average 
number of lines per function, estimated development time 
and average per function, code comment percentages, 
compiler directives and nesting depth levels are also used. 
The maintainability index combines cyclomatic 
complexity with Halstead measures to produce a practical 
measure of maintainability. We use all of these measured 
in this paper.  See Fenton, et al. [12] for additional 
information regarding code metrics. 
2.2 Advantages and Limitations of Metrics for OS 
Source Code Analysis 
The static metrics we used are commonly accepted by the 
software engineering community and the IEEE.  These 
metrics come with many caveat emptors. There are 
widely differing opinions on the worth of Halstead 
measures, ranging from "convoluted... [and] unreliable" 
[13] to "among the strongest measures of maintainability" 
[14].  There is evidence that Halstead measures are useful 
during development, to assess code quality in 
computationally-dense applications[15]. 
Common practice today is to combine measures to suit 
the specific program environment. Most measures are 
amenable for use in combination with others (although 
some overlap). Oman[15] presents a comprehensive list of 
code metrics that are found in maintainability analysis 
work, and orders them by degree of influence on the 
maintainability. These include: 
· lines of code per module  
· lines of comments per module  
· variable span per module  
· lines of data declarations per module  
We therefore selected these as intrinsically reasonable for 
the basis of our analysis.  Certain desirable characteristics 
of the metrics can be identified.  For the most part, the 
metrics we chose were: 
· Simple to understand and comprehend 
· Precisely defined and reproducible 
· Objective, cost effective and informative 
· Automated as much as possible 
· Able to integrate with other measures 
· Appropriate for many different application domains 
· Applicable to the unit of analysis (a function) as 
defined in the programming language 
Nonetheless, there are clear limitations to static code 
analysis. This work is not run-time, executable analysis 
and it will certainly not uncover or discover the majority 
of run-time conditions and faults. Traditional testing, 
instrumenting the source code and compiling, or inserting 
other types of technology in the object code may uncover 
those types of flaws. Therefore, there is clearly a category 
of risk that comes from the dynamic side of an operating 
system and the embedded concurrency in the OS, where 
our metrics provide limited value. 
2.3 Complementary Metrics 
There are some metrics which could complement this 
work that we chose not to use.  Function point measures 
provide a measure of functionality, with some significant 
limitations (at least in the basic function point 
enumeration method); the variant called engineering 
function points adds measurement of mathematical 
functionality that may complement Halstead measures.  
We chose not to use these metrics in order to simplify our 
analysis. 
Our focus is on techniques and methods that allow errors 
to be detected early and methods that can prevent errors 
from arising in the first place.  Techniques to promote a 
better understanding of the system and the location of 
risks while also assisting in the development, test and 
maintenance process are paramount. The metrics we use 
here serve as a powerful predictor of risk, of coupling and 
cohesiveness, maintenance and development effort, error 
proneness, excessive program size, and code optimization 
levels. This source code analysis, despite limitations, can 
detect the potential likelihood or the risk that errors could 
be latent, and/or the degree to which the code is 
cyclomatically complex (decision point/statement 
analysis) and the degree of difficulty for maintenance.   
Hatten indicates[6] that static inspection of software is 
still not practiced often despite considerable evidence of 
its effectiveness when supported by analysis tools and 
software quality engineering techniques.  This work 
bridges this gap. 
2.4 Organization of the Remainder of the Paper 
The remainder of the paper is organized in three sections. 
The first section presents results.  Results are organized 
into five subsections.  In Section 3.0 we discuss the 
methodology for the measurements.  Section 3.1 presents 
the summary results discussing overall characteristics of 
the systems with respect to each of the metrics.  Section 
3.2 discusses predicted error rates of the systems 
analyzed. Section 3.3 and 3.4 discusses subsystem-level 
analysis of the kernels and summarizes subsystem 
complexity and quality across the observed kernels.  The 
section also examines predicted risk profiling at the 
function level for each of the OSs using the Level of 
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 Effort metric. Section 3.4 also discusses the statistical 
correlation of metrics with in-field observations for a 
Vendor A OS therefore validating the measures. Section 
4.0 presents related work and Section 5.0 concludes. 
3.0 Methodology 
In our study we compared several different UNIX kernels 
including commercial and open source, and where 
possible for each kernel, trace its evolution over many 
releases [Vendor A, Linux, and FreeBSD]. Vendor B did 
not provide us with more than one snapshot.  To assist in 
this process, we abstracted the respective kernels from 
each UNIX operating system and placed them in logical 
buckets (or subsystems) as shown in Table 1.  
Every kernel source file was assigned to one subsystem 
and the results of our analysis were applied to each 
discrete subsystem as well as for the entire kernel as an 
aggregate. This approach helped us determine 
characteristic features of those subsystems - which 
subsystems in general are more complex, which 
subsystems are being changed the most during the 
evolution of the kernel and which subsystems were the 
most stable throughout the product’s lifetime.  
The analysis was conducted using SET Labs metrics tools 
previously used in the NSA study[1].  We set the tools to 
ignore compiler directives. Consequently, every line of 
the source code was analyzed even if it was part of 
conditionally compiled code. Experiments were 
conducted to assess the impact of this approach on the 
results.  Our analysis determined that the values of the 
metrics were not significantly changed whether we 
preprocessed the code or not. Another reason to ignore 
compiler directives is that we wanted all the code to be 
analyzed despite configuration or platform differences.   
Once the analysis was completed the results files that 
were generated were analyzed with a set of specially 
created tools for this work. Perl scripts as well as 
commercial statistical analysis packages were used in the 
final analysis. 
3.1 Summary Results 
Table 2 provides summary level results of the analysis of 
the four kernels. Expected threshold ranges for the values 






Subsystem(s) Description of Subsystem 




Generic and some specific file system implementations 
IOmanagement I/O operations and management 
IPC Inter Process Communication implementation 
KernelThreads Light weight processes and SMP implementation 
Mem Memory management, virtual memory, swapping etc. 
NetCommon NetIP 
NetTCP NetUDP 
Implementation of networking management and protocols 
ProcessControl Process creation, scheduling etc. 
RPC Remote Procedure Calls implementation 
Security Authentication implementation, Kerberos support, etc. 
Signals General Unix signals mechanism implementation 
Other Modules which we found difficult to assign to one of the existing buckets 
  Table 1 - Subsystems  Used to Categorize the Study 
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Table 2 - Unix OS Kernel C Code Summary.  Underlined measures represent best of the four releases. 
Table 2 shows some important aspects of these systems.  
In terms of size, Vendor A has a kernel that has roughly 
twice the amount of executable code as Linux or 
FreeBSD.  Both commercial platforms [Vendor A and B] 
have more executable code than their corresponding 
public domain kernel counterparts. Vendor A has 22% 
more functions than Linux.  Vendor B has the fewest 
number of functions. 
In quality metrics Linux 2.4 has the best values for purity 
ratio, level of effort, average cyclomatic complexity, and 
has the lowest average source lines of code per function 
and lowest average number of executable lines. FreeBSD 
is close behind.  At a gross level, this indicates that the 
code we analyzed in both open source operating systems 
and proprietary ones has been fairly well optimized, has 
been carefully coded and is relatively maintainable. 
The four kernels are remarkably similar with respect to 
average predicted errors per thousands of lines of source 
code (KSLOC) and are in the mid to higher “five” range 
(normalized threshold is 3-8 errors per KSLOC), except 
for Vendor B which has a statistically significant lower 
predicted error rate of 4.82 per KSLOC.  
In addition, Vendor B als o has the fewest number of 
functions coupled with the highest percentage of 
comments.  The meaning of these metrics is that the 
Vendor B kernel will have fewer functions to maintain.  
Also, what code there is to be maintained is very well 
commented in comp arison to the other systems we 
examined. 
Our results show that vendor source code can vary in 
quality significantly. For example, Vendor B has the 
fewest functions and the highest percentage of comments, 
but also the highest average number of SLOC. The three 
best metrics from Table 2 are located within the Vendor B 
release and the Linux release has four of the best metric 
values.  Given this “tie” there are clearly no winners in 
terms of quality that consistently produces an overall 
better quality product based on open source or closed 
source methods from the code artifacts we examined. 
With respect to Cyclomatic Complexity, Vendor A and B 
and FreeBSD have an average of 6 while Linux is only 4. 
Linux is clearly much less complex overall than all three 
of the other OSs. In addition, the nesting depth or average 
function calling tree is only 1 for Linux versus 2 for the 
rest. We can infer from these numbers that Linux has a 
more optimized design and tighter cohesion with respect 
to the structure of the code when compared to the others.  
The reader is cautioned before making erroneous 
conclusions that Linux is superior when comparing OSs 
without considering the size of the code base and the 
overall set of features. Linux does not support as wide a 
range of kernel features as found in the commercial 
operating systems and in terms of supported features its 
simplicity manifests itself through a smaller source base 
that is perhaps easier to control and maintain.  Notably 
missing from Linux is support for a journaling file 
system, the ability to name removable devices, support for 
hot plugging, support for enhanced power management 
called ACPI (Advanced Configuration & Power 
Interface), and an improved virtual memory system. 
A comparison of number of lines of code (minus blank 
and comment lines) per function is shown in Table 2.  
Vendor B has the highest average number of lines of code 
per function with 41.64 while the Vendor A averages 
42.67. However, Linux has an average of just under 26 
while FreeBSD averages just over 37. Clearly, both 
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 vendor counts are very similar. However, Linux is the 
most functionally compact code and lowest in complexity 
overall. 
All of the Unix releases have the metrics within threshold 
bounds except for comment percentages. Vendor B is the 
true exception and stands out with a much higher average 
comment percentage than the others, indicating better 
possible maintainability. 
Overall, the commercial vendor metric values are very 
similar. One may be able to surmise that the closed source 
development methodology may have some affect on this 
correlation. We note significant differences between the 
vendors in predicted error rates, number of functions and 
comment percentages. 
3.11 OS Trend Analysis Using Kiviat Diagrams  
Three trend releases over time were selected for the OSs. 
The following releases were chosen: Vendor A release b, 
d, f, and h; Linux releases 1.2, 2.0.01, 2.2 and 2.4; and 
FreeBSD releases 3.4, 3.51, 4.0, and 4.1. The metrics 
used to present this analysis for each subsystem 
considered the number of procedures (functions), purity 
ratio, the number of predicted errors, ratio of errors per 
thousands of lines of source code (KSLOC), average 
volume or program size, semicolon or live code counts; 
average of semicolons per procedure, comment 
percentages, and the number of asserts.  
Figures 1-3 are trend analysis kiviat charts graphically 
representing the indicated metrics within a sampled 
family of OS source code releases and comparing the 
delta changes across these same releases.  
The greatest single trend analysis pattern revealed for 
Vendor A is the significant increase in the number of 
asserts and in the number of overall functions. In fact, the 
number of asserts in release h is almost double the 
number from release f.  Predicted error rates were above 6 
and have held below 6 since release b. Since release b the 
amount of code has almost tripled reflecting substantial 
increases in the networking related subsystems. The 
number of total functions for the release h is 







Figure 1 – Multiple Trend Analysis for Vendor A  
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Figure 2 – Multiple Trend for Linux 
 
Figure 3– Multiple Trend for FreeBSD 
percentages have held steady in the 27 percent range. 
However, estimated level of effort development hours 
have ranged from 1.24 down to 1.08 (rel d) and back up to 
1.32 (rel h) on average per function overall across all 
subsystems indicating higher optimization levels with the 
use of fewer operators and operands in later releases. 
For Linux the trend is quite clear. Every release has 
resulted in a number of quality improvements over time. 
For example, volume, lines of code, complexity, level of 
effort and predicted errors have dropped. Level of effort 
averages per function have dropped from 0.80 estimated 
hours to 0.50 estimated hours per function. Estimated 
cyclomatic complexity has gone from 6 in release 1.2 to 4 
in release 2.4. The average amount of source lines of code 
per function has dropped from just over 41 to just under 
35. Program size or volume numbers have also declined 
significant by almost a third and this in the face of 
significant increases in the number of functions and 
amount of code. Of note is the huge increase in the 
number of asserts since the releases beginning with 2.x. 
Most of this assert increase has been in the common net, 
process control, net, and netIP subsystem code. 
Figure 3 shows the remarkable stability of FreeBSD 
overall. With the exception of total number of functions 
(increased by some 40%), the delta shift for the rest of the 
metrics is quite small when compared to the other OSs. 
This may reflect a very mature design and highly 
cohesive and loosely coupled code. 
3.2 Predicted Error Rate Summary Trends                          
Much of the analysis we conducted focuses on the 
predicted error rates of the various OS releases. Empirical 
validation for these predicted error rates is discussed in 
Section 3.42 and we revisit this topic to evaluate predicted 
error rate trends at the functional level in Section 3.4.  
This section focuses on summary-level analysis of this 
metric for an entire OS release across numerous releases. 
The IEEE predicted error rate algorithm (B^) was used for 
this calculation and then graphed to reveal the trend lines 
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 between releases (See [5]). The number of errors 
predicted by B^ is simply an estimate of the number of 
predicted errors in the code upon completion of the 
coding phase for that software. This predicted error rate is 
normalized based on the number and distribution of 
operators and operands used in the code. 
Figures 4-6 presents predicted error rates for the baseline 
version of the code and all new functions added or 
removed from the base code between releases. Generally 
accepted threshold ranges for predicted errors are 3-8 
errors predicted per thousands of lines of code (KSLOC). 
Overall predicted error rates for the Vendor A releases 
from version C have steadily declined until the last 
release (see Figure 4). Analysis indicates that several 
changes and updates took place within this las t release. 
Overall Vendor A releases (other than the last release) 
have leveled out in the mid to upper 5 range for predicted 
errors per KSLOC. But even this last release from Vendor 
A is just below 6 for predicted errors. Also note that 
Vendor A “new” and “removed” code is more error prone 
than the base code while the same is not true for Linux.  
In fact, there is actually more "volatility" in the predicted 
error rates for the newly added code in Linux (see Figure 
5). Although within range (other than for the earliest 
releases) we observe that for the last couple of releases 
the volatility is much lower with a significant 
improvement in the predicted error (well below 6). With 
the exception of these two releases, the overall predicted 
error rates for Linux are essentially the same as Vendor A 
although there are more fluctuations in the quality of new 
and removed code in Linux in these metrics. 
FreeBSD is very stable in predicted error rates and the 
new and removed code error rates are quite close. The 
overall error rate for the four FreeBSD releases is well 
below 6 and the last release has all the new and removed 
code error rates very near the base rate.  Notably, as well, 
Vendor B has the lowest overall predicted error rate for 
all of the OSs with 4.83 and a rate that is well under 5. 
This is nearly a full point or more lower than all three of 
the other OSs predicted error rates.     
In summary, FreeBSD and Vendor A have new and 
removed code that is higher in predicted errors than the 
base, but Linux has removed code and added code that 
often is better than the base but also just as likely to be 
worse than the base. In other words, Linux has both 
higher and lower error rates for removed and added 
code but Vendor A and FreeBSD are 
producing/removing code with more consistency than 
Linux. However, the last major 2.2 release and the 2.4 
release both have removed and added code above the 
base rate. This would suggest that the review process 
for Linux is much broader in scope than the other OSs, 
and especially for the releases earlier than 2.2 and that 
earlier often resulted in less error prone code as the OS 
development base evolved over time. 
3.3 Selected Critical Subsystem Analysis per OS 
For the subsystem analysis between and within OSs, the 
IO Management, Kernel Threads and Net subsystems 
were compared.  Figures 7 through 11 sample some of the 
metrics that changed the most over time across the OSs. 
Note that the same releases were tracked as used in 
Section 4.21.  
Figure 7 reveals that the both the commercial and open 
source OS code have realized significant size increases 
over time in the Net subsystem arena. Vendor A has a 
large increase in the number of functions over time 
devoted to the Net subsystem particularly between the 
third trend release and the last. 
One interesting observation is that FreeBSD has the 
greatest number of lines of code for the Net subsystem. 
Vendor A and Vendor B are very similar in size for earlier 
releases. Linux has the fewest number of lines of code for 
this subsystem. This suggests to us that the networking 
code for Linux had been elevated in priority for 
development effort in latter releases like 2.4.  In fact, we 
later found out that Version 2.4 of Linux had substantive 
development effort in this area by adding threading 
support to the networking code. 
Figure 8 shows the number of asserts in Vendor A’s 
kernel.  The trend across the lifecycle of Vendor A’s 
kernel is that the number of asserts is greatest in IO 
Management, followed by network code, and followed by 
Kernel Threads. Vendor A makes extensive use of asserts 
throughout much of their code base. 
Profiling asserts can be quite valuable in understanding 
where development effort is occurring or where likely 
instabilities can be found.  The selected subsystems 
profiled show significant growth rates in asserts 
suggesting the subsystems profiled are being actively 
developed, debugged and scrutinized for errors by the 
developers. 
Figure 9 focuses on Vendor A.  It reveals the code growth 
over multiple releases for the IO Management, Kernel 
Threads, and Net subsystems. The fourth trend release 
indicates a significant increase in the amount of Net code. 
The figure also shows modest code growth increases in 
the IO management and the Kernel Threads subsystems. 
Figure 10 gives the predicted errors per KSLOC for the 
networking subsystem. Some of the highest risk for all the 
OSs is in the networking area. Figure 11 shows that 
Vendor A, Vendor B and Linux are very similar in 
predicted errors with FreeBSD having the fewest overall 
predicted errors. 
Overall, the networking subsystems (Netcommon, NetIP, 
NetUPD, etc.) are generally the most complex, followed 
by IO Management and Process Control and carry a lot 
more code, but even this can vary between OSs.  Observe 
the correlation between code size increases in the
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 Figure 4 - Vendor A  Predicted Error Rates (per KSLOC)
Figure 5 - Linux Predicted Error Rates (per KSLOC) 
            




























   
Figure 7 -Trend of Lines of Code in Networking  
 











Net Subsystem Source Lines of Code Trend Analysis
Vendor A 32124 36417 48539 114271
Linux 20451 42793 111072 148313











Assert Analysis for Vendor A (Selected Subsystems)
IO Management 1924 2472 2332 6124
Kernel Threads 133 187 209 504
Net 20 98 345 1303
Vendor A
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 Figure 9 - Vendor A code Growth Trends   
 










Predicted Errors per KSLOC for Net Subsystem
Vendor A 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.8
Linux 5.6 5.8 6 6.3











Vendor A Lines of Code Trend Analysis for Selected Subsystems
IO Management 1924 2472 2332 6124
Kernel Threads 7825 12027 12356 19301





        
   Figure 11 - Subsystem Risk Analysis Across OSs  
networking area in Figure 10 and predicted errors in 
Figure 11. 
We also wanted to assess the degree of risk posed by the 
subsystems based on the Level of Effort metric. The 
Effort metric predictively reveals the degree of code 
change in "velocity and acceleration" over time and the 
relative magnitude of instability and error proneness in 
the software.   It is also a very strong indicator of 
development implementation "time" by the engineers.  
Figure 12 is a "ribbon" chart showing highest risk 
subsystems across OSs based on average estimated level 
of effort converted to hours.  For Figure 12 the 
normalized summary risk threshold values for subsystems 
are as follows: Anything over 7.0 is at highest risk, 
between 4.5-7 is at risk, from 2-4.5 is borderline risk and 
below 2.0 is within bounds. 
Figure 12 shows the predicted ris k subsystem trend for 
highest average estimated level of effort in hours. Highest 
risk code is in the NetTCP area for Vendor A, B, and 
FreeBSD. Linux does not have any subsystem code at 
risk. For NetTCP Vendor B has the highest predicted risk 
with 13.6. FreeBSD is 9.71, Vendor A is 6.07, and Linux 
is 0.88.  
Across all subsystems the highest estimated number for 
Linux is Fsufs with 1.62; Vendor A is NetTCP with 6.07, 
Vendor B is NetTCP with 13.6, FreeBSD is NetTCP with 
9.71.  The general observation is that for predicted risk, 
networking code stands out followed by the Security 
subsystem for FreeBSD. Everything else is well within 
scope and all OS have similar patterns.  Table 3 
summarizes this data. 
Operating 
System 








Net UDP 5.45 
Net 2.62 
Vendor B 





Linux filesystem code UFS 1.62 
Table 3 - Summary of Findings in Risk Analysis  
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 The Linux numbers are significantly lower overall in 
comparison to the other three OSs. Based on our analysis 
over 150 million lines of code across many domains we 
have never seen a source code base of this size and 
functionality with as few “at risk” subsystems. This 
speaks well for the open source development method that 
is producing code with low numbers in estimated level of 
effort development times and reflects higher quality. 
For Table 3 the Level of effort number was used to sort 
the list of functions for each OS across the four trend 
releases (with the exception of Vendor B) and determine 
the highest predicted level of risk with respect to error 
probability. 
To summarize, the goal of this part of the analysis is to 
identify the subsystems at risk and therefore to identify 
code to operating systems designers for improved design 
and coding practices in the future.  The risk analysis 
findings show a common trend that the networking code 
is the code at highest risk across all operating systems 
analyzed exc ept Linux.  Given the complexity of memory 
management code, process control, scheduling, virtual 
memory and a number of other subsystems in the kernel, 
this result is extremely significant.  Networking code has 
been the source of changes for support of common new 
Internet standards including Ipv6; the growth of network 
functions and significant changes in this subsystem is 
evident across the various operating systems analyzed and 
supported by our results in Figure 7.  Thus, our results 
show that networking code is evolving significantly and 
may pose higher risk to the stability of the kernel than 
many other more mature subsystems that often have been 
thought of as having very tricky or complex kernel code.   
Figure 13 - Predicted Risk Functions
3.4 Function Level Risk Analysis (Level of Effort) 
In this section we again use level of effort metric to 
evaluate kernel functions. The analysis provides the 
highest risk code at the function/procedure level based on 
the sorted Level of Effort metric.  The results are meant to 
identify the weakest “links” in the kernel that should be 
considered for code scrappage and/or reimplementation. 
 3.4.` Methodology  
Table 4 shows the breakpoints for classifying the code 
qualitatively based on our extensive past operational 
experience with this metric on other application-level 
source code. The values differ in Table 4 from those used 
in Figure 12 because the raw values are used to establish 
these thresholds where Figure 12 normalizes the value to 
level of effort in average hours per function. A paper that 
uses a similar approach and this metric is used in work of 
one of the coauthors[11]. 
Risk Factor Effort Value 
Extremely high predicted risk  >= 10,000,000 
Very high predicted risk  >=2,000,000 
High predicted risk >= 750,000 
Borderline risk  >= 200,000  
Table 4 - Risk Categories: Level of Effort Thresholds  
We determined the highest predicted risk functions by 
sorting the individual functions for all kernel functions for 
all OSs by the Level of Effort metric. We generated a 













Predicted Risk (Sorted Level of Effort)
Vendor A Release g Linux 2.4 Vendor B FreeBSD 4.1
Vendor A Release g 12 92 317 1460
Linux 2.4 0 11 86 532
Vendor B 6 83 220 918
FreeBSD 4.1 1 37 174 791
>=10Million >=2Million >=750,000 >=200,000
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3.42 Predicting Functional Risk in OS Code 
Based on Table 4 we wanted to gain an understanding of 
the distribution of the predicted risk functions.  We 
statistically sorted these functions based on the level of 
effort metric across the four latest “sampled” releases.  
Figure 13 shows the distribution of functions that 
exceeded the normalized maximum threshold for each 
range. We began our analysis by observing that Linux 
does not have any functions that are extremely high in 
predicted risk and by far has the lowest number of 
predicted risk functions when compared to the others. 
Vendor B and Vendor A are quite similar in ratio of 
predicted risk code to threshold values.   Finally,  





































Table 5  - Top ten Vendor A (rel f) Predicted Highest 
Risk Functions.  * functions are functions with one or 
more actual defects associated with the function 
 
FreeBSD is second behind Linux in the lowest number of 
predicted risk functions per threshold range. Our limited 
sample suggests that the open source development 
process results in a much lower number of predicted risk 
code overall when compared to commercially developed  
code.   
Table 5 shows the riskiest predicted functions for Vendor 
A Release f. The raw data shows that there are 16,423 
individual functions with 345 ctl functions in the kernel; 
these functions are identified as ctl functions by having 
“ctl” as part of the function name.  Thus, ctl functions 
represent 2.1% of the kernel functions.  Despite the small 
percentage of these functions, several of these functions 
were predicted at highest risk.  Four of the 10 predicted 
high risk functions presented in Table 5 are ctl functions 
and 2 of the four ctl functions marked with an asterisk had 
one or more defects.   
Of the general population of functions (16,423) only 6.9% 
had actual defects.  Thus, we could expect only 24 ctl 
functions of the 346 would have defects based on the rate 
in the general population.  Interestingly, our results show  
for the 41 ctl functions (11.8%) have defects which 
indicates the tools are predicting functions with higher 
risk and higher actual defect rates. The io and network 
subsystem contains many of these functions.   
This result is not entirely surprising since ctl functions are 
well-known for a variety of loopholes to alter kernel 
variables or parameters.  Thus, the analysis shows in 
addition to identifying certain high risk subsystems, 
certain classes of high risk functions also exist in Unix 
kernels. 
3.43 Maintainability Metrics 
Coleman, et al.[10] points out that Halstead’s volume and 
effort metrics were the best predictors of maintainability. 
Experiments showed that the regression model that was 
most applicable was a four-metric polynomial based on 
Halstead’s effort metric and on metrics measuring 
extended cyclomatic complexity, lines of code and 
number of comments[10].  We used this metric to 
evaluate the functions in Vendor A’s kernel.  Specifically, 
a comprehensive highest predicted risk evaluation was 
conducted including the calculation of a Maintainability 
Index (MI) for the code (the lower the number the less 
maintainable). 
This MI is desirable both as an instantaneous measure of 
maintainability for the code and as a predictor of 
maintainability over time. The ability to measure and 
track maintainability is intended to help reduce or reverse 
a software systems tendency toward "code entropy" or 
degraded integrity, and for the purposes of reengineering, 
to indicate where it might be cheaper and/or less risky to 
rewrite the code than to change it[16].  
 
The basic MI takes the form of a polynomial in the 







aveV = avg Halstead Volume V per module 
(pgm size) 
aveV(g') = avg extended cyclomatic complexity 
per module (Myer¹s Complexity)  
aveLOC = the average count of lines of code 
(LOC) per module; and, optionally 
perCM = average percent of lines of comments 
per module 
 
Table 6 shows results that closely match results in Table 
5.   
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Table 6  - Top ten Vendor A (rel f) Least maintainable 
functions using Coleman Maintainability metric 
(polynomial) 
3.43 Validating Functional Risk in OS Code   
To confirm our measurements of the quality of the source 
code and its correlation with operational defects, we 
empirically validated predicted risk by examining the 
function level bug fixes mapped to the predicted error 
values for Vendor A’s OS release f. Release f is not the 
most recent version of the kernel, but it is a version that 
allows us to validate predictive measures with data the 
vendor has gathered.  Thus, working in close cooperation 
with Vendor A, we developed a tool that examines the 
whole source tree of the product (one of the UNIX 
version control systems) and extracts all of the bug fixes 
that were made to the product in a specific version down 
to individual functions within a source code file. 
The defect extraction information was made based on the 
record in the history of the version control system. 
Vendor A provided us with the complete history of 
changes the developers made along with the workspace 
for this earlier version of their OS and we were able to 
extract the number of distinct “fixes” for individual 
functions. These fixes are certain classes of faults that 
have a much higher priority to the vendor and are called 
escalations. These faults are serious enough that VendorA 
invests a large amount of time and money in the 
correction of these defects and subsequently must produce 
patches to correct them. The actual escalation events that 
do occur in the field and this level of sensitive data has 
never, to our knowledge, ever been provided for an 
analysis of this kind that correlates static predictive 
measures at the source code with actual field faults in 
operating systems. 
Table 7 data compares the predicted highest risk functions 
with the actual escalations from Vendor Release f.  
Release f for Vendor A contained 16,423 individual 
functions. Of these functions, 1,148 (or 6.9% of the total 
number of functions) had at least one escalation assigned 
to it.  A number of functions had multiple escalations for 
the same function (multiple defects caused by the same 
function) for a total of 2,625 individual escalations. The 
table shows a summary of the percentage of functions 
predicted to be at highest risk and how well the prediction 
matched the escalation data. 
Note that the predicted risk functions for the highest risk 
factor category has a 100% hit rate, 33% for the next 
highest category, 29% for the third category and 22% for 
the fourth category. There are 728 escalations that map to 
the predicted risk functions representing 28% of the total 
number of escalations. The remaining 1897 escalations 
fall in the 14,223 functions not found at risk using our 
metrics.  One way to interpret the result is that very weak 
links in the code base predicted statically should be fixed 
before deploying the code otherwise the increased cost of 
an escalation will be paid.  The tools identified riskiest 
functions accurately. 
 











# of  
Vendor A 
Escalations                
(one to one) 
Successful 
Predictions 
(hit rate)  







>= 10M 3 3 100% 7 
2) Very high  >=2M 66 22 33% 73 
3) High  >= 750K 202 58 29% 178 
4) Borderline >= 200K  929 202 22% 570 
Total  1200 285 24%  728 

























   Figure 14 - Distribution of Vendor A Release F Escalations Across Functions (Sized by Level of Effort)
 
3.43 Analysis of Escalation Data 
The escalation data analysis itself shows some interesting 
results.  Bugs in software and the associated subsequent 
changes and fixes to the same code are not usually 
distributed equally and tend to cluster. The above graph 
demonstrates this quite well in showing the clustering 
effect of the escalations around certain sets of OS 
functionality. 
 Figure 14 displays the Vendor A Release f escalation 
clustering where “bubble” size is determined by the Level 
of Effort metric.  Specifically, the functions were sorted 
by the directory pathname in alphabetical order and then 
mapped against Vendor A escalations. The clustering of 
the escalations is given by the functions on the x-axis 
based on the alphabetical order of the functions and their 
containing directories in which the functions appear in the 
kernel.  
Interestingly, not all escalations are distributed evenly in 
Vendor A’s Release f OS source code base. Results show 
the clear tendency for certain escalations to cluster around 
certain sets of functions in certain subdirectories. Each 
expanded oval represents the number of escalations 
associated with a given set of functions sorted by 
directory pathname. The higher the “floating” bubbles are 
in escalations and size, the greater the risk the sets of 
functions pose to the OS baseline. Our analysis of the 
alphabetical ordering with the subsystems delineation 
used in this paper indicates that clustering is primarily 
part of the io and tcp subsystems. 
Overall results show a significant correlation between the 
actual bugs and the level of effort rates and reveals that 
the predicted level of effort metric is well correlated to the 
actual escalation events that occurred in terms of 
clustering. The data also shows the age-old software 
dilemma based on Pareto’s Law where 20% of the code 
contains 80% of the errors and 2.5-5% of the code 
predictively contains 95% of the most critical errors. 
In overall significance, Table 7 and Figure 14 shows that 
static software metrics are a powerful predictor for the 
developer.  The metrics can help identify error prone code 
before the software is tested and even compiled. The 
validation of this result has profound impact in the 
evaluation of large, frequently changing source code 
bases where manual inspection is not a reasonable option, 
peer review of code may not be feasible for the entire 
code base, and automated tools must be used.  
4.0 Related Work 
There have been few studies conducted that analyze the 
quality of operating system source code at the kernel level 
using classic static software engineering metrics. In 
Henry, et.al.[7] the authors present the results from a 
source code analysis of the UNIX operating system. The 
paper focuses on the use of the metrics and shows that 
there is a high correlation between "Volume", "Effort" and 
"Cyclomatic Complexity" in the analyzed code.   
Significant results were also presented in Schneidewind 
and Hoffman [8]. The authors proved that the propensity 
to make programming errors and the rates of error 
detection are dependent on program complexity. 
Knowledge of these factors can be used to avoid error-
prone structures in software design and to devise a testing 
strategy based on the anticipated difficulty of error 
detection and correction.  
Significant relationships were also found between 
complexity measures (McCabe's Cyclomatic Complexity) 
and error characteristics. Similar results were reported in 
Ward’s work[9]. HP's Waltham Division showed success 
with software defect prevention using McCabe's 
Cyclomatic Complexity metric. The study specifically 
showed that McCabe’s metric provided automatic 












Vendor A Release F Escalation Clustering Sorted by Directory Files (Alphabetical)
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testing was started, the metric identified code modules 
that could benefit from code inspections, the metric 
provided for a means to have well-defined coding 
standards accepted throughout the lab, and it established 
effective code defect prevention strategies based on the 
restructuring of overly complex code.  
Coleman, et al.[10] demonstrate how automated software 
maintainability analysis can be useful.  Their work 
focuses on quantifying maintainability by calculating a 
“degree of fit” from a table of acceptable metrics ranges.  
When the metric value falls outside of the optimum range, 
it indicates that maintainability is lower; hence, there is a 
deviation (or penalty) on the components contribution to 
maintainability.  The optimum range value, called the 
trigger point range, reflects the “goodness” of the 
program style.  The authors evaluated approximately 50 
regression models in an attempt to identify simple models 
that could be calculated fro m existing tools and still are 
generic enough to apply to a wide range of software 
systems.  These metrics were used at the component level, 
subsystem level and whole system level to evaluate and 
compare software much in the way we have done in this 
paper. The authors state that in spite of research that has 
moved away from using Halstead metrics, all tests clearly 
indicated that Halstead’s volume and effort metrics were 
the best predictors of maintainability for the test data 
evaluated.  Experiments showed that the regression model 
that was most applicable was a four-metric polynomial 
based on Halstead’s effort metric and on metrics 
measuring extended cyclomatic complexity, lines of code 
and number of comments.   
Finally one of the coauthors presents an ext ensive 
overview of how to measure software quality[11]. To 
ensure cost-effective delivery of high-quality software, 
the National Security Agency analyzed code bases of 
more than 25 million lines of code. This case study 
illustrated the benefits of code-level measurement 
activities. 
We are not aware of published studies that have looked at 
the quality of large amounts of operating system software 
code using the software engineering metrics we selected. 
It is of extreme significance to the operating system 
community to have a firm understanding of where kernel 
code tends to be complex and significantly more difficult 
to maintain throughout the product release cycle. This in 
turn can generalize to allow research to focus on 
simplifying design in these areas and for improving 
coding practices on the more complex portions of the 
kernel. 
In order to gain an understanding of how well a software 
system such as the operating system kernel is actually 
coded in terms of code quality, our research group used 
standardized tools that have been used to assess code 
quality. Our study assesses kernel releases in a systematic 
manner tracking the improvements in discrete 
components and correlates quality improvements between 
different versions and different components. Over 10 
million lines of code were analyzed and results are 
presented here of one vendor’s operating system kernel 
over several releases, another vendor’s source code (one 
snapshot) and two public domain versions of operating 
system kernels, namely Linux and FreeBSD through their 
evolution.  
5.0 Conclusion  
The paper presents the first analysis we are aware of that 
shows a strong correlation between the classic static IEEE 
metrics and actual escalations events evaluated at the 
functional level and summary level.  We have been able 
to obtain traditionally sensitive data for this paper that has 
not been made available to the public and this data has 
provided significant results that are sweeping in scope due 
to the validation with “in field” defect data.  The paper 
showed that the level of effort and associate predicted 
error and complexity metrics identified the riskiest code 
functions remarkably well.  Consequently, this can allow 
developers to provide for important resource allocation 
for testing and modification of the higher predicted error 
source code before it is deployed in the field.   
From an operating systems standpoint, the results are 
significant because the correlation pertains to operating 
system source code, was analyzed on a commercial 
vendor’s source base, and appears to have exceptionally 
strong practical significance for large, frequently 
changing codes where manual inspection is not a 
reasonable option.   
The metrics used can assist in the development of better 
quality operating systems code because it is much cheaper 
to fix and update risky code early in the development 
cycle instead of waiting until the code is deployed later.  
In fact, a well-known conservative industry average is 
$10,000 per bug to fix code defects once the code is 
deployed in the field.  The static metrics can provide a 
direct bottom-line impact on the containment of 
escalating costs associated with operating systems 
maintenance before defects escape downstream in the 
development cycle and become expensive to fix.   
An exceptionally surprising result from our work that 
generalized across operating systems (except Linux) was 
a common trend in high risk networking code.  Given the 
complexity of memory management code, process 
control, scheduling, virtual memory and a number of 
other subsystems in the kernel, this result is extremely 
significant.  Our results show that networking code is 
evolving significantly as new standards emerge and may 
pose higher risk to the stability of the kernel than many 
other more mature subsystems that often have been 
thought of as having very tricky or complex kernel code.  
Another result that surprised us was that the riskiest 
functions crossed the boundaries of the various 
subsystems analyzed.  Various ctl functions floated to the 
top of functions highest at risk when all subsystems were 
aggregated and analyzed.  The risky values associated 
with the ctl functions seems obvious once one considers 
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these functions purpose, their overall functionality, and 
the potential risk they pose to operational stability. 
In terms of comparison between systems, Linux numbers 
are dramatically more positive overall in comparison to 
the other three OSs. Although this kernel is small, it is of 
exceptionally high quality.  Based on our analysis over 
150 million lines of code across many domains we have 
never seen a source code base of this size and 
functionality with as few “at risk” functions per code size. 
The quality of commercial versus open source systems is 
difficult to assess based on this "limited sample" because 
the scope of the open source system was more limited in 
functionality than the commercial ones.  However, a very 
good indicator of the methodology differences appeared 
in our analysis of new and removed code during the 
kernel trend profiling we performed.   
In summary, FreeBSD and Vendor A have new and 
removed code that is higher in predicted errors than the 
base, but Linux has removed code and added code that is 
both better and worse than the base.  Thus, Linux has both 
higher and lower error rates for removed and added code 
but Vendor A and FreeBSD are producing and removing 
only inferior code with more consistency than Linux. Our 
conclusion here is that the review process for Linux may 
be much broader in scope than the other OSs.  Code is 
removed from Linux to improve it regardless of the fear 
that some good code is being discarded and consequently 
this often resulted in less error prone code as the kernel 
base evolved over time. 
Overall, the results of this study have provided new 
information to the OS and software engineering 
community on many dimensions.  We hope the results 
will be useful in improving the quality of operating 
systems source code, in containing maintenance costs, 
and in establishing the use of predictive analysis with 
profiling metrics to predict field faults and vendor 
escalations before they actually occur. 
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